









# BRITISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS



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BY

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WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY  
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## PREFACE

This book is an exploration into the present relations of the British and American peoples as influenced by their conceptions of each other, with a brief reference to a few of the historical events which are somewhat responsible. To give a complete and authoritative history of British-American relations from the beginning should be the work of a learned and skilled historian. To present a profound study of the psychology and philosophy of the two nations would be possible, if to anyone, only to the professorial authority. The author is neither. He is merely an American whose remote ancestors were British and whose forbears helped in their various ways in the building up of the American Republic from its earliest beginnings and through its periods of greatest trial. He has lived long enough in the heart of British life to grasp what he believes to be the vital principle in the successful conduct of the international affairs of the present and future — to wit, the hearty and practical co-operation of the two English-speaking nations. Mutual compliments and sentimentality have done as much to retard a complete understanding as the more apparently dangerous diplomatic disagreements. Conditions must be faced as they are. Intelligent frankness, honesty and a subsidence of mutual suspicion will accomplish in the end, by the very strength of the natural bonds between the two nations, what cannot be reached through more or less premature negotiation. What is here written is a record of impressions carefully revised from time to time through years of intimate residence among both peoples.

J. D. WHEEPLY.

LONDON, 1st November 1923.



## INTRODUCTION

I am glad of this book. Nowadays so much is written upon British-American relations which apparently relies for its reaction upon subtle distinctions and finely spun argument that it is refreshing to find an author who deals with simple verities and couches what he says of them in speech direct and intelligible that he who runs may read.

The eyes of the English-speaking peoples were never so contemplatively turned toward the relations between our two great stocks. In the present turmoil and travail of the world interest has caught and centred as never before upon the idea and the hope of British-American co-operation for the peace and economic well-being of its distracted populations. It is well that this is so. No other two modern nations can look back over so long a past of continuous and parallel development of democratic institutions and government. If democratic institutions are in our day to win in the struggle for human freedom, it will be because Great Britain and the United States of America have made the victory possible.

And if what has already been accomplished in this co-operation is to deepen and broaden for the future we must strive to understand each other, trust to candour rather than to euphemism, and do our best to root out the illusions upon which have been based so many disappointments in the past.

The author of this book points out not only the deceptive contrasts presented by the systems and habits of thought of our two peoples, but their fallacious likenesses, showing that misunderstanding breeds alike from both.

Truly what is supremely needed—and what Mr Whelpley's vision sees paramount—is that “unflagging optimism of those in each generation who are doing what they can to bring the two great English-speaking nations into close and more permanently and widely co-operative relations.” And our belief in the future and our faith in what it holds for us both must be,



after all, based upon the bed-rock of racial character and sympathy. This is the true call of the blood. If these two great peoples, in stress and in rejoicing, are to grow closer, it will be through the operation of this instinct, than which no other is more deeply rooted in man's nature.

EMBASSY OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

LONDON, *2nd November 1923.*

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## CHAPTER I

### NATURAL ALLIES

**I**N the days of general illiteracy any two or more Governments could make an alliance or bring about a working entente such as would accomplish many of the results expected of an alliance. In the present day no two Governments can make a real alliance or bring about an effective entente without the approval and consent of a majority of their respective peoples. This being the natural result of the increasing prevalence of more or less representative forms of government and more widespread literacy, it follows that the real and binding force of an alliance or an entente must now emanate from the people themselves rather than from an executive Government, no matter how much freedom of action is given that Government by its constitutional structure. In other words, the nations themselves now dictate to a larger degree than heretofore their international affiliations, the active treaty-making powers of their respective Governments obeying, evading or nullifying these mandates as best they may, according to their power, their secret designs and the quality of their stewardship.

The days when a small governing class or autoeracy conducted the foreign affairs of a nation without effort to ascertain the will of a majority of that nation and without going through even the form of securing a mandate from that majority have passed in many countries where such procedure was once common. Even in countries where the constitutional form of government required from the beginning that the will of the people not only be expressed but followed after having been determined, the nation is consulted with more seriousness than it was in earlier times. In all of the countries with modernised government—that is, countries where the people select their own representatives—the nations have taken over the conduct of their foreign relations, and the Governments

thereof are but the executives of the people's will. To arrive therefore at the possibilities and probabilities of any proposed international alliance or entente it is necessary to consider the nation in part and as a whole, and not merely the personality of some ruler or leader or that of some group of politicians who may be in power for the moment. This does not mean, of course, that in all such countries the people direct their Governments in the details of the management of foreign affairs, but it is safe to assume that in larger questions of policy and commitments a representative Government will adapt itself to popular opinion in the matter of foreign relations. When it fails to do this it ceases to be representative, and at the first opportunity given the voters will register their disapproval, thus furnishing a practical guide to those who succeed as to what is required of them.

It is notorious that even the largest and comparatively most advanced self-governing nations are often insensibly led into certain ways of thinking through skilful leadership, a well-directed Press, accomplished propaganda agencies, or even through current events which direct public opinion notwithstanding the superficiality of their significance and their lack of relation to fundamental conditions. These current events may originate in mistakes of Government or unfortunate conditions which bring about an act of expediency antagonistic to the public opinion of some other nation, thus causing apparent alienation of sympathy. Fundamental conditions are not changed by such divergencies of opinion, though they may at the time cause two peoples to come into sharp disagreement. It is below all these surface currents and beyond the affairs of the moment that the analyst of international relations must go to arrive at the foundations which will clearly indicate the possibility or the impossibility of a real entente between two peoples.

The change which has come about in the method of conducting the foreign affairs of nations—that is to say, the change from the Star Chamber method to that of the open forum—brings with it far-reaching consequences and great and complex questions of government, especially in Europe. It has absolutely destroyed the older system of diplomacy. There are still men in power in the high councils of the European

Powers, who have not fully sensed this change. They were born and bred in the older school and cling to the old formulas. This is not a matter of age and experience only, for there are young as well as old reactionaries. It is a mental state due largely to education and environment and also to a certain rigidity of mind which the older systems of Government brought about among those who made governing the profession of a lifetime.

• It was possible in the days before the people had to be taken into the confidence of the Government for alliances and ententes to be arranged, the details of which remained secret and the human psychologies of which were negligible. These arrangements were for offensive and defensive purposes, to maintain balances of power, to offset the growing strength of rivals, and not infrequently to get a potential enemy into a position where activities could be watched and possibly controlled. This was the big game played by a select few to their own entertainment and sometimes to their profit. Patriotic and conscientious statesmen played for the benefit of their own countries respectively, finding their reward in dignified occupation, exalted position and personal power. There was a fatal flaw in this system, however, which developed in proportion as democratic beliefs made headway among the people. Quite frequently the nation was called upon to furnish large armies to support the position taken by the Government in regard to which the nation had previously hardly been consulted, and the taxpayers found their burden suddenly increased for causes with which they had no previous concern.

As illiteracy decreased and a sense of revolt grew, the people discovered their disbelief, not only in the divine right of kings, but in the existence of a divine right of Government, such as was assumed by the few who directed public affairs. The question as to which is theoretically the most perfect form of government for the ultimate good of a nation is not an issue, for the people of to-day demand and will only have a Government in which they are adequately represented, and they also insist that all important questions arising in home and foreign affairs shall be referred to them, that the people themselves as a nation shall at least share the responsibility of determining the course to be pursued. The power of the people

in a representative form of government constituted in itself, indirectly at least, a law of referendum.

Before the power and will of the people made itself felt in the conduct of foreign affairs, Governments paid little attention to the real personal relations of the two peoples it was proposed to bring into an alliance, or between whom an entente was to come about. The Governments made the agreement or arrangement on behalf of their respective people, and sometimes the people knew about it and at other times they were entirely unaware as to what they had been committed. More often than not these commitments meant war, in which the people were enormously and vitally interested when it came, for they had to carry it on for those who had agreed to make it. Even up to 1914, notwithstanding the progress made in representative government, liberties were taken with the will of peoples by those who held office by virtue of the popular vote. By that time, however, it had become necessary to take public opinion into account, and events were anticipated by skilful press-work, accomplished oratory, and the beating of the big drum of national patriotism, that minor virtue so often shoved into the first rank by interested hands to divert attention from mistakes of Government or questionable action on the part of those high in power: in other words, government without the consent of the governed, under a formula which professed to guarantee that such consent should be obtained before a Government could function.

A great deal could be said concerning the modern methods of creating a public opinion useful to those who create it, of the political and other camouflage employed to hide deliberate evasions of the public will; and in the handling of foreign relations by all Governments there are many instances of this, quite justifiable, it will be claimed, but, strictly speaking, dishonest and subversive nevertheless. The period of the Great War of 1914 can hardly be taken into account in any estimate of normal conditions excepting for the later reactions of that cataclysmic event. The fact remains, however, that out of the welter of that struggle in which fortune made strange bedfellows, and out of the mire of the aftermath one clear and incontrovertible fact emerges, and that is that the people of all the great countries are more than ever determined to exercise their constitutional right to

dictate to their Governments in the matter of their foreign relations.

This state of affairs ushers in a new era in diplomacy. It destroys the power of a Prime Minister and a Foreign Secretary or a President and a Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to involve their country in international agreements without the consent of the governed. The powers that rule can make such agreements, but to become effective they must have the approval of the electorate—an intolerable state of affairs as viewed by the older diplomacy, but one to which all Governments must yield if they are to be successful for more than a day. A President of the United States went to Paris in 1919 and signed important documents making large commitments for a nation of a hundred million people, but his signature was worthless and his commitments void because he had not consulted the people of his country, taken them into his confidence and asked their approval for each paragraph as he agreed to it.

The British Government undertook many post-war commitments without consulting the people who were to pay the bills. As the nature of these commitments has been disclosed, public clamour has grown louder and louder, not necessarily for repudiation but for cutting the inevitable loss by terminating the adventures entered upon without complete understanding by the people as to what the consequences would be. The people of all the great nations have taken upon themselves the management of their own foreign affairs, and the business of diplomats to-day is to make effective the will of the people and not that of any individual or particular group of individuals. There is less scope in this field of modern diplomacy for individual initiative, cleverness and consequent *réclame*, and the methods to be employed are more cumbersome. The results, however, be they good or bad, will be accepted by the people, for the policies will have come from the people, and to the nation as a whole will be given the praise or blame. What is more, if the people's policies lead to war, there will be no need to beat the drum, for the nation will rally to what it has stood for. A man will fight better for his own slowly developed convictions than he will for those of someone else that have but lately been presented for his consideration and support.



It appears to stand forth clearly enough that if the peoples of the countries enjoying representative government are in the future going to exercise a large measure of control over their foreign affairs and dictate to their respective Governments the policies to be followed, in the matter of all alliances and ententes public opinion will be the dominant influence. When alliances and ententes were arranged in the secrecy of embassies and foreign offices, the actual purposes and terms of such agreements were the only things that mattered. It made no difference to one side or the other as to the real attitude of the peoples represented one to the other. One could be black and the other white. One could wear many clothes and the other none at all. One side could be monogamists and the other polygamists. It was even possible that there existed a deadly enmity between the individuals of the two countries to such an extent as would induce them to try to kill each other on sight. All this counted as naught if the two Governments achieved by agreement something to the advantage of one or other or both.

In such alliances and ententes as may be dictated to Governments by the will of the nations concerned the whole affair is on a different basis. Alliances for mutual safety in time of need are not considered, for when the danger becomes remote the alliance or the entente languishes if not soundly conceived, and if the two nations are of incompatible temperament it is only a question of time until the status of affairs reverts to the days before a common danger drove them into each other's arms. Sentimentalists will object to this, for there has been so much proclaimed concerning the bond of common service and the ties of brotherhood in war and grief, it is difficult to set aside the natural feelings of those who have suffered together and realise that this very stress of a common danger and community of suffering may have submerged for the time being and thus obscured deep-seated racial and temperamental differences and radically different habits of thought, methods of procedure and standards of living, both moral and physical. These differences might conceivably be so great as to make any alliance, and especially an entente between the two nations as a whole, utterly impossible.

Here we arrive at what appears to be a logical conclusion,

and that is, that under a system of government where the people dictate to the executive in matters of foreign policy no true entente can be arrived at between two such Governments and nations unless there is a high degree of mutual understanding and sympathy between the two peoples as to life in all its larger aspects and the purpose thereof. To arrive at such high degree of understanding and sympathy it is necessary that the two peoples should understand each other—that is to say, all classes of the two peoples should be able to grasp the fundamental truths which govern each other's lives. Such an understanding between two nations, no matter how much akin, cannot be complete, no more than one individual can really know and perfectly understand another individual even though they may be of the same family. Differences due to environment, education, habit of thought and other influences will always maintain a gulf of ignorance of each other between two nations, but it is possible under certain conditions for two nations to grasp the fundamental principles which govern their respective lives, and if these conditions are fulfilled so that such grasp is possible and it is found that there is a considerable likeness between governing principles in both nations, that there is more or less a common purpose in living and in letting others live, the foundation presents itself upon which to build an entente that may reasonably be expected to survive the wear and tear and strain of many years of peaceful conditions.

The test of strength for an entente between nations does not come in time of war, when a common danger and a common suffering form an unbreakable bond. The test comes when the skies are clear and each nation is more or less comfortable and well satisfied with itself. The need of a friend is not felt so keenly then and national dignity is apt to grow pompous in its insistence upon recognition. To avoid these dangers and achieve lasting quality an international entente must be built up from an enduring foundation. The requisites for such a foundation are a common tongue, the same origin for the common law of both countries, sufficient racial similarity to ensure like qualities in character, a common literature, like ideals in their hopes and fears for mankind, and a healthy rivalry in all the activities of man at work or at play.

There must be respect for each other's strength and power, for there must be no feeling of patronage one for the other. Each must permit the other to go his own way at his own gait, recognising the right of free thought and action within the law of nations, but always ready to act together in the furtherance of a common purpose arising out of ideals held in common.

There are but two nations in the world which offer the requisite material for building a foundation for an entente between them which will endure under the stress of storm or the enervating effects of peace, and they are to be found in the British Empire and the United States of North America.

A clever maker of epigrams has said that a common tongue is the source of friction between two peoples and leads to misunderstandings impossible between those who do not speak the same language. There is considerable truth in this contention, but the advantages claimed are negative. The deduction implied is erroneous and superficial, however, for it is by reason of this ability to explore each other's minds that people are able to arrive at real agreement. Disagreements may and do arise in the course of such exploration. They lead, however, to better knowledge and a surer basis of compromise, the principle of all human co-operation. One of the severest tests of international friendship arising from two peoples using the same language is that all the unpleasant things said by one concerning the other are quickly repeated and understood by all. There is this advantage, however: each side knows the worst and is easily made aware of the particular points upon which offence is taken.

Unfriendly cartoons, paragraphs, jibes and serious criticisms printed in daily and other publications are unquestionably an important factor in influencing the views of one people concerning another, and this is to-day the most dangerous feature of the Anglo-American situation, for the unthinking mind reacts almost unconsciously to the clever jibe although it may have no basis in truth. The American newspaper which represents John Bull as making a secret treaty with Japan to his advantage while at the Conference over disarmament held in Washington, unwarrantably sows the vicious seed of distrust and suspicion. The English publication which, a few days following the acceptance by the

British Cabinet of the terms agreed upon for funding the British debt to the United States, displays a cartoon representing the Statue of Liberty in New York Harbour as holding, instead of a torch, the sign of a pawnbroker, does likewise, and retards by just that much the accomplishment of a closer union of the English-speaking peoples.

It must have given the British Government considerable satisfaction during the difficult conversations with France over the matter of German reparations that the mass of the people in England were not able to read the remarks made about England at that time in the Press of France. Had they been, it might have made the task of maintaining the Anglo-Franco entente even more difficult than it was. The point is, however, that no true international entente can rest upon concealments. Each nation must know all there is to know about the other, including all shades of opinion good and bad. Knowing all, the effect of unpleasant surprises can be safely discounted when they come at critical and dangerous moments. If ententes were made overnight and their permanence depended entirely upon the fluctuations of superficial public opinion, it would be much safer to arrange them between peoples who could not communicate with each other through a common language. The real entente, however, one with a large element of permanence, is a matter of slow growth and more or less complete mutual understanding. It can exist only between nations having few reservations from each other. Such an entente is of sufficiently tough fibre to withstand the shock of temporary disagreements or irresponsible press-work.

In the days of government by a few it was not necessary the mass of the people should understand the mental life of an ally. It was enough that those who made the arrangement should be able to read and speak the language mutually understood. For one nation to really know another it is essential the written and spoken word of one should be intelligible to the other. Co-operation in action can be conceived of two men who must communicate with each other by signs for lack of a common tongue. To obtain real knowledge of each other and to be able to work out a common agreement in principle it is essential, however, that the words of one should be clearly understood

by the other. It is even recorded in history that skilled experts have sometimes failed to correctly express in their own language ideas which have been received in a foreign idiom with which they were supposed to be familiar. If this can happen with those whose business it is to internationalise diplomatic negotiations, how much more probable is a dispute over interpretations among those who make no claims to linguistic ability other than the use of a limited vocabulary in their native tongue?

No true entente can exist between any two peoples who are inarticulate one to the other, for a true entente is not founded merely upon lines of physical safety; it is a thing of the spirit, and it is the essence of the spirit which constitutes the matrix for the setting of such practical affairs as may appear of mutual interest. The British Empire and the United States of America are the only two large countries in the world which hold nations speaking the same language and which are therefore the only two great and numerous peoples articulate one to the other in all matters that affect the spiritual and material life of man. Without those occasional disagreements and arguments which arise between two peoples speaking the same language no mutual understanding can be reached.

To expect two peoples unintelligible to each other to reach an agreement in principle is to ask for the impossible, for to-day it is not a question of an accord between a few in each nation, it is a matter for the multitude, and without such an understanding between two peoples *en masse* it is useless to expect a practical working and lasting entente. The British Empire with its form of government and habit of procedure in foreign affairs would be able and presumably willing to make a mutually advantageous formal alliance with the United States. As, however, the making of formal alliances is forbidden to the United States by reason of well-established foreign policy and public sentiment, only an entente is possible. Such an entente brought about by the peoples of the two countries would be the strongest and most permanent form of alliance. The actual foundations of such an entente have already been laid and the superstructure is well under way. This progress towards an entente is the outcome of over one hundred years of friction during a like interval of military peace, and is also due largely to the use of a common

tongues<sup>of</sup> for this yields a sense of kinship and understanding more potent with the average man or woman than any formula of statecraft.

Common law states the principles underlying the administration of justice. The common law of England is largely the common law of the United States—a notable tie between the mentalities of the peoples of both countries—for it indicates similar ideas of justice. That the practice of law differs does not affect this situation, for the use of the same common law constitutes an agreement in principle as to the treatment of individuals. It means even more than this, for it has been said of the law that it is merely codified common sense. This being true, it is clear that the two nations are governed by the same quality of mind in passing considered judgment upon men and events, which in itself is a guarantee of no important divergence of lasting nature in their international relations. It was natural and probably inevitable that the people of the New World should adopt as their own the basic principles of the law of that part of the Old World from which they came, but it is even more significant that nearly one hundred and fifty years after they achieved their political independence and became a dominant world-power in their own right they should still find nothing else that so well expressed their own attitude towards the administration of justice. It is competent evidence to the effect that notwithstanding the admixture of other races in the making of the modern American citizen the national mentality follows the same path in matters of the law that it did when all but a small percentage of the population was purely British. It also points to a common understanding and ideal of justice, that foundation of all institutions which are to remain permanent whether they be forms of governments, ententes or social arrangements.

No two nations possess such a similarity of character as expressed in national life as do the British and American. This may possibly be considered a controversial point, especially by Englishmen, but it is true of the American of a family deep-rooted in the soil. Fifty-five per cent. of the white American people are of British extraction, and within that fifty-five per cent. will be found a predominating number of those who make the laws, establish precedents, lead the intellectual movements

and otherwise direct the currents of national life. No other nation is so near akin in blood, hence no other nation can be as near akin in character. Different environment and circumstances have brought about different manifestations of the same characteristics, not always easily recognisable in their true likeness, which is unfailing, however, when the test is applied. Slow to fight but, once committed, carrying on with all strength and stubbornness possible. Just and generous to a defeated enemy and cherishing no hatred. Intolerant of cruelty to man or beast. Striving for ideals in home and government, and maintaining optimistic hopes of future attainment after each failure to secure them. Free speech, free thought and a free press are advocated theoretically at least, and only denied under the stress of great reactions or outraged feelings, which at times outweigh reason, for the British and American are both intensely human in their faults as well as their virtues. It is fairly safe to assume that a truly representative crowd in either country would react to events much in the same manner in matters of sentiment and those of judgment. In times of stress in foreign countries, in both large and small affairs, on countless occasions have British and American representatives united in common cause of defence against the enemy, of whatever other nationality he might be. It is a natural outcome of a common language, a like habit of thought, and the sense of kinship or sympathy generated by these attributes when held in common.

Along no other line are the two nations drawn closer together than that of a common literature. The founders of the American nation took with them to that land, which was later to be known as the United States, the traditions of English literature, and it was many years after the signing of the Declaration of Independence before there came into being a distinctly American form of literary effort. From early childhood to old age the American mind developed its powers through the guidance of British authors, and to this day the classics of one country are the classics of the other. The predominance of English literature in America, lasting to the present time, has given the American an advantage over the Englishman in his knowledge of British character and conditions. It is only in comparatively recent years that a purely American literature faithful to the American

environment and conditions has made its appearance, and it is only in the life of the present generation that such literature has begun to be generally read by the British. It may even be said that it is only since the Great War that the British public generally has adopted the habit of reading novels by American authors reflecting only American life and conditions outside of the larger cities. Quite recently a considerable interest has been awakened in books of this character, signs of which are to be found in publishers' announcements and in the records of the lending libraries. English authors of fiction have always had a wide market for their wares in America, and nearly all of these authors have laid the scene of their stories in Great Britain. The stay-at-home American has acquired therefore a much clearer conception of British life than the stay-at-home Britisher has acquired of the American counterpart.

It may be due to a lack of real literary talent that the American author of fiction has not before found access to a larger number of British homes, or it may be that the conservatism of the British reading public has prevented exploration into new fields. However this may be, and it is largely a matter for literary critics to decide the cause, the result is the same. The average American of intelligence who comes to England knows what to expect, and often finds himself more or less familiar not only with the physical aspects of the cities and the country, but is quick to recognise the people with whom he has made acquaintance in the pages of English novels and other writings. It is the exception, however, to find a stay-at-home Britisher who has more than a hazy idea of America as a whole or of the manners, habits and other characteristics of the people he would meet if he paid a visit to the United States. The American reader of books, from early childhood to the grave, is mentally saturated with impressions in detail of life in England, and through this very fact obtains a fairly correct general impression of English life and character. The English reader of American books has not yet reached this point where he is able to visualise America or the people in correct perspective. If *Main Street* is the first book of this kind he has read, he sees America, with its population of over one hundred and ten millions, as one vast collection of "Main Streets" and all the people as of the types



described in that book. If by chance his first book, *dealing with modern life in America* describes a certain social set in New York City, he can but visualise America as a country where life has a hectic hue and the principal occupation of everyone is the securing illegally of a sufficient supply of liquor to give extravagant entertainments. This idea is probably confirmed by stray newspaper stories of conditions reported to prevail in the film city of California.

As time goes on, however, this state of affairs will probably remedy itself, for America will produce the trained man or woman of literature who knows and lives what is to be recorded, and the habit of reading American books, now perceptibly gaining ground among the British people, will soon result in greater familiarity with American life and an improved sense of perspective. There have always been on both sides of the Atlantic those who saw truly, but what is wanted now in these days when majorities of the people dictate foreign policies to their Governments is that these same majorities shall have a more comprehensive knowledge of each other and that the intellectual few shall not be the only authorities on the subject. Even to-day, however, no two peoples live so closely together in the world of thought, science and literature as do the British and American. This constitutes one of the strongest ties which could be forged between two peoples. It is also significant that every immigrant who seeks American citizenship, no matter from what country he may come or from what race he may spring, is drilled in the English language and required to familiarise himself with a certain amount of purely English lore before he can be passed as fit to share the responsibility of governing the country. If young enough to go to school, his mind is satisfied of its thirst for knowledge from springs of British origin, and if he be too old, his children start their intellectual life at the beginning, from the same level as all American children, and acquire their education after the pattern devised by the Anglo-Saxon.

Out of racial likeness, a common law and a common literature naturally develop the same hopes and fears for mankind. These like hopes and fears lead with equal directness to similar ideals and formulas of life, modified by circumstances, such as different conditions of living and precedents. The

British people are governed in their social, political and legal procedure by a greater number of unwritten laws, otherwise precedents, than are the people of the United States. When the American Government was organised, simplicity was the keynote in reaction to the complex life they had left behind in the older communities. Political power was shorn of its pomp and circumstance; directness was substituted for circumlocution, and with few precedents to hamper the community life of the people was organised with a direct bearing upon the principles upon which were laid the foundations of the new Government. In the earlier days of the American Republic the road to justice for all, equality of opportunity, the emergence of the private citizen from the rank and file to political power and his prompt return to the ranks after a term of service, seemed to be plainly marked and easy to travel. It was not long, however, before the inevitable complications arose. Human nature proved to be the same in the confederation of new States as it was in those of ancient institutions across the sea. A written constitution framed in the hope of being an adequate foundation of government for all time was found to need amendment, and by the year 1919 nineteen such amendments had been formally adopted by Congress, and the approval of the people of all the separate States formally recorded. Hardly a year now passes without serious suggestion of further changes to cover either new developments in the life of the nation or to broaden the scope of government. The laws of the United States are more informative as to the beliefs and interests of the American people than are the laws of any European country, for they prescribe in detail what is to be done under the administration. An Act appropriating money for instance is so rigidly worded as to require for each official charged with its expenditure a formal legal opinion as to his power of disbursement in detail. Any intelligent foreigner who seeks to grasp the guiding principles and methods of government adopted by the American people for their own control and guidance can go far in such understanding by familiarising himself with the written word.

On the contrary, it has been the experience of every American who has sought a true comprehension of British life in the United Kingdom to realise before long in the course of his study that in many cases the obvious was to be avoided and that all formal

and informal actions were controlled or directed more by what was unwritten into the law of the land than what appeared in the text-books. The foreigner whose work lies in Great Britain soon finds himself facing the problems which arise in connection with the complex life of the British people with a certain timidity born of earlier mistakes, and becomes wary of accepting what at first glance appears to be the natural road to travel. Out of this apparently amazing complexity of purpose and procedure emerges in time, however, clear-cut intentions and results recognised and acknowledged by all the world as truly British and as dependable phenomena. These intentions and results bear close resemblance to what the American system produces by what at least appears to be a more direct process. A mutual agreement as to what is due to the citizen is discoverable, based upon ideals which differ more in form than in reality. The American ideal for the administration of government has been actually expressed to the effect that the inalienable rights of every citizen are "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." In this principle the British people are in absolute accord with the people of the United States. With both nations the accomplishment has fallen far short of the theory, and each nation objects to the other's manner of carrying the principle into effect. The principle remains however, and the efforts of both peoples are along parallel lines leading in the same direction. The attitude of a Government towards its own citizens is more important than its foreign policies, but one will be reflected in the other. If a Government is just to its own people it will be just in its dealings with others, hence the inner life of a nation is an important clue to what it will do in international affairs.

The British Government is more representative of the mass of the people than it was a few years ago. It has a considerable distance to travel, however, before it is as representative in its final authority as is the Government of the United States. It follows therefore that public opinion finds quicker and more general expression in America and is crystalised more surely and directly into the form of parliamentary action. It was only when the seventeenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States was adopted in 1913 that the Upper House of Congress was placed on a basis of the popular

vote, thus completing to its last detail the truly representative character of the American Government. So long as a single law-maker is appointed or becomes such by reason of heredity, and so long as there is no residential qualification required of a candidate for the position of representative of a district, the Government of which he is a member cannot be said to be truly representative of the public opinion of all classes of the people for whom it is to act. There is a marked tendency towards progress in this direction, however, in Great Britain, and many Britishers believe the day to be not far distant when all parliamentary functions will be performed by those chosen directly by the people; and there are many who go farther than this in their forecast of the future, for they have a vision of an Imperial Parliament of the British Empire, in which all parts are fully represented, and a series of local parliaments in the various subdivisions of the Empire corresponding to what is known in America as the State legislatures, competent to deal with purely State affairs. To realise these present differences of political methods in Great Britain and the United States is perhaps necessary to understand the differences which occur at times in the reactions to what is practically the same principle in both Britain and the United States. Failure to recognise these differences of method has led at times to disappointments and misunderstandings.

There is another phase of human activity, a very important one from the Anglo-Saxon point of view, in which the British and American peoples are more closely allied than any other two nations, and that is in the domain of sport. America is the only country which has adopted the British game of golf quite generally and enthusiastically. This game is one of temperament, and for that reason it is more important from a psychological standpoint than many others. It is only nations of a well-recognised temperament which play golf by reason of the nature of the game and its requirements. At first thought this may appear to be an insignificant point in international relations, but it really is most important and illuminative. The probability that psychologists of other nations would make light of its possible significance proves the point. Tennis, football, polo and other games have their devotees in all countries, even though the game may be played with variations,

and while they are a large and important feature of Anglo-Saxon life, no one of them possesses that significance of like character among those who play such as is indicated by the pursuit of the ball along the fairway. It is also interesting to note that the great majority of golf players in America are generally American-bred for several generations back, and that nearly all of them are of British stock or were brought up under conditions when Anglo-Saxon methods prevailed.

Estimating the possibilities of close relations of permanent character between nations by a rule of natural selection would probably eliminate all except the American nation from the list of those with whom the British might seek an entente, and the same is true of America as concerns the British, for the British Empire holds the only people in the world who would measure up to the American requirements for a copartnership in international affairs---a relationship based upon mutual understanding, community of thought, similarity of ideals, and a like sincerity of purpose in responsibility to the best interests of humanity generally.

There are other elements in the situation which must be carefully considered, however, to arrive at any intelligent opinion as to whether such a copartnership as is here suggested is feasible. Two nations might present all the elements of harmony implied by a common language, common law, common purpose and like ideals, and yet the psychology of the two peoples might be such as to render any real co-operation based upon understanding an impossibility. This psychological phase of international relations is enormously important, even more so than other matters already spoken of. The psychology of each nation is a complex study by itself and it is difficult to formulate an estimate that fully expresses this side of a nation's life. There are constant currents of thought running in channels worn deep with the passing of time, and there are the surface eruptions which carry all before them at the moment and yet leave scarcely a trace when they have passed by. There are always influences at work, some beneficent and some malign, to thwart the process of natural selection. Some of these influences are from responsible sources, others are of entirely irresponsible origin, and yet so susceptible is the nature of man that one may be as effective as the other in

keeping those apart who would otherwise become the best of friends.

It was Lord Balfour who, after a lifetime service in diplomacy, said that distrust and suspicion were the causes of all international difficulties ; that if these could be done away with all would be plain sailing for those who managed the foreign affairs of nations. There will always be distrust and suspicion, however, so long as the human mind has its present limitations. It is the task, not of diplomats alone, but of the nations themselves, to set at rest these qualms in others so far as they themselves are concerned. This can best be done by frankness and the cultivation of a knowledge of each other. No two nations have a better foundation to work upon in the attainment of these ideals than the British and American, and fair progress has been made ; but the road is yet long to a real working entente between the two peoples, a stronger form of alliance than was ever yet devised in treaty form.

## CHAPTER II

### ENVIRONMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL

**T**HERE is such a difference in the mental and physical environment of the Britisher and the American that even the American of British extraction lives in an entirely different world and has acquired different habits of thought and point of view from those of a native resident of Great Britain. The latter comes into a ready-made world of thought and custom. His social state is cast for him at his birth, to a great extent. This was entirely true of the Great Britain of a few years ago. It is still true to a remarkable degree considering the political and physical changes which have come to his country in recent times. The Englishman, using the term in its broader and generally accepted meaning, does not inherit that social freedom of action and liberty of thought possessed by the American. There are exceptions, and many of them, to the general rule in either country, but that this is true as a general statement may be accepted.

It is not due to any particular qualities of the American that he is born into this freedom, nor is it any particular lack in the Englishman which impels his thought and actions along certain prescribed lines. The Englishman is born into a State in which a certain degree of fixity has been attained in the evolution of an old civilisation. In a large way things have been as they are for many generations. In America, except in some of the older and more self-centred communities, the same things are a matter of the moment. They have never been before and possibly will never be again. If by chance the American is born into a more or less rigidly organised society, the probability is he will escape into a less stable environment before he passes his formative years. He is expected to establish, within bounds, his own precedents, and originate his own habits and customs, with due respect withal to the rights and comfort of those about him. It is true that American society has been

organism for over a hundred years, out of which time a certain degree of fixity might be expected; but the country is large, and the American nation of one hundred years ago was a comparatively small affair, clustered along the eastern seaboard, and with all its traditions reaching back to Europe within the memory of those who helped to bring it into existence. In point of fact, there was no real American nation until long afterwards. It may almost be said that the real American, the product of new and exceptional physical environment and the mingling of the blood of many other nations, did not make his appearance until the soil and climate of the New World had been given time to set their mark upon the children born under their influence even unto the third or fourth generation.

Living in a confined space geographically, influenced for countless generations by the same physical conditions, the Anglo-Saxon was a type before Columbus set sail. Natural conditions having fixed the type, the latter then proceeded to build up a social system, with the rules of which all were expected to comply. The Englishman is a stickler for freedom of thought, and in the years immediately preceding the Great War he took legitimate pride in his freedom of intellectual expression. During the period of the war no citizen of any country had any freedom of expression, and if he indulged in freedom of thought he kept the results of his self-communion to himself, especially if they conflicted in any way with the course his country, as represented by its leaders, was taking in public affairs. After the Armistice, and even after the peace treaty was signed, emotions generated by the war survived to a sufficient extent to confuse the thinking of many people, and to approve every action of the erstwhile Allies and decri every act of the enemy was the popular thing to do. It can be said of Great Britain, as of practically every other country, that the Government had so contracted the habit of regulating the personal affairs of its citizens during the long years of war that, after the war was over, and nations had, officially at least, returned to a peace basis, this matter of regulation was very slow to disappear, and it will be many years, if ever, before the average citizen recovers the freedom of thought and action that was his prior to August 1914.

It is advisable therefore, in the attempt to make any estimate



of British-American relations, to try to estimate the mentality and point of view of the people of the two nations, bearing in mind that the really important factor in the situation is the temper and preconceived ideas of the two peoples, and not the foreign policies of the two Governments; for, while alliances can be made by Governments, ententes must be made by nations. Practically the only way to determine the possibility of making such an entente is to inquire into the status of Anglo-American sentiment among the people, and as this is impossible in detail it is necessary to divide the nation into classes on broad lines, the divisions necessarily shading one into the other, but remaining sufficiently distinct for purposes of general analysis. The normal division of political parties in Great Britain is now Conservative, Liberal and Labour, with a few Members of Parliament representing divergencies of opinion which are not included in these parties. The attitude of the three great parties towards the United States commercially is governed by the avowed policy of building up British industry first and rendering import subordinate to manufacture for home consumption and for export. The late Coalition Government leaned towards a Protection policy, which was inaugurated under the guise of the necessity induced by war conditions and the need for temporary protection of British industries, also in the plea that all the revenue possible, consistent with established British fiscal policy, should be derived from the customs.

The Government in 1923 (succeeding the Coalition) became Conservative, but continued the fiscal policy of the Coalition almost without change. This Government came into power through a division in the Opposition, for it was elected by a minority vote, as is often the case in countries where the franchise is widely placed. It is doubtful, however, whether, even if the Opposition—that is to say, the combined vote of the Liberals and Labour—had secured control of Parliament, a notable change in fiscal policy would have followed, as this has been dictated by expediency rather than through the carrying out of any avowed economic policies. Before the war Germany was the greatest trade rival of the United Kingdom, and the rapidly growing trade of Germany in foreign markets induced the British Government to take certain restrictive measures calculated to handicap German effort in competing with British

industry in its own home market. With German trade crippled by the results of the war, and still hampered in Great Britain by more or less restrictive measures, the United States became the chief rival of Great Britain in foreign trade and in British markets. The result of this has been the transfer of a certain amount of this trade jealousy from Germany to the United States. Something of this existed before the war, but was so overshadowed by the stronger feeling towards Germany as to make it far less noticeable than after the war. So far as the British Government was concerned after the war, however, no such open antagonism to a foreign trade rival has been shown towards the trade of the United States as was shown prior to the war towards the trade of Germany.

The English financial, trading and business community has always been of a proud and independent nature, so much so in fact as to even deery assistance or interference from the Government of its own country in its affairs. England was the creditor nation, and the figures of her foreign trade and the amount of her exchanges justified the belief of the average business man that British influence was dominant throughout the world, and would so continue. The fact that Great Britain is now largely in debt to the United States Government, and also to private banking interests, also the fact that the pound sterling, which for so many years held its par value in gold throughout the world, is now at a discount in American money, hurts the pride and irritates the British business man, these being natural manifestations of human nature. Allowing for this possible jealousy and envy, and an irritation produced thereby, and taking into account the avowed and laudable determination that British influence shall again dominate the foreign markets of the world, if it be within the power of the British Government and the British people to restore the erstwhile prestige, it can be said with truth that the attitude of the leaders of the political parties and the leaders of the industrial and financial world within Great Britain is that of respect and consideration for the industrial and financial friendship of the business men of the United States.

There is no question but that the Conservative party, as organised and controlled in 1923, formed a Government that did everything in its power not only to remain friendly with the

United States, but sought co-operation with that country in important international affairs. The leaders of the party were primarily business men, and probably possessed a clearer idea of the international and reciprocal character of trade and finance than those who make politics their sole interest in life. It may be said that the attitude of no one of the political parties, as such, is unfriendly to the United States—in fact quite the reverse. There are individuals within these parties who are avowedly anti-American, not only in their personal feelings but in their utterances. There are more such to be found in the Conservative party than in the Liberal, Labour and other political sections which incline to the Left. It is interesting at least to note that many of those who show anti-American feeling are men who have come from Canada to make their homes and careers in Great Britain. This is the Canadian feeling of jealousy of the neighbour to the south transplanted to England and injected into the affairs of the British Empire as a whole. This feeling does not go very far however, as nearly all of these men are shrewd, and are concerned with large business or financial affairs, but it finds its outlet in utilising every possible opportunity for captious criticism and an indulgence in jibe, sneer and innuendo which is dangerous because it is effective, perhaps unconsciously, in assisting to create an unfriendly atmosphere among the mass of the people with whom will rest in the future the matters of international co-operation.

The influence of the British Press with the people is very great, not perhaps so much in its editorial advocacy of this or that policy, but in the way the news can be handled; in the special articles by clever writers, and in the cartoon, squib or paragraph which appeals to the emotions rather than to the reason. As compared with that of the United States the Press influence of Great Britain is concentrated. The London newspapers reach practically all sections the day they are issued, and nearly all the weekly periodicals of large circulation come from London. These weekly papers play a very great part in forming public opinion outside of London among the working classes and in the agricultural districts, as they are practically the only papers which are thoroughly read. The ownership and influences behind nearly all the more important daily

newspapers is fairly well known, and what they say is intelligently discounted by more of their readers than the proprietors are aware. Their editorial leanings are not taken nearly as seriously as they believe they are, or as they would like to have them.

The weekly, however, is on a different basis. Its propaganda is more insidious, hence more effective. Proprietary influence is more deeply camouflaged and expression of editorial opinion more indirect. There are few of the leading daily newspapers which could be called distinctly anti-American in their position, and to a number of these Anglo-American friendship owes much. The science of power was never more clearly illustrated than in the influence of the Press as a whole upon British public opinion; for, whether it takes weeks or years to accomplish the result, a state of mind among the people can be produced against which argument, supported by competent testimony, is of little avail. The way can be prepared for the adoption of a national policy which, had it been suggested before the educational work was done, would not have received public approval. It is perhaps not exaggeration to say that if the British Press decided, in a general way, that war between Great Britain and the United States was advisable, within a very few years a state of mind could be created among the people which would make such a war inevitable when a crisis, which could also be largely created artificially, came about.

Fortunately the bulk of influence has been the other way, and whatever his critics may say of the late Lord Northcliffe, his belief in the value of an effective working entente between Great Britain and the United States was shown in a most practical and effective manner in the conduct of the many publications which he controlled. These ranged from *The Times*, of institutional character, to the cheap-class weeklies, each designed to reach a public remote from the influences of the general-purpose newspaper, and each and every one of them exercised either a positive attitude in favour of a good understanding between the British and American nations or at least avoided the use of any material which would create bad feeling or the slightest antagonism between the peoples of the two countries. An Anglo-American entente was, as he himself expressed it, his hobby.

What the British Press can do in the matter of creating a state of mind among the people was shown in the general attitude of the British people towards Germany when the crisis came in 1914 ; and how difficult it is to do away with this state of mind, accentuated of course by the war and its circumstances, is shown in the difficulties which beset the British Government when it attempted to carry out a fair and common-sense policy towards the defeated enemy after the war. It is an interesting commentary on human nature to realise that if a few of the owners of British publications combined to bring it about they could, without question, manage a war between Great Britain and the United States within a comparatively short time, considering the apparent impossibility of such an event as affairs now stand. It would not be as easy now to bring about a great war as it would have been before 1914 however, not even for the British Press ; and not because America fought side by side with the British in the recent war, but because of the widespread, universal demand, among the English-speaking peoples at least, that there should be no more war.

To the casual American visitor America and American affairs do not appear to have a good Press in England. Many sneers over American politics, foreign policies, American personal habits and peculiarities, and American events generally, will be found scattered through the newspapers of the day, regardless of their political affiliations or their attitude towards the United States in matters of large policy. This apparently bad Press must not be taken too seriously in judging international relations. English life is so concentrated, leading publications are so comparatively few, and the political life so centralised, as to bring all things to one market and thus give a false impression as to quantity. Every day in the United States the Press has as many unkind things to say about the British, but these are so scattered and ineffective as they relate to the whole nation that they fail to give that impression of importance unconsciously attached to the same number of things which might be printed in the British Press during a similar period of time.

The British Labour Party as a party, and in its individual units, is absolutely opposed to war of any kind, and is more or less friendly in its attitude towards the United States and

the American nation. As a party and individually labour is critical of the attitude of the American workers towards unionism. The political idea as expressed in British Unionism has not made much headway in the United States, where it is on more of an economic basis. The British worker does not think he gets that co-operation, sympathy and actual support in his organised efforts from American labour that he should, and he feels resentful; as it is firmly believed by him that if British and American labour interests worked together effectively they would be able to bring about the ascendancy of labour politics throughout the world.

There is a much stronger class-consciousness with British labour than with American wage workers, this being due to the greater opportunity America has always offered for the wage worker to become an employer. To this greater opportunity is also due the lack of that bitter antagonism to capital and the employer which is so common to British labour, and which so frequently manifests itself in deeds as well as words in time of conflict. Limitation of output has found little place in American labour methods also because of the wider opportunity to secure adequate reward for speed as well as thoroughness. There is less chance in the United States for the employer to exploit the wage earner, hence the latter has less fear of being deprived of the results of super-labour, and there is less malignancy towards the employer, be he an individual or his individuality merged into that of a company. These things are more or less superficial, however, in the relations of British and American labour.

Millions of British have gone to America and done well for themselves, and this has given the British worker a feeling for the United States which is a blend of admiration, envy and regret that American labour forces will not rally, as might be desired, to the support of British labour interests at home. The war suspended much of the personal intercourse that had existed between the wage workers of the two countries, but by 1922 the tide of emigration to the United States from Great Britain began to rise again, and, but for the restrictions placed on immigration by the American Government, would soon have risen beyond a pre-war point. It was not until 1923, however, that the annual quota of immigrants allowed by the American law from the British Isles (about 77,000) was fully utilised,

and in that year it became insufficient to include all of those who wanted to go. In the first ten months of the fiscal year 1st July 1922 to 30th June 1923 the entire quota of immigrants allowed from Great Britain for the year was exhausted. For two months none could go. This is sufficient proof that among the wage workers of Great Britain at least there is no antagonism to America or to things American.

## CHAPTER III

### CONTRASTS

**T**HERE are no questions of American internal policy which seriously conflict with British ideas, with the possible exception of prohibition. British support for this measure is much greater than the publicity organisation of the brewing, distilling and distributing businesses will admit, and the fact that British peoples elsewhere have adopted prohibition, while certain communities within Great Britain have shown a strong leaning that way, indicates that the apparent antagonism to prohibition is not particularly a British quality but is governed by local conditions and influences possibly susceptible to change. The British emigrant does not appear to be perturbed by the prospect of a "dry" future when he chooses the United States as a future home in preference to some British overseas country where he could continue to indulge the habits of a lifetime. The fact of the matter appears to be, judging by recent statistics and observations, that the whole world is gradually going "dry," this event being hastened in some places by insistent legislation and in others taking its natural evolutionary course.

One of the reactions from the late war has been a vast development of the "verboden" idea in all countries, and they are now quite generally on a par as to the number of things the people must not do. The seeker after that degree of personal liberty which prevailed prior to 1914 will travel far in his mission, and find in the end that he might as well have stayed at home, no matter which country he originally started from. There is a strong tendency towards the regulation of the life of the individual by the State, a particularly obnoxious principle to the Anglo-Saxon mind, and one for which he would never have stood but for an amenability to restrictions which came about through the necessities of life in a country at war, and in danger of serious default in the necessities of life for the population.



There is less of that dogged individualism which demands non-interference with personal action in the composite American than there is in the less composite British ; but, unless grave need soon again puts absolute power into the hands of the State, it is inevitable that the English-speaking peoples will ask a return to freedom for themselves and their children with that insistence generally displayed in demanding the employment of a favoured principle in life, and to a large degree will win back what they have lost.

There are several possible developments in American domestic policy which closely concern foreign interests. The high Protection policy of America is disliked by foreign nations, and considered unreasonable, but no serious complaint can be made by any one country, as there is no discrimination. The goods of all foreign nations are received at the United States custom-houses on a par. They all pay the same import duties, and their success in the American market depends upon their selling price and quality. If, however, such policies as have been strongly advocated were introduced—such as discrimination in favour of goods carried in American vessels, in favour of American vessels using the Panama Canal, or even in subsidised American shipping—there would be considerable controversy and consequent ill feeling, which would unquestionably lead to retaliatory measures. This would in time involve the countries concerned in a trade war, which, while hardly creating any danger of an armed conflict, would result in bad feeling.

British interests are largely maritime, directly and indirectly, and any measures taken by the United States as suggested would quite reasonably be considered as discrimination against British interests more than those of any other nation. Controversies of this character often lead to serious diplomatic situations, and in days gone by might easily have led to actual war. The British Government would go a long way to avoid serious trouble with the United States, but there is a point beyond which it would be difficult for any Government to go and retain the approval and necessary political support of the British people. It would need most drastic and discriminatory action on the part of the United States, and in fact a considerable accumulation of grievances, to overcome the desire of the British Government to maintain peaceful relations with

America? This desire at the present time is strengthened by urgent need, but it would be a grave injustice to the British people to say that their concern for good relations with America was dictated solely by financial or economic considerations. The misfortunes which came to Europe through the war, and which resulted in vast burdens of debt, unemployment and general depression, have strengthened rather than weakened the spiritual bonds uniting the English-speaking peoples. As a man is apt to disclose his real character in times of trouble, so have the European nations disclosed themselves, and the only people in Europe who have not whimpered at the burden placed upon them and suggested repudiation of obligations forced upon them are the people of the United Kingdom.

It has often been said that the Englishman requires "a lot of knowing." Certain modes of speech and manner peculiar to the British Isles often cast a chill over the American of the offhand, breezy, seemingly irreverent and utterly good-natured type. Feeling hurt, rebuffed and thoroughly puzzled as to his real standing with his newly met British acquaintance, it is often a long time before he overcomes the feeling of resentment most naturally generated under these circumstances. This was especially noticeable during the war, when thousands of young Americans, hitherto untravelled, landed in England on their way to France. They left America full of enthusiasm, with a great uplift in their hearts, and prepared to accept their Allies as blood brothers, to be treated frankly, affectionately and on the same personal basis as they would accept one of their own countrymen under similar conditions.

The young American who, with these feelings dominant in his mind, crossed the Atlantic in bad weather, suffering great discomfort in a crowded and possibly disease-stricken troopship, may have disembarked in Liverpool on a cold foggy day, been crowded into a cold and dank troop train seemingly interminably delayed. The only thing needed to put the finishing touch to his resulting discomfort and disillusionment was furnished by some British Army officer who, with the best intentions in the world, met the advances of his newly arrived American brother-at-arms with a manner, voice and language which gave the American the impression of being colder, foggier and just as unfriendly as the conditions under which he

had laboured since leaving the United States. If the American was fortunate and, being a decent sort of fellow himself, was given opportunity to get really acquainted with his British co-workers, the results were generally admirable, and mutually advantageous, not only for the time being but for the future relations of the two peoples.

The situation was well expressed by a young and able lawyer of Boston who was for the time being an officer in the American army. He was a man of culture and high ideals, withal a practical and efficient soldier, as was proved later on, for he won rapid promotion and returned to his law practice with decorations of exceptional service from both the British and the French Governments. In recounting his experience in England he said that he had been most fortunate, for while his arrival in England had been as described, and he had quickly come to the conclusion that he was in truth emphatically anti-English except for the purposes of the war, he had later on been assigned to duty with English troops, and, as he said, he really got to know the Englishman and formed friendships which he will value all his life. This incident is important, and is given at length because it was the experience not only of one but of thousands, and in it is expressed one of the most difficult phases in the building up of an entente between the two peoples notwithstanding the natural sympathies of race and tongue which would seem to guarantee an immediate and mutual comprehension.

Many Americans do not like the English, any more than many English like Americans, but the thoughtful American who admits his personal antagonism will, almost without exception, give the Englishman credit for character, strong, persistent and unfailing in its survival under the most destructive circumstances. This results in a most general admiration among Americans for the British, based upon a recognition of that toughness of fibre which carries them through to the end they have marked for their destination, and this admiration, which naturally carries respect with it, is the most helpful element in British-American friendship from the American point of view.

It is extremely difficult to summarise the Englishman's opinion of Americans, but it is not as favourable as the American's opinion of the Englishman. There is a certain

peculiar<sup>ly</sup> unchangeableness in the British attitude towards Americans as a nation and individually. It might be described as one of tolerant dislike, though this is perhaps too strong a term to use. At times this feeling comes very much to the surface, and at other times it is submerged under the emotions of the moment, but it is always there, and takes the form generally of a vague distrust as to motives, uncertainty as to what the American will do next, and lack of sympathy with American stridency of life and lack of reserve. There is generally a certain amount of patronage in such approval as is given and a feeling of justification when America does something which is disapproved. There is a full appreciation of American energy, resource, vitality and accomplishment. There is always an under-estimate of the spiritual forces at work in America and an over-estimate as to the importance with which material things are regarded in that country.

There are many Englishmen who have a true conception of American life and the forces at work in that country ; but it is necessary to generalise in regard to both countries in dealing with these matters on a national basis, for it is the nations as represented by their majorities which will decide the terms of any co-operation there may be between the two peoples. A prominent Englishman now living, and still influential in British affairs, was once queried by an American as to what he thought about the relations between the two countries, and he replied by saying : " How can I tell what the future will bring, for it is not a question with us. We do not change, we are always the same ; but what will America do ? That is the question, and in that is the answer to what our future relations will be."

There is considerable truth in his deduction, but there is an element of unfairness in the English position which exasperates the American eager to have his opinions and motives accepted at their face-value and not understanding why he or his country should be considered guilty until proved innocent by testimony which he must furnish. The American resents being placed in the position of appearing before a judge to clear himself when he feels that he stands upon equality with the person who would elect himself as the final court of arbitration, and that every nation in the world is open to just criticism for acts

performed and preconceived judgments rendered. The greatest difficulty in the way of an entente between the American and the British nations to-day is an intangible mental attitude which, while at times temporarily obscured, can always be found to exist. An entente between peoples is a state of mind.

In America waves of emotional disturbance play back and forth across the national consciousness, but underneath, and occasionally coming to the surface, is always that desire to be friendly, to be thought well of, to be taken at face-value, and a certain simplicity of ambition in all foreign relations, which, briefly expressed, is to the effect that there is no reason all the world should not be at peace and on good terms, and especially that the English-speaking peoples of the world should stand together, always good friends. In Great Britain there is every desire and every reason for the best relations existing between the British Empire and the United States, and between the peoples of the two countries; but underneath among the people there is always some reservation, a sense of doubt as to whether America will do what Britain thinks she ought to do, and a considerable degree of pessimism concerning the same. This feeling existed in Britain before the Great War. It grew in intensity between August 1914 and April 1917. It was deeply submerged between April 1917 and November 1918, and again came to the surface as the making of the Treaty of Versailles proceeded to its abortive ending.

Yielding to expediency and necessity, the British accepted as much of the programme introduced by President Wilson as they could possibly entertain, believing they were yielding to the will of a great and friendly people who had come to their aid in time of need. It is not difficult to visualise the reaction when these same British found they had yielded to the will of a single man, who, as events proved afterwards, represented only himself and an impotent minority of the nation he came from. It would probably be an exaggeration to say that the Wilson fiasco in Paris and the subsequent refusal of the United States to remit any of the debt owed by Britain on war account have nullified all of the progress made in Anglo-American relations through co-operation during the war, but that these affairs have greatly discounted the gain then made is lamentably true. It

is not the rights or the wrongs of these matters that count ; it is the mental reactions.

Well-informed Europeans might well say they knew that all President Wilson could do was to try to deliver the goods for which he made contract. Well-informed British bankers and the financial representatives of the British Government may express themselves as well satisfied with the financial arrangements made in connection with the British debt, and may even pay tribute to the friendliness and good will of America in funding that debt at a lower rate of interest than is being paid by the American Government for its huge indebtedness to the American people. Even these things bear small weight, however, with the feeling among the mass of the British people to the effect that America let them down at Versailles, and when the time for financial reckoning came, demanded the pound of flesh at a time when the British taxpayer was staggering under his burden and a million and a half British workers were such in name only.

During the war the possibilities of British-American co-operation in time of need were splendidly demonstrated, and the disappointment over the subsequent reaction on both sides of the Atlantic is all the more keen because of those days when the British and American flags advanced together, leading armies with a common purpose, to be pursued willingly to the death if need be. Such episodes as these are apt to induce pessimism in regard to the possibility of such an Anglo-American entente as is dreamed of by those who have the vision of its potentialities in this world of international jealousies and suspicions. This in itself is an additional handicap for the cause, and it can only be combated through the unflagging optimism of those in each generation who are doing what they can to bring the two great English-speaking nations into closer and more permanently and widely co-operative relations.

Be it understood, however, that at no time has either the British or American Government entertained for a moment the possibility of a real break in the relations of the two Governments ; but as it is of greater concern that the relations of the two peoples should become of such character as to forbid any serious disagreement, official or otherwise, account must be taken of the psychology which reacts to affairs which do not

affect, and sometimes are not even recognised by, officialdom. No real major controversy has arisen between the British and American Governments which carried with it any threat of armed conflict since the American civil war.

The Venezuela episode of 1895 may be instanced as an exception, but so little chance of war did there appear to be, either from the Washington or London point of view, that the American Government made no stir in military or naval activities, and with the exception of rushing a few extra naval supplies to Plymouth and other ports the British Government did not even mobilise its naval forces--always the first sign of British interest in anticipated coming events of serious international character. As a rule, American challenge to Britain has come as a result of an emotional wave originating in an apparent threat to American rights, principles or property. From the British side these challenges to America have arisen from a well-considered policy of the British Foreign Office, into whose confidence the people have not previously been taken. After the British Foreign Office has made its *pronunciamiento* however, and the British public has recovered from its surprise at discovering anything was wrong, British public sentiment has stood behind the Government with a matter-of-course air and apparently but a languid interest in the question at issue or the possible outcome. If, however, the British Government reaches that stage in a controversy where the co-operation of the people is necessary, it has in the past been given promptly and without question.

Something of a change has come over the British body politic since the late war, however, and the people do not seem quite as content to let a few men direct the foreign policies of the Empire without even taking Parliament into their confidence as they were a few years ago. This change in public opinion will have some effect upon the future policies of the British Empire, and lays stress upon the importance of a good understanding between peoples as well as between Governments.

The British Government knows why the United States is not in the League of Nations. The British Government is fully aware of the reasons why the United States fails to take a hand in the salvaging of modern Europe, and the British Government knows, hence its agreement, why America could do no more for

Great Britain than it did in the matter of the British debt. These matters could probably be explained fully and satisfactorily by a dozen officials of the British Government, but the fact remains that the British people as a whole do not know these things, and, not knowing, are naturally critical of what America does or does not when opportunity apparently offers.

There is no publicity work done for America in England other than that done by believers in a British-American entente who secure opportunity to express their views. Naturally America finds no apologists, or even interpreters, in the British Press, and the British newspaper correspondents in America who furnish their home papers with news must naturally handle this news from the British view-point. A number of British publications—notably *The Times* of London among the dailies and *The Spectator* among the weeklies, to mention two, but with no intention of slighting the others—have done good work for the entente by endeavouring to give the American view-point as well as that taken by their own people; but it is not these more expensive and high-class publications which reach the mass of the people, and the others, feeling that such topics are too abstruse or dull for their readers, fail to do more than to use American actions, events and demonstrations for the purpose of inspiring a cartoon or turning a witty paragraph, and quite reasonably these clever pictures or brief notes are made at the expense of America.

Far more elaborate expositions of the British view-point are made in hundreds of American papers, and no American reader of the periodical Press, if he be so inclined, can fail to get the British view, even though he may not agree with it. The ultra-conservative section of British society, and the Press that represents it, is more distinctly antagonistic to American affairs, more captious in its criticism, and more stubborn in its belief that little if any good can come out of America than any other element in British life. To put the matter plainly, the future of a British-American entente now possibly in the formative stage looks brighter to-day than ever before by reason of the gradual elimination of this ultra-conservative element now coming to pass in the dominant forces of British politics, business and social life. The ultra-conservative Britisher is



British all the way through, and loathes anything that smacks of internationalism. He is the embodiment of that spirit of England which made the nation insular in thought and habit. He is for British interests first, last and all the time ; not much of a thinker, far from being intellectual, slow to adopt new ideas and not given to originating. He does not care to be troubled to think for himself on questions of the day which do not affect him personally, and the sentiment " For King and Country " is his religion and creed, and largely defines the scope of his mental activities. He must not be underrated, however, as a great force in his nation, however narrow may appear his vision, for there is a vast amount of sturdy courage and doggedness of purpose in his make-up, and the Empire always knows where to find him when wanted. He can be depended upon. He wants no war with the United States, but if his country is threatened and its contentions controverted he is for his country, right or wrong, to the utmost he can give. If it meant war he would deplore such an event, but he would shrug his shoulders and prepare to do his bit as part of the inevitable.

It was not so many years ago that the nobility governed the United Kingdom and directed the affairs of the British Empire. It was in the days of this phase of British Government that came grave episodes, one of them resulting in actual war with the United States and others merely causing diplomatic disturbances within the two Governments and general alarm among the two peoples. To-day the old nobility as a class is negligible politically, except to the tax-gatherer. Within its ranks, however, are individuals who have proved themselves tremendously capable and useful men even in these democratic times, and these men have remained prominent in the Government of the country through sheer force of character. The new nobility is an aggregation of politicians, new-rich and super-business men, and their sentiments are those of the class from which they came originally, whatever that may be. They were born into no single political creed or habit of government, and their thoughts and actions upon coming into power are suggested and controlled by the influences which then surround them rather than those which are a birthright. These men look upon Anglo-American relations largely from a business point of view,

and perhaps it may be said of the Government that came into power in Great Britain in 1923, following the breaking up of the Coalition, that its policy in all Anglo-American affairs was dominated by the instincts of men of large business affairs, which it may be said make at least for temporary safety.

## CHAPTER IV

### INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK

**E**ARLY in the late war the British Government required that all aliens resident in Great Britain should register with the police. An American long resident in England reported in consequence to the nearest police station, to comply with the regulation. The police officer in charge, when told of the purpose of the visit, said with an air of surprise: "But you are not an alien, you are an American." This was not so much a testimonial to blood-brothership, however, as it was to certain pre-war conceptions prevailing among the masses of the English people. The word "alien" came into general usage in England with the enactment of the so-called "Aliens Act" in 1905, although it was used legally and in other limited applications before that time. It was not until the war of 1914, however, that it became a word used generally by the people, and understood by everyone as meaning a person who was not a British subject. If in the proclamation requiring registration of aliens the word "foreigner" had been used there would never have been any doubt in the English mind of any grade of society as to what was meant. To the average English countryman the people of the world are divided into two classes: British and foreigners; and no matter for how long a foreigner might live in England, or even if he had through naturalisation become a British subject, he never escaped from his original classification.

The advent of the American brought some confusion, for a foreigner was supposed to speak with such an accent as to betray the fact that he was not British. Many Americans would do this as convincingly as any to whom English was not their mother tongue, but if an American failed to thus give evidence of being a foreigner, and spoke English as it is spoken in England, it would be quite easy for him to escape the imputation of being a "foreigner"—especially if he were of Anglo-

**Saxon origin.** Before 1914 there was very little prejudice among the English against foreigners, except for that feeling of difference in race which made the foreigner an outsider no matter what the circumstances of his residence in England. The foreigner might be well liked and respected, and it might even be admitted that it was not his fault he was a foreigner, more the pity, but the insuperable difficulty in the way of his complete absorption and acceptance into British life was this fact of foreign origin.

This tolerance of foreigners extended to all nationalities prior to 1914, but the war brought into high relief the intense nationalism of the British. Before that time nationals of countries with which England had been at war many times in her history suffered no more handicap in their social relations with English people than did the nationals of any other country. In all previous wars England had either been successful or had emerged without damage, and at all times Great Britain had been reasonably safe from invasion. A feeling of careless security had come about, which led the people to believe in the inviolability of their own country. This sense of security was shattered in the war of 1914; and the consequent dread of actual attack, and the fear that such attack might be assisted from within, changed the national feeling towards foreigners from one of friendly toleration to one of suspicion and distrust. This was not confined to nationals belonging to the enemy countries. The nationals of neutral and even of Allied countries were involved in this distrust of anything that was not wholly British. There was some justification for this attitude of mind, for the enemy employed nationals of other countries to do the work of espionage impossible to their own nationals, and the British people felt more keenly than ever that the one and only nationality they could depend upon was British. That they were sadly betrayed in numerous instances is now notorious, but throughout the British country-side to be a foreigner during the war was to incur more or less suspicion and to suffer estrangement.

It is useful in estimating the strength of the feeling of nationality among the British people to compare their attitude towards naturalisation with that found generally in America. The national of one country who decides to change his allegiance

to another country for reasons of permanent residence, gratitude to a place in which he has prospered, or for some other reason equally convincing, does so only after mature consideration, and with considerable regret, if he be honest in his intuitions and is possessed of the usual feelings of normal man. He looks upon this change first as a renunciation, and secondly as more or less of a compliment or tribute to the nation he is preparing to join. He feels that he has a right to expect his attitude will be understood and his action appreciated by those with whom he is to join in responsibility of citizenship.

In the United States this is largely so. The new citizen is not only welcomed, but it is considered the duty of every foreigner who makes his permanent residence in the United States to become an American citizen, that he may share in the burdens, as well as enjoy the privileges, of those to the country born. Once nationalised he is accepted as a citizen, with all the rights, privileges and responsibilities of such, and in no way is he discriminated against politically, socially or in a business way. He has become an American and that is all there is to it. Naturally this attitude of the people towards an adopted citizen arises partly out of the fact that in the past one hundred years forty million people have come to the United States and they or their progeny have become American citizens, made so by legal process or by birth. This general acceptance of the naturalised citizen is not based entirely, however, upon the fact of large immigration. It is due to the feeling that, theoretically at least, any man who so desires to become an American as to comply with the requirements, to give up entirely his legal ties to the land of his birth and to make a permanent home for himself and his family in the United States, has given satisfactory evidence as to his good intentions, and should be accepted at face-value without reservations.

In Great Britain the situation is almost the reverse of that in America. The conservative British mind, holding with all the ardour of a religious belief that British citizenship is something far superior to any other, looks upon an Englishman who has become naturalised in another country as one who has sold his birthright for a mess of pottage, or something else equally valueless, in comparison; and while he understands and appreciates the natural desire of a foreigner to become British, he is

rather inclined to believe some unworthy motive must prompt the change, for he cannot really understand why any man should want to lose his citizenship in his native land and, attempt to disguise it as he may, he thinks no better of him for so doing. The result of this British attitude towards naturalisation is that, no matter how firmly a foreigner may become lodged in British life, whether naturalised or not, he remains a foreigner, and is never fully accepted as British. The experience of the war strengthened this feeling, for it was then disclosed that Germans and other enemy aliens had become naturalised British for reasons either entirely sordid or unworthy, and the Englishman then felt that he had been entirely justified in his antagonism to naturalisation.

They failed, however, to discriminate between the German—who could become a British citizen through naturalisation and still retain his German civic rights under the dual-citizenship law of Germany—and the American, for instance, who if he becomes a British citizen forfeits his American rights absolutely. Geography also has something to do with sentiment in both Great Britain and the United States. The European emigrant who goes to the United States to live puts considerable distance between himself and his native land, and as a rule he goes seeking relief from economic or political conditions he is trying to escape. His desire to make his permanent home in America is entirely genuine, and he often burns his boats behind him in making the move.

The European who goes to England, and there becomes naturalised, is at all times but a few hours' journey from the country of his origin, and he does not accomplish that complete separation and estrangement which comes without effort to the man who goes to America. The result of the troubles experienced in England with naturalised citizens during the war was the enactment of a law giving the Courts power to revoke a naturalisation certificate—or, in other words, deprive a man of a British citizenship formally bestowed. This still further depreciated the value of British citizenship to a foreigner who was honest in intention and took the matter seriously, for with that provision there is no guarantee but that a man might be deprived of his laboriously acquired rights without due cause. Courts have been known to make mistakes, and waves of

popular emotion in times of stress have been known to influence Government action in such matters.

Under a dual-citizenship law the naturalised citizen of Great Britain deprived of his naturalisation would simply revert to his original status in the country of his birth. An American, however, who had become British by naturalisation and who was deprived of his acquired British citizenship would have none at all, and from a legal point of view would have no rights in any country—he would in fact become a man without a country. The result of this situation in Great Britain, both as to popular sentiment and the law, is that no American who approaches the question of changing his citizenship with seriousness finds any encouragement so to do. He is also inclined to view with some bitterness perhaps the different treatment of British citizens in his own country, where millions have been accepted as Americans without question as to the genuineness of their conversion.

That Americans are not the only people who feel this British attitude to be unjust was shown at the time the matter was under discussion in the British Press during the war. Scores of letters were received by the newspapers from Frenchmen, Belgians, Italians and other erstwhile citizens of Allied countries complaining of the fact that, notwithstanding their naturalisation as British subjects, they were still looked upon as foreigners and treated as such. This is a matter which cannot be changed by law or international agreement. The Englishman merely shrugs his shoulders and replies to the effect that if the British attitude towards naturalisation is not liked, then why get naturalised, thus emphasising the fact that if a foreigner becomes a naturalised Britisher it is not because of any encouragement he may receive from the British.

The American will still cling to his broader interpretation of the meaning of citizenship, and yet be just as proud of his own as the Britisher is of his, and will continue to welcome foreigners who decide to become Americans. It is a situation created by racial temperament, environment and historical development, and must be dealt with understandingly and tolerantly by both peoples, as one of those irreconcilable differences which, while more or less important from an international point of

view, do not stand in the way of co-operation in all vital affairs. It is not only wise, but it is necessary, that all such irreconcilable differences should be discovered and frankly admitted; for if this is not done they at times inject themselves into affairs unexpectedly and lead to misunderstandings which could have been avoided. This might not be important if it was only a case of Government dealing with Government, but with a nation dealing with another nation many things to which official diplomacy is indifferent become enormously so.

The position of the American resident in England between August 1914 and April 1917, the period when the United States was a neutral, was not enviable. Naturally if he was in England with honest purpose he was pro-British, and not backward about saying so. The mass of the English people did not understand why the United States did not come into the war, and assigned reasons for American neutrality far from the truth, and often far from complimentary. The lack of understanding of the American position on the part of many people in England was shown by the fact that even in the spring of 1917, only a few weeks before the United States declared war on Germany, Americans in England were asked, in all seriousness, by people of more than average intelligence, if the United States was coming into the war on the side of the Central Powers.

It is probably true that at the beginning of the war the British Government was satisfied with the neutrality of the United States. It was not then believed the war would last as long as it did, or result in such an indecisive position as prevailed in the first months of 1917. There is also no doubt but that many conservative Englishmen regretted the necessity of welcoming American co-operation in actual military operations, for the reason that they feared American participation in the anticipated material fruits of victory. They also deprecated the right which would fall to America as an active ally to have a say in the final negotiations and to have any voice of authority in the disposition of European affairs.

In the first two years of the war it was felt in high quarters that the American people were giving vast assistance in the matter of credits, food and war materials without laying the foundations of any participation in making the treaty of



peace which was to recoup the Allies for their losses and yield exemplary damages. These impressions yielded to necessity later on, and as the strain on Allied resources threatened to become more than could be borne, it was realised that, if the war was not to end in more of a compromise with the enemy than was desirable, American aid must be forthcoming. The British people as a whole were tremendously relieved when the United States declared war on Germany, and this relief was quickly reflected in the attitude of the British Press and public towards Americans and American affairs.

Then came a long period of growing doubt and disappointment. This was not shared by the British Government, the British Navy or by others in the know. Owing, however, to the necessity for secrecy the British public was kept in ignorance of the vital work being done by the American navy in British waters, and there was considerable criticism, inspired by impatience and severe war strain, over the apparent delay in American co-operation. It was only when the thousands of American soldiers began to arrive in England in the summer of 1918 on their way to France, and the mass of the English people were thus given evidence of American co-operation, that many of those not in touch with official information gave credit to America for the whole-hearted support which had been forthcoming since the beginning, and became really convinced that the United States had indeed joined the Allies in their war against Germany and the other Associated Powers.

Then came the high tide of enthusiasm for the British-American entente, and it rose to a height never before reached, and which will probably never again be witnessed. There was real enthusiasm in England then—even more, almost an exaltation—for the British people were weary of the task to which their backs were bent, and doubt as to the outcome had crept into many a brave heart. When these thousands of young American soldiers poured from the transports and made their trail of khaki across England on their way to the Channel, and the English people heard of the thousands more who had gone direct to France, they were able to relax their minds and bodies for the moment necessary to give them new strength, courage and hope with which to carry on. It was a great moment in the history of British-American relations, and an

inspiration for the future which cannot fail to be of tremendous value.

It is not, however, in moments of exaltation that lasting international ententes are made, for these associations must be so constituted as to weather the storms of disagreement and to live through the trying days of peace, prosperity and absence of great events which would divert public attention from minor causes for complaint or controversies with friends over really unimportant things. With the Armistice and its immediate reaction came a more or less hasty return to normal mental attitude, and each nationality once more became an entity, the war coalition being separated into its component parts in the international stock-taking.

The British attitude towards America and Americans remained extremely friendly until after President Wilson reached Paris and the making of the Treaty of Versailles began. The League of Nations and the "Fourteen Points" came to the British public as something of a surprise, and were received with considerable doubt and criticism. They were accepted, however, in the end because of what were held to be compensatory points in the agreements entered into by President Wilson. Well-informed Englishmen knew that Congress had to ratify these before they became effective, but the British people as a whole had no more doubt of their ratification than they had of the ratification by Parliament of the agreements made by the British plenipotentiaries. Later, when it began to dawn upon the British mind that President Wilson was discredited in his own country and that all the negotiations at Versailles had been in vain so far as America was concerned, there was a decided reaction unfavourable to America and American affairs. There was a great deal of anger and bitter comment.

Some of this was just and some unjust. Nearly all of it was founded upon ignorance of procedure in American Government affairs, an ignorance to be expected and for which no blame attaches. The real reasons for this criticism and bitterness were keen disappointment that the United States was not to play a part in carrying out the punishment of the enemy and doubt as to what that country intended to do in future relations with Germany. There was also a feeling of having been made a fool of in agreeing to a large part of the contentions made by

President Wilson and finding after all no concessions need have been made, and that certain features of the treaty in which disagreement was subordinated to expediency could have been omitted.

In the months during which President Wilson wrangled with Congress over the treaty British opinion hardened against the United States, and the entire episode, ending as it did in complete repudiation of what was done at Versailles, gave British opinion time and favourable opportunity to get back to its original view-point as to America and American affairs—that is to say, one of some doubt and distrust as to what might happen in the future and the general unreliability of all things American. It is now useless to speculate as to what would have happened if the United States had taken a full share in events subsequent to the making of the treaty as planned by President Wilson. It may be that new arguments and causes for disagreements and jealousies would have arisen out of the proceedings, with the United States playing the part of a principal, but there is no doubt as to the psychology of the situation so far as the British are concerned, for the British-American entente reached its greatest strength in history between the two peoples between April 1917 and that day when the British people realised the futility of the joint negotiations at Versailles. After all is said, however, it is necessary to take stock of public opinion in both countries when the entente is at its lowest ebb rather than at its highest if it is desired to measure its real qualities and the degree of its permanency.

## CHAPTER V

### FOREIGN POLICIES

**T**HE supreme difficulty met by the British in forming an opinion as to American action in the near future, or in fact in any great crisis, is that the American people themselves are not aware in advance of what their national or foreign policy is going to be. That it will be governed by certain broad principles fairly well established in the life of the Republic is believed by every American, and realised by a small minority of well-informed British, but within the scope of those recognised principles it may present a wide diversity of application. The actions of the British Government in all foreign affairs can be anticipated much more accurately, and more in detail, because of guiding precedents and numerous well-established rules indicating a continuous policy which, with all its apparent variations, follows certain well-recognised lines.

From the American people can be expected a quick reaction to anything affecting the North or South American continents, or anything elsewhere which touches directly upon American interests. A very slow reaction can be depended upon in foreign affairs in which America is not directly concerned. It takes a long time for the American people as a whole to realise an American interest in a foreign situation when such an interest is of an indirect character. This is not due to any lethargy of interest or slowness of thought. The interest is there, but it remains academic ; and the thought is there, based upon a lively power of visualisation and a hunger for general information which is characteristic of the national mentality. This hunger for information is expressed in a vast curiosity, ranging from petty observation of neighbours' doings and an insatiable demand that there be no personal privacy or secrets to that spirit which leads to the foundation of great research laboratories, the sending of special investigations to all parts of the world, and the organisation, at great expense, of numerous

foreign commissions to find out what other people have, and are doing, and why they are doing it.

The American people have been accused of being provincial ; and they are, in the sense of desiring no active participation in the affairs of other nations. The British people are accused of being insular, and they are, in their attitude towards anything foreign, in so far as it means a belief that to be British is to have reached the most desirable civic state of man, and that all things British are the best—or, if not the best, thoroughly British, hence satisfactory. The difference between the so-called provincial American and the insular Britisher is, however, one of great concern to the relation of the two peoples ; for, while the provincialism or self-centred nature of the American is largely the driving force which urges on the rapid internal development of the United States, the insularity of the Britisher is that immutable characteristic which has built up the British Empire and made all questions of foreign affairs essentially British affairs.

It is incomprehensible to the Britisher that America could send two million soldiers to Europe and, after the fighting was over, withdraw so completely as to leave no trace, and return to a pre-war attitude of apparent indifference as to what was going to happen in Europe. The British policy results in the acceptance of mandates, armies of occupation and diplomatic participation in all subsequent proceedings, be they on the Rhine, in Mesopotamia, Palestine, Lithuania or elsewhere ; for these are held to be British interests, having been made so many years ago by the pursuance of an age-old policy of imperialism, the object being British dominance in world affairs, or at least the maintenance of a balance of power favourable to British interests. That is where the average Britisher differs in view-point from the American ; for, no matter how badly informed he may be as to the territory in question, he has a keen realisation that it is not the interests of the country referred to that are at stake, but British interests in, or in connection with, that territory.

The American is interested and curious as to what is going on there ; he likes to read or hear all about it, but he never for a moment believes that American world influence or American imperial interests, such as they are, can be involved. He knows

they are not, for any schoolboy can give a list in a few words of the territory, outside of the United States proper, in which the American people believe they have sufficient interest to warrant important influence upon the foreign policy of the United States Government. The American views what is going on in a foreign country with more or less impartiality and detachment; the Britisher with a lively interest as to what may befall British interests in the outcome of any disturbance or negotiations. There are a few parts of the world in which the American has a strong sentimental interest—such as Turkey, Armenia, Liberia, and possibly China. Nearly all of this sentiment has been created through long years of contributions to Christian missions. Liberia is looked upon as a protégé of the American negro, hence of some importance politically. Interest in China began with the visit of Commodore Perry to the Far East, and was sustained in view of possible foreign trade and as a vast field for missionary work. It was the American Government which later on insisted upon the “open door” policy in China, which in the end resulted in other nations, through superior foreign trading ability, getting by far the largest share of the business.

Since modern history began the British have been foreign adventurers, their explorations, based upon commercial enterprises, ranging from outright piracy and marauding to legitimate effort to extend their markets for British goods or to find new sources of profit in the handling of the products of other lands. The greatest impetus to British foreign trade was given by Queen Elizabeth, and to her memory the merchants of the City of London paid tribute when it was realised what she had done. The methods employed in those days would hardly pass muster to-day with the International Court of the League of Nations, and the freedom of the seas of the sixteenth century was not quite as narrow in its interpretation as it is in the twentieth. It is out of these wanderings afar that came the British Empire, and for at least four hundred years the affairs of all the world have been of more or less concern to the British, not because of particular academic interest in the welfare of humanity, but because they vitally concerned the welfare and the political futures of the British people, and the nations who looked to them for guidance and support or to whom they paid tribute.

This interest and concern with foreign affairs has been bred into every child of British parents, and that it is maintained to this day with even greater intensity than in the past is evident in every British newspaper, in any and every day's session of the British Parliament, and in all political declarations of parties or individuals.

This is one of the fundamental differences between the Britisher and the American, and accounts for much of the lack of understanding between the two peoples on occasions. The American from early childhood is intensely cultivated in purely American affairs. Even Europe is a far country, of which he reads, and which he hopes to visit some time before he dies ; but it is a region infinitely remote from his real mental or physical activities. The percentage of the two million Americans who came to Europe in khaki in 1917 and 1918 who had been in Europe before has never been stated, but it was extremely small ; and yet the American people are now justly considered the most numerous of all visitors to foreign lands. British people cannot understand why Americans should not be actively interested in foreign affairs when so many of them travel abroad. The number of Americans who travel is certainly larger, but in the great population of the United States they represent a small percentage. Before the Great War the largest number that went to Europe from America in a single year was about three hundred thousand, and in 1922 only about two hundred thousand found their way across the Atlantic. This is hardly one-sixth of one per cent. of the population, and as a rule the travel each year is accomplished by a large percentage of the same people who came the year before.

It sounds impressive to say that Americans spent a hundred million dollars in travel in Europe in 1922, but the relative unimportance of this expenditure to American affairs is perhaps realised when it is known that this is less than the expenditure in a single season at one American seaside resort of popular character. A large percentage of these Americans who come to Europe are those who came from Europe originally, and who have acquired American citizenship, or whose parents were natives of European countries. Another large percentage are Americans whose business interests bring them across the

Atlantic. The others come, as a rule, in a thoroughly detached frame of mind, recognising no especial American interest from a national point of view in what is going on in Europe. From their journeyings, however, a much clearer understanding of foreign conditions is obtained than by those who stay at home, and a personal interest is generally awakened which gives its reactions when the traveller returns. It is a leaven which is working in the American nation, and the results are already apparent to anyone who is able to compare the interest taken in foreign affairs in the United States twenty-five years ago with that taken at the present time.

The British traveller can hardly go to a foreign country without a lively consciousness that in that country lies something either favourable or unfavourable to British interests, not only in a national way but politically as well. He cannot escape from the influence of the British Empire, and consciously or unconsciously, and with the degree of intelligence with which he is gifted, he must be for ever cognisant of the importance of everything foreign to his own affairs directly or indirectly. The British people of to-day have inherited a vast and complex relation to the affairs of all the world from which they cannot escape, and it is the principal equation in all British affairs, be they matters of expenditure, taxation, foreign trade, the personality of men in power, or almost anything else that may come up in the course of the administration of the nation's business.

The American has no such consciousness of a personal interest in things outside of his own country. He may wish that his country did or did not adopt certain foreign policies, but he recognises that these will be acts of volition and not of necessity. The Britisher knows that his Government will be forced by circumstances to play some part in every event of importance which concerns the foreign relations of any other country. In this difference lies, as suggested, the possibility of much misunderstanding in Anglo-American relations as concerns the two peoples. The British quite generally consider that Americans are selfish and stand aloof by choice from matters in which they should take a hand. The Americans quite generally have the impression that the British insist upon having a finger in every international pie for the sake of the gain that may come out of



it. The cause of the misunderstanding is that the British do not realise the entirely voluntary character of any American participation in international controversies between countries other than their own, and Americans do not fully realise the necessity which drives the British Government into all international situations to protect vital interests for which that Government is already responsible to the British people.

The more clearly the radical difference in point of view engendered by these different positions as to foreign affairs is understood, the more importance will be attached to it in considering the relations of the two peoples. The British position is vastly complex, and must be studied with care, intelligence and more or less sympathy to be understood to any degree. The principal point to be accepted is that, regardless of how the British Empire was built up, regardless of any possible questionable acts in the past that may have contributed to its greatness, the situation is as it is. The British Empire is now in being, its interests concerned with the welfare of four hundred and fifty million human beings, comprising scores of different peoples, speaking different languages, employing different customs, religions and theories of government, and occupying territory literally in all parts of the world. The fountain-head of all government for all these peoples in all these different lands is the British Government as represented in London. Upon that Government rests the responsibility for the welfare and safety of them all, and the result of the vastness of this organisation is that no important move can be made by any other Government which is not of some concern to the British Government in its relations to people under British dominion who might be affected thereby, and there is not an important country in the world which does not have within the immediate sphere of its influence some community over the destinies of which the British Government exercises control.

No questions of international boundaries, no legislation affecting the rights of foreigners—in fact, no action touching the lives of other than its own nationals—can be taken by any Government which does not concern the British Government, not from an academic point of view, but as a practical question in the administration of its great trust. American interests

are concerned first hand with the North and South American continents, the West Indies and certain comparatively limited areas in the Pacific. Matters affecting the two continents and the West Indies are simplified through the recognition by European Governments of the principle of non-interference set forth in the so-called Monroe doctrine, one of the few continuing ideas in American foreign policy. It was with extreme reluctance and many forebodings that the American people accepted dominion over the Philippine Islands, for it was believed by many that an extension of the American sphere of influence to such a distance, and into a region where international jealousies played a considerable part in the determination of policies and events, might force the United States Government to at least partially abandon its well-established policy of political isolation.

This feeling was expressed in steps which were immediately taken to provide for the independence of the Philippines at such time as it might seem advisable. That time has not yet come, and may never come, for many able men who are familiar with the question and who have served as governors over the islands have warned the American people that complete independence for the Philippines was as yet inadvisable, not on account of American interests, but in the interest of the native people themselves. There is still a strong feeling in America in favour of letting go their far dominion, but it must be recognised that there has been some growth of Imperial spirit in the administration of American affairs, which means among the people, in recent years. The country has become so great in its wealth, population and influence in the world's affairs that to hold or release the Philippines from American rule does not seem to be such an important matter as it was twenty-five years ago.

The results of the Great War have also had an influence upon the situation, for the United States has acquired the responsibility of the control of islands here and there between the western coast of the American continent and the Philippines which somewhat complicates the situation. Those who feared political difficulties might arise from this extension of American influence into Asiatic waters have been justified to a certain extent, for it is doubtful whether much of the friction with

Japan noted in the past few years would have come about otherwise. Without possessions on the western shores of the Pacific the questions of naval armament, possible aggression upon American territory and the need of such careful consideration of Japanese intentions would not have become so pressing. The questions of race discrimination, the protection of American interests in China and other matters for discussion with Japan would have taken care of themselves without any serious threat of armed conflict, especially as the matter of race discrimination was one of American interior administration, and in that of China the United States could depend upon the co-operation of other great Powers in restraining Japanese ambitions. The trusteeship of the Philippines changed the whole character of American relations to Japan, and has threatened in the past, and will again, to force the American Government more intimately into the international councils of other nations interested in Pacific affairs.

In the case of Europe, however, a section of the earth's surface which now holds the attention of all peoples and Government, the United States occupies no such position. American interest in Europe is in no sense territorial. Vast financial and commercial interests that country has in Europe, and the prosperity or depression of the people of the United States is closely linked with the present and future state of Europe. There is also a great humanitarian interest and concern felt by the American people in Europe, as is evidenced by the national assistance given since the Great War, a work of salvaging humanity not surpassed in history. With inter-European disputes the American people have no concern in times of peace, whereas the British Government and the British people look upon these as not only within their ken but as possibly affecting British territorial and political interests. It is not the concern of the American people, from their own point of view, as to what political combinations are made in Europe, but it is the need of the British Empire to so far as possible control these combinations as to either maintain a balance of political power in Europe or else to provide if possible that the preponderating power is not antagonistic to British interests.

In the past twenty-five years America has been gradually forced by circumstances, some of them originating in increasing

wealth, influence and power, to take a larger interest in world politics, and with this larger interest has naturally followed a greater degree of participation than has been thought desirable by the American people. While in the case of the British Government such interest and participation is part of the regular work of governing the Empire, and taken as a matter of course by the British people, the American Government advances slowly and cautiously in all such matters. There is very little of the imperialistic spirit among the American people, and any move along that line is made reluctantly and with doubt as to the wisdom of such a course. The American Government, however constituted politically at such times, is well aware of this national sentiment, and in its caution, hesitancy and apparent reluctance to move in matters where American territorial rights are not involved merely reflects the mental attitude of the nation. Among the British people the reaction is just the opposite, for any British Government giving evidence of lack of foresight in foreign affairs, and which failed to act promptly and decisively for the protection of British interests however remote, would fail to retain the confidence of the electorate.

This difference in attitude towards foreign affairs between the two peoples is enormously important in its effect upon all international affairs and in its direct bearing upon a mutual understanding. It should be realised by both nations that it is not a matter of character or temperament, but one of circumstance and environment. The British are taught from the cradle that the affairs of the whole world, or any part of it, are British affairs ; while the American is taught, from an equally early age, that American affairs have boundaries to the north, east, west and south. It may be suggested that it seems hardly credible that the great body of American people should feel this way when so many of them came from Europe themselves, or their parents or grandparents came from Europe, leaving many family relations still resident in the Old World. It would appear that these people would take a lively interest in the lands of their ancestors and that this would constitute a sufficient body of opinion to have a decided influence upon the American outlook.

The truth of the matter is, however, that many of these

immigrants were of a class which had no concern with politics, national or otherwise, in the countries of their origin. It is also true that, while they may retain a sentimental interest, they were glad to get away, and would be very much upset at the idea of returning. Their chief interest in the older country, if they have any, is the relatives left behind, and one of their great and successful efforts in the United States is to provide means for these relatives to join them in the land of their adoption. The experience of many of them has been such as to induce them to favour anything that is different from the old environment, and the political boundaries of middle Europe have been so frequently changed that such loyalty to old tradition as there may be is more racial or family than to any particular political subdivision. As a rule these people become enthusiastic Americans, and develop a loyalty to the country in which they have found a home at times almost fanatical in character. There is an element of so-called intellectuals driven from their European homes by severe conditions of one kind or another which clings to the traditions of a former country and which will do all it can to assist the older country, politically and every other way. These people are, however, generally in revolt against the Government in power in the country of their origin, and the United States Government is forced to ignore their efforts to make international trouble.

An extraordinary instance of this has been the Irish Republicans in the United States, and it has only been by exercising the utmost care that the United States Government has kept free from difficulties with the British Government over the Irish question. A perfectly correct position has been maintained by the American Government in both Democratic and Republican administrations during the whole of the Irish crisis of the past few years, but only those who were required to conduct the affairs of the United States Government during that period are fully aware of the extremely difficult and delicate task allotted to them. In the end, however, this disturbing element has become innocuous in the international situation, and no matter what may happen in Anglo-Irish affairs in the future, the matter would never again cause such deep concern to the American Government as it did in the period immediately following the Great War—which concern was relieved only

when the British Government came to an understanding with the Irish Free State. The Englishman who goes to a foreign country, or even to a British overseas possession, to live, never ceases to be an Englishman, and though he may never accomplish the return journey his dream is to again at least visit the country of his birth, or even return there to live until he dies if fortune be kind to him in his foreign adventures.

There is little of this undying loyalty to native lands observable among those of any race who go to make their homes in America. They soon acquire a feeling of permanence, and if the new country is kinder to them than was the old, as is generally the case, there is no such urgency in their possible desire to revisit their ancestral homes as in the case of the Englishman who is elsewhere overseas. Once the immigrant—of whatever race or from whatever country—is absorbed into American life he seems to be satisfied to remain where he is, and quickly, though unconsciously, adopts the general attitude of the American people to the effect that their interests lie mainly within the boundaries of their own country and that their energies can be fully and most advantageously employed at home.

## CHAPTER VI

### NATIONAL TYPES

**T**HERE are several easily recognised physical types of the home-grown American. The long, lean wiry figure, the face with high cheek-bones and strongly developed jaw, the rather cold blue-grey eyes, fair colouring and nervous temperament are familiar to all the world, for that is the type from which the Uncle Sam of caricature has been drawn. Then there is the shorter and stouter figure, the smooth, nearly round face, a greater variety of colouring and a more lymphatic temperament. These are the two principal types of the native-born American, as was demonstrated in the muster of five million men in 1917 who were between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-one. The first-named type is that of the settlers of New England who came from England. The descendants of these overseas adventurers became the pioneers of Western America, and soil, climate and conditions of life further accentuated their physical characteristics, as they had influenced the physique of the aborigines. The stocky, round-faced type of American is generally of Teutonic blood, and his physical likeness runs more to that of the people of Northern and North-Western Europe.

It was often remarked in England when the American troops were crossing that country on their way to France how many of them resembled the Australians and how many of them looked like Germans. There was good reason they should, for the first-named physical type sprang from the same stock as the Australians, and they and their fathers had lived much under the same conditions as have prevailed in Australia. The other physical type resembled the German for like reasons, and it would be found, if the life-history of each one of them had been traced, that this type was more experienced with the life of communities, large or small; that they were more recently American than the others, and that in consequence physical

environment had not had as much opportunity to set its mark upon them as in the case of the other type mentioned.

It is impossible to classify any nation completely by types, physical or mental, and especially in America, where sufficient time has not elapsed to produce an unmistakable native always of the same description. Even in countries where the people have been of one blood for many generations there is no hard and fast rule for describing all natives. America gives signs, however, of being on the way at least towards producing a physical type of white native peculiar to that country and different from the native of any other country, and the two physical types mentioned above are already clearly defined in the great mass of the population which has been American for several generations. The lean and nervous type is, as stated, the older of the two, and probably indicates what will be done by the natural physical environment to the human life entrusted to its care if time is given for the accomplishment of more universal results.

There are interesting mental differences between these two types of American-born which are as readily noticeable as is the physical contrast. The lean and nervous type is generally reflective, laconic in speech and direct in purpose. Impatience of circumlocution and quickness of action are characteristic. There is more of the nature of the Puritan or the Scotsman than of the bucolic Englishman, the Welshman or the Irishman. Passion is there of a devastating nature, but it runs deep. When it comes to the surface something generally happens. The plump and lymphatic American native is loquacious, sentimental and simpler in his mental processes. He is, under normal circumstances, friendly, good-natured and easily amused; but his feelings react to atmosphere and surroundings quicker than those of his lean brother. He has more the responsiveness and temperament of a child, and often lacks depths and hidden resources in his mentality. His goods are generally all on the counter if anyone asks to see them.

It is the more nervous type which has governed America, formulated the ideals and led the people in all great crises, notwithstanding the fact that it is in a minority in the nation as a whole. The fear has been expressed that this variety of American is either dying out or is becoming hopelessly lost



in the vast aggregate of humanity which now inhabits the country; and that as this influence weakens, so will the character of the nation change, and not for the better. There is no reason to believe this to be true when fundamentals are considered. It is only when judgment is based upon more or less superficial symptoms that it even appears to be true.

In this year of 1923 the American people are afflicted with two vast evils: one is sentimentality and the other is the spirit of sacrifice to the god of business. The blighting effects of sentimentality are apparent in American literature, in the theatre, in religion—and in fact in nearly every activity of human life, excepting in the domain of business. It is a poisonous element in the national life, which kills originality and retards genuine intellectual progress. It is the cause of most of the pessimism extant as to the direction in which the nation is travelling.

To the casual observer the American people are worshippers of the Golden Calf and have no other real religion than sentimentality. All too many do measure the worth of a man by the size of his accumulation of tangible wealth, or by his ability to get it for others. Success has but one meaning to these people, and to them life is wasted unless its results are financially good. Children are taught to measure men and affairs with this yardstick, and spirituality is looked upon as a luxury few can afford. If man or woman hankers after it to the detriment of his finances he or she is looked upon much as a spendthrift youth who dissipates his inheritance of opportunity in life. He who runs may read these things in American life, for they are in evidence everywhere and in everything. What he who runs may perhaps not read is the saving grace which is in the nation, and which flows quietly in a deep, strong current through the national life, occasionally, but rarely, though convincingly when it does, coming to the surface, but for ever exerting its powerful influence upon the national character. This saving grace ranges from a momentary doubt as to the real value of what all the noise is about to a complete sacrifice of everything popular opinion would hold as worth while for the sake of being intellectually and spiritually honest. Mothers with the shadow of the future in their eyes are trying to bring their children to a realisation of real values. In most cases there is a necessity

for compromise at the moment ; but the seed is being sown, and the harvest will add largely to the spiritual reserves of the nation.

The late war was a moment of revelation to the American people, not as a time of martial exaltation but as an exposure of the false gods followed after by humanity the world over. Poisonous sores in the body social and politic were laid bare by the shock of war and illuminated by the torch of reason. The American people, previously serene in their ignorance or their avoidance of the truth, have been shocked and mentally stunned by these revelations. They have withdrawn to themselves in their attempt to regain their equilibrium and take stock of their future relations to the world at large. The national conscience has been awakened, however, beyond return to its former state of torpidity, and that comfortable feeling of self-satisfied isolation which prevailed has gone for ever. Twist and turn as the nation may, it will never escape the spiritual discomfort of a feeling of moral responsibility. Proof is forthcoming that the so-called New England conscience is not a myth, but is one of the pillars upon which has been built the social order of the largest community of white humanity in the world. It has become encrusted with all manner of strange decorations, but these have been proved to be stucco only, and they fall with the impact of truth.

This element of saving grace in the character of the American nation betrays itself sometimes in obscure phenomena and sometimes in the manner of a great revelation. The urge for education and culture, which expresses itself in some form or other in every community however small, and oft-times appears ridiculous to the sophisticated, is just as much a sign of the soul of a people clamouring for an outlet as is the great moment of a national sacrifice. The strength of this element of saving grace in the life of the American people lies in that optimism which is the basis of American character. America is the land of the optimist, where the pessimist is a rank outsider and holds no sway. There is always hope ; there is always the belief that things will come right in the end ; and this gives a stimulus to courage which is invaluable. The keynote of American life is optimism, not only in material things but in spiritual as well. No matter what trials the nation may be going through, this

note never changes, and to-day it constitutes a practical guarantee that adverse and undesirable conditions will not prevail permanently in the life of the nation.

The American people have set their hearts and minds to the task of making their country the best they can according to their lights, and being young, strong, determined and optimistic they may go far along the road towards a human ideal. When the nation comes to full flower then decay will set in, and somewhere else the experiment will again be repeated, but in the life of a nation as it goes the American people have a long way yet to travel before they reach the highest peak of their progress. This will fall far short of an ideal, as such human affairs always do, but the morass of sickly sentimentality and worship of false gods through which the American people are now travelling is but an incident along the way. In these stirrings of the spirit which have been noted, and in the national uneasiness which is unmistakable, lies one of the great impulses which are bringing the English-speaking peoples of the world closer and closer together. It is intangible, therefore of more importance and significance than any tangible act of the moment, no matter how formal or complete it may appear, or what it may seem to mean one way or the other.

Superficially there are many discouraging features of present British-American personal intercourse. Some of these are due to characteristics of that type of American who is most in evidence in foreign countries, for reasons either commercial or personal. There is a note in all American life which is foreign to the life of Europe, and that is stridency. The young enthusiastic American business man is a born "boomer" and salesman. He cries his wares that all may take notice, and will admit nothing derogatory to anything American unless he is at home. There he is a persistent "kicker." A "kicker" is not a grumbler. The latter is ineffective. The former generally gets something done, for he "kicks" to a purpose. There is also a blatant variety of American, very numerous it may be said, but who is just as obnoxious to Americans who are not blatant as he is to foreigners. He is the man who is always bragging as to his hundred per cent. Americanism, and it is often the case that his hundred per cent. has been acquired within the space of one or two generations of his family.

The opposite member of this individual in British life is the man who begins all things with the assumption, not to be controverted, that all things British are the best, and that the highest praise he can bestow is to say a thing is very English. This assumption is made quietly as a rule, however, and with such an air of unassailability that it acts as an irritant upon the citizen of any other country, especially an American, and has a tendency to increase the blatancy of the latter. The only difference between the opinion of the Britisher and the quiet American as to the latter's blatant fellow-citizen is that the American, of whatever temperament or manner, understands his fellow-American, does not take his idiosyncrasies very seriously, and realises that probably beneath it all he is a very good-natured and decent fellow in his relations to his fellow-man. Practically all citizens of Great Britain, with the exception of a few who are counted in their own country as eccentrics, have no influence at work to counteract the belief of the people that the British are really after all the only one hundred per cent. people in the world, and that few citizens of other countries reach even into the nineties. The old story of the Scotsman who asked an American where he came from, and was told by the American that he came from "the finest country in the world," the Scotsman then remarking that his friend must in that case have lost his accent, is a human illustration of the way most people feel about the country of their allegiance. It is natural, and there is nothing wrong in it. It is only the manner in which the attitude is impressed upon others which makes it merely identifying or thoroughly obnoxious. The enthusiasm of the naturalised American for the land of his adoption is not always rightly interpreted. One of the best explanations was given by one of them when asked what made him so attached to America, of which he had recently become a citizen. He replied to the effect that it was the new-comer's "daily experience with that personal decency and largeness, that warm generosity and trustfulness, that sense of fair-play and soundness of heart which win and hold him, because these are the essence of Americanism." He also said that "for every one who admires our traditional shibboleths there are tenscore thousand or so who surrender their hearts to their neighbours."

In the United States certain well-defined and powerful forces are at work which go far towards directing that composite and elusive element known as public sentiment. There are certain conditions that prevail in America which are known and recognised by many people. Some people are more familiar with one phase of American life than they are with others. It is necessary in any attempt at a summary, however, to mention what may be declared to be the obvious, but what is obvious to one may not be obvious to another. All the conditions prevailing in America are known necessarily, but not so many people are familiar with them all as to make it unprofitable to comment upon those most vital to American foreign policy as dictated by public sentiment to the Government at Washington.

The United States is a country about 3000 miles from coast to coast east and west, and 1200 miles from the Canadian border to the north to the Mexican border to the south. This great tract of land is more or less well occupied by 112,000,000 people, of whom about 11,000,000 are negroes. The degree of illiteracy for the entire population over ten years of age is about six per cent. The illiteracy of the native-born whites is two per cent.; of the negroes twenty-three per cent.; of the foreign-born whites thirteen per cent. The total number of native-born whites who can neither read nor write is less than the total number of illiterate negroes or illiterate foreign-born whites. These figures show that the potential population of white people in America who can read and write is about 100,000,000. Since the American Government was organised nearly 40,000,000 immigrants have come to the United States, every country in the world being represented. Before 1914 the figures of immigration had reached a total of about a million and a quarter a year. During the war, owing to military service and difficulties of travel, the tide ebbed, but after the war again it rose rapidly, and in 1921 it was evident that unless some check was put upon the movement it would soon reach the million mark. Owing to bad conditions in Europe a vast exodus of European people to the United States was threatened, and on 19th May 1921 a law was passed limiting the number which might be admitted in a single fiscal year (which in the United States is from 1st July of one year to 30th June of another) to three per cent. of the number of each nationality

resident in the United States according to the census of 1910. Under this law the total number of immigrants admitted in a single year cannot exceed 358,000.

In the fiscal year 1922-1923 this quota was exhausted before the end of the year for all countries except Germany. From that country there was no great movement, partially because of restrictions still in force against Germans nearly everywhere, and also because the money of the class that emigrates was of such low value in foreign currency as to preclude the possibility of travel. The quota of immigrants allowed from the United Kingdom, 77,000, was filled by 1st May 1923, or two months before the end of the year. There is always considerable agitation in America over the question of immigration. The labour unions are opposed to any large influx, as are many people who believe that the social organisation of America has an undue strain put upon it by the admission of a large number of aliens.

The large employers of labour favour unrestricted immigration, as do the people who have friends and relations in the older countries who desire to go to the United States. The Jewish element is particularly insistent upon making the United States the refuge for all the indigent Hebrews who can be got there from Russia and many other countries. In 1923 it was proposed to limit the immigration to two per cent. on the same basis as the law of 1921, which allowed three per cent., and the indications are that in the future immigration into the United States will be severely restricted rather than encouraged.

## CHAPTER VII

### INFLUENCES AT WORK

**T**HE foreign-born white population of the United States in 1923 was about 14,000,000. Of these 14,000,000, 7,000,000 were males over twenty-one years of age. Of these 7,000,000 over 4,500,000 had become naturalised or had taken the first legal steps necessary to become citizens. The nationality of these 14,000,000 foreign-born citizens or residents of the United States is of interest in that it indicates the possible trend of public opinion when the descendants of these people shall have been completely absorbed into the social body of America. It is found that 3,300,000 are British—1,200,000 of these coming from Canada; 1,000,000 from Ireland; 800,000 from England and 250,000 from Scotland. Other principal nationalities are as follows:—German, 1,686,000; Italian, 1,610,000; Russian, 1,400,000; Polish, 1,140,000; Scandinavian, 1,000,000; French, 120,000; Dutch, 132,000, and Belgian, 62,000. It is significant of such influence as may be exerted upon American life by alien immigrants that about twenty-five per cent. are of British origin, while no other nationality exceeds twelve per cent. It is also of some interest that practically all of these foreign-born residents make their homes in the northern half of the United States, very few of them being found in the south.

About one half of the people in the United States live in cities and the other half in the country, but the cities now show a tendency to gain on the country in the matter of population. About eighty per cent. of the males over ten years of age are wage-earners and twenty-one per cent. of the females. These wage-earners are about equally divided between the agricultural and manufacturing industries, with a slightly larger percentage in the latter. Nearly one half of the houses in the United States occupied as homes are owned by the people who live in them. In 1920 there were 104 males for every 100 females in the population. In the United States there are 25,000,000

families living in 21,000,000 houses, and there is an average of slightly over four people to a family. The population of the United States in 1790 was about 4,000,000. In 1890 it was about 63,000,000 and in 1923 it was about 112,000,000, or a growth of 50,000,000 in thirty-three years.

The first settlements being in the eastern seaboard, the centre of population in 1790 was several miles east of Baltimore, Maryland, or about fifty miles west of New York City. In 1920 the centre of population had moved nearly six hundred miles to the westward, and was found to be in Indiana, one of the states of the Middle West, and in the valley of the Mississippi river. There are only five cities in America with a population of over one million, and only nineteen with a population of over five hundred thousand, but there are over eighty with a population of over one hundred thousand. The population of the United States averages 35.5 to the square mile, while that of the United Kingdom averages about 303 to the square mile.

All of these facts are obvious, and can be easily secured in a few moments by anyone, and from authentic sources ; but it is useful in any attempt to visualise a country and the nation that live in it to occasionally group the salient physical data in such a way as to renew impressions as to the conditions under which the people live in whom we are interested. These figures are most significant of the environment of a nation, and this environment has much to do with the physical and mental life of those who are under its influence, and in its reactions can be found the explanation of many of the psychological phenomena possibly otherwise unintelligible. In Great Britain is found nearly one quarter of the entire population of the country resident in or near-by a single great city. In the United States the same percentage of the total population is scattered over thousands of square miles, in hundreds of cities of moderate size. In Britain it is generally the case that the same families have lived in the same place generation after generation for hundreds of years. In America the population has been on the move since the beginning of occupation by the white man. A family which originated by the Atlantic seaboard may find its representatives of to-day in some one of the far-western states, with groups of relatives dotting the trail here and there back



to the eastward, thus marking the temporary halting-places of the erstwhile pioneers.

In Great Britain every child born in the land finds as he grows up that custom, convention and tradition have fairly well marked the path he will tread. His houses have been built for him, and even the flowers planted in the garden. In America many a youth with character still unformed has been one of those who codified the rules of life for a newly established community. Of late years American life has shown a greater degree of fixity ; for there are many places, even in the west, which now call themselves old as time runs in America ; and they are old to the present generation, although their fathers or their grandfathers may have been among the first settlers.

“ Old Settlers’ Day ” is still an institution in many American towns, and on that day gather together those who may have made the plan for the modern city which now covers a large area of the erstwhile plains or valleys. That same permanence of residency and address which is such a marked characteristic of British life is possessed by few Americans. It is quite the usual thing to pull up stakes on short notice and without ceremony adopt a new home, which may be three or three thousand miles from the old one. It is not considered a very serious matter, nor is it regarded as ending one and beginning another epoch in life as it might be considered in England. In many novels of English life one book ends and another begins when the hero has moved from one city to another. In America this might occur within a chapter, and be mentioned only as incidental to an account of some emotional crisis.

It is estimated that about fifty-five per cent. of the blood of the American native-born white population is of British origin—a larger percentage than that of any other nationality. Next comes the German, or rather Teutonic. The British element has been feeding the stream of American immigration steadily year after year, but nearly all of the Teutonic blood came into the country between 1875 and 1900. Following the Franco-Prussian war, Germany endured sixteen years of industrial and agricultural depression, and in a single year in the eighties as many as a quarter of a million Germans left their country for the United States. On the whole, they were the best immigrants that came to America at that or any other time. Many

of them were farmers, and they came to take up Government land in the north-western states, where they worked hard, prospered, made good citizens and their descendants made good Americans. Regiments of them came back to Europe in 1917 and 1918 to help defeat Prussianism in the land of their fathers, and no better troops ever faced gun-fire or fought with a clearer idea of their purpose than they.

The Teutonic element in the population has been thoroughly absorbed into American life, for in 1913, and for some years preceding, only a few thousand left Germany for America, owing to better economic conditions prevailing there than when the great exodus of thirty years ago was in progress. From east to west and north to south in the United States it will be found that it is the descendants of the British and the peoples of North-Western Europe who conduct the affairs of the country. They hold the offices, make the laws and, as a rule, comprise that class known as the leading citizens of nearly every town, village and country-side. To the British, Germans, Swedes, Norwegians and Dutch, America owes the dependable qualities of the nation. It is worthy of note, however, that it is to those of British descent that the American people have turned in their search for men to place in high positions. Every President of the United States, with two exceptions, they being Van Buren and Roosevelt, has come of entirely British stock. The men who have held the highest executive, legislative and judicial positions in the United States from the beginning of the Republic to the present time have nearly all been of Anglo-Saxon descent. This much granted it is necessary, however, to note the difference in character and mental and physical attributes which have been brought about by the different conditions under which live the Anglo-Saxon of the United Kingdom and the Anglo-Saxon of the North American continent.

It is very evident that it is not physical conditions alone which create a national type, if there be such a thing, for the Canadian is no more like a native of the United States than he is like a home-grown Englishman. The Canadian and his near neighbour to the south live on the same kind of land and enjoy the same climate. They speak the same language and their material interests are largely the same. Their respective political and social structures are slightly different, but not so

much in contrast as to account for great differences in national character; and yet the two peoples, Canadian and American, are as foreign to each other as almost any two nationalists in Europe so far as mentality is concerned. This is all the more significant in that many Americans and many Canadians come of the same stock, and the social and business exchanges of the two peoples are as frequent and intimate as they are among the two peoples each in their own habitat. The estimated population of Canada is less than nine millions. Half as many Canadians as there are in Canada to-day have crossed the line into the United States to make their homes, and among the foreign-born now living in the United States are 1,200,000 who came from Canada—a number equal to nearly one-sixth of the present population of the country of their origin. With all the social intercourse which this state of affairs implies, the Canadian and the American remain distinctly as of different nationalities to even the most casual observer.

To actually define the difference in mentality is difficult, but as the influences which prevail in the national life of America come to be estimated it will be realised how unlike they are to those which influence the population of Canada, especially in the eastern and middle sections of that country; and the inference appears logical that it is the effects of these influences, or in other words the national mental atmosphere, which plays its part in forming the character and temperament of a people. To accept the Canadian, however, as representative of that type of Britisher with whom the American must come to an understanding for the purposes of an international entente between the British Empire and the United States would be a mistake, for it is, and always will be, the Mother Country that sets the pace in international affairs and relations. The foreign policy of the British Empire as a whole would be dictated in all its larger phases from London so long as the Empire lasts, and it is the Englishman at home who makes or unmakes his governments, which in their turn control and direct Imperial policies. An English Government utterly in disfavour with a British overseas people might easily be of lasting quality if it satisfied the people of the United Kingdom, whereas a Government to which this same overseas dominion might give enthusiastic approval might go down in overwhelming defeat

if it failed to measure up to the home standard in some matter with which perhaps the overseas dominion had no concern.

In no country in the world is public sentiment so influential in legislative and executive matters of government as in the United States. An expression of public sentiment is quickly secured, and is generally unmistakable. This is due to the character of the popular sources of information of the newspapers and other periodicals. Excepting perhaps in the heat of a political campaign, and then only in extremely partisan newspapers, practically all of the two thousand or more larger newspapers of the United States are independent politically to a greater or lesser degree. Scattered as they are from one end of the country to the other, and intensely local in their bid for support, each one is quick to sense the wishes of the immediate constituency. While in Great Britain the London newspapers are read by everyone, and thus have a national character, there is no newspaper in the United States which may be said to have much more than a local following. This is due, of course, to the greater distances which separate the cities, but it is a notable factor in securing a prompt reflection of popular sentiment upon any issue, without regard to a general national situation or the position of the Government.

No American newspaper has, or pretends to have, the influence with the Washington Government that is assumed by any one of the leading daily newspapers in London in its relations to the British Government. American newspapers have been charged with the circulation of propaganda, but no one of them has ever reached a stage of partisanship for or against a man or policy which has been achieved by some of the London dailies of large circulation. The American Press bends its knee at times, in particular instances, to financial or industrial interests, but no newspaper could live for long with the American people if it coloured the news, twisted facts and quite generally ceased to be a newspaper and became merely an organ in the intense desire of the proprietors to serve a certain line of policy. The result of this situation is that an American visiting England could read the newspapers in vain in an effort to find out what the English people thought about any particular man or matter. He could find out what each particular newspaper proprietor thought, and what he was trying to get the

Government to do about it, but to arrive at any intelligent consensus of public opinion would be impossible.

If he read a lot of newspapers all of the same date of issue he might realise a drift of general opinion along a certain line, but the chances are he would simply be confused at the positiveness with which each publication asserted its own views and its own theories as to what should be done. Practically all of the greatest newspapers in the United States are independent politically, although most of them incline to the support of one party or another. This has come about within recent years, and is relative to the enormous growth of what is called the floating or independent vote, which goes with the party most in favour with the people at the moment. To present the news and let their readers think out matters for themselves, making their own deductions, is the aim of American newspaper editors. In recent years the London newspapers have given their readers the impression they were not getting all the news, that every "special correspondent" was sent out with full instructions as to what his newspaper wants him to find out and report, and that the whole editorial force of the newspaper was using every resource and straining every nerve to force the reader to a certain conclusion.

This attitude on the part of the London newspapers is far more noticeable than it was ten years or more ago; and quite recently also there has come over a large number of the London daily newspapers an air of provincialism in their "stunts," their claims for credit due for this or for that, their self-advertising, and their methods generally, which compels an unfavourable comparison with the London Press of a few years ago. The more important section of the Press of America, with its many admitted faults and weaknesses, has seemingly outgrown long ago some of the methods now apparently popular with newspaper proprietors in London. Many of the newspapers of the larger English cities outside of London still retain the dignity of older methods, and by contrast are superior to their London contemporaries.

The number of people in any community who think for themselves is small. The thinking of most people is done for them, and their opinions are mere reflections. The result of the prostitution of so many of the London newspapers to the

policies of their owners is that a few moments' conversation with anyone will generally reveal the newspaper which he reads each morning, without any names being mentioned. The use of a great daily newspaper which has achieved wealth, importance and a large circulation through enterprising news and distribution methods in earlier days to disseminate a particular slant upon affairs is no more or less than a fraud upon its readers, or else the use of the word "newspaper" is a misnomer. The Press of all countries at the present time is more or less guilty of this subornation of news, but it is doubtful whether in all the history of London journalism, and it has a great and wonderful history, conditions were so bad as they were in the years following the war.

During the war there was sufficient excuse to warrant almost anything, but after the war the people were entitled to receive a record of events written without bias. The editorial—or leader page, as it is called in England—is the place for opinions, and not the headlines upon the newspaper or in the text of the news. This idea sounds slightly old-fashioned and out-of-date nowadays; but the older school of journalism, in which one of the first principles instilled into the young reporter was to avoid any editorial comment in his reports of events, produced good men who had the confidence of their readers. One of the advantages possessed by the reader of American newspapers is that nearly all of the news comes from associated or co-operative sources, and as these sources serve papers of all shades of opinion, the news must be kept more or less impartial to satisfy all of the clients. A writer of headlines in an American newspaper office who injected partisan opinions into his work would soon be called to account by his chief. This matter is of considerable importance in all international relations, for if the reader's eye is greeted with a headline which prejudices his subsequent reading one way or the other it is a dishonest attempt to influence a patron who has bought what has been erroneously called a newspaper. In this manner a twist can be given to foreign news which robs the news itself of its true value.

American newspapers are more given to flippancy in their treatment of news, even concerning important matters, than are the papers of London. The latter are more apt to laboriously and solemnly work at the propaganda game, with perhaps more

serious results in the case of British readers who do not discount the effort, as is more the habit of Americans to do. These remarks do not apply to all British newspapers or to all those of America. There are notable exceptions in both countries, newspapers which still attempt to live up to the principle of the older school. As before stated, however, a leading newspaper of London is more influential with the British people as a whole than a leading newspaper in any large American city is influential with the American people as a whole. The centralised life of Great Britain gives the papers of London a far greater influence with the British nation than any paper in New York, Chicago or San Francisco could possibly have with the American nation. The use of the popular daily newspaper of large circulation in Great Britain for the dissemination of views rather than news is a danger to which the British people are slowly awakening. No nation which holds so tenaciously to intellectual and spiritual freedom is going to allow such a state of affairs to exist for long without rebuke.

What will probably happen is that history will repeat itself, and the leading newspapers of to-day will not be the leaders of to-morrow. The history of every great newspaper property is that at some time in its career its power began to wane through a mistaken policy, and its influence was gradually dissipated in the effort to carry through something which the community rejected. The great searchlight of the Press of the world, as it plays over the surface of international affairs, either discloses things as they are or records distorted shapes confusing to the minds of men. It is within the power of those who direct the destiny of this great factor in human affairs to make it a mirror of truth or one of falsehood. It is an awesome responsibility.

## CHAPTER VIII

### AMERICAN ISOLATION

THE people of the United States were much criticised—not only in England but in every other country, including Germany—for their complete withdrawal from European affairs in the years immediately following the making of the Versailles Treaty. This withdrawal was emphasised and made complete by the departure of the American troops from the Rhine in January 1923, and this particular move gave opportunity for expression of displeasure in the European Press that was promptly and fully taken advantage of. Most of the comment in the British and German Press was made on a regretful note rather than critical, but much of the French Press comment was bitter and sarcastic, due to the feeling that the American departure was in fact significant of American disapproval of the French advance into the Ruhr.

There is no doubt but this French interpretation of American action was more or less justified, for the executive power of the United States Government, guided by well-balanced and non-partisan reports from its representatives, had reached certain conclusions in 1922 concerning the situation in Europe. The most important of these were, in effect, that Germany was unable to carry out the terms of the Versailles Treaty, that the Allied Councils would fail to agree upon such modifications as were necessary, and that France was determined upon measures the wisdom and purpose of which were more than doubtful, and which might lead to complications in which it was desirable that America should not become involved. Hence it was that the American Army of Occupation on the Rhine was ordered home. At the earnest solicitation of the Allies this order was so modified as to leave a small force at Cologne. As soon, however, as the French advance into the Ruhr began, previous conclusions appeared to be entirely justified, and without delay the sentry post still held by American troops on the Rhine was



evacuated, and on 25th January 1923 a transport left Antwerp taking back to the United States the last remnant of that army of over 2,000,000 men which had appeared in Europe during the years 1917 and 1918 to fight side by side with the Allied armies against those of the Central Powers. Thus came to an end America's greatest foreign military adventure.

The United States declared war on Germany on 6th April 1917. The first American troops landed in France on 26th June 1917. Between that date and 11th November 1918, or in about nineteen months, an army of over 2,000,000 men, with equipment and supplies, was sent to Europe, while over 2,000,000 more were being prepared to join the Expeditionary Force if necessary. Between 11th November 1918 and the spring of 1920 an army of about 5,000,000 men was demobilised, and the size of the army limited by law to 150,000, including those who sailed for home in January 1923. The direct cost of this great adventure was about 320,000 casualties reported, while, of course, there were thousands of others whose lives were ruined from the effects of military service, and an expenditure directly chargeable to the war and its reactions of about 50,000,000,000 dollars. It is possible that in the course of time 10,000,000,000 dollars of this amount may be recovered, though this is a very liberal estimate.

In other words, the money-cost to the American people of nineteen months of war will, at the best, amount to about 40,000,000,000 dollars, or as much as the total National Debt of the United Kingdom in 1923. In return for this expenditure the United States acquired no new territory or profitable "mandates," and exacted no reparations. It was a loss dedicated by the nation to the future security of the United States, and the national moral responsibility to the cause of civilisation, regardless of political boundaries. These few facts are recounted merely as a reminder of the tangible quality of the background of American interest in the subsequent situation in Europe. Having raised an army of 5,000,000 men, and spent an amount of money representing about 10,000 dollars for each one of the 5,000,000 soldiers, the American people most naturally watched with keen interest the reactions from the great game in which they had played a hand, especially as they were not allowed to forget the post-war claims of those

who actually participated, and the tax-gatherer reminds them each year of the enormous increase in the national debt incurred thereby.

It is the fashion for those who speak and write for the public to dwell upon the alleged lack of knowledge and lack of interest the American people take in foreign affairs. From certain points of view there is ground for such a complaint, but it is not advisable to underrate either the knowledge of, or the interest felt in, what is transpiring in Europe. In the great Middle West, where live the people who constitute the bulk of the population, and who determine the course of political events in the biennial elections, are newspapers of enormous circulation, which spend as much or more money on foreign news than do the newspapers of the seaboard states. This section of the Press, which caters to the readers of the Middle West, is free from many of the influences, financial and political, which dictate the policy of the newspapers of the large eastern cities. They are more impersonal in their presentation of the news, and, as a rule, more impartial. If their readers were not interested in foreign events they would not spend the money in foreign news service, nor would they give as much space to such topics as they do.

These papers all have correspondents in London, Paris, Berlin, Rome and elsewhere, who are expected to take an entirely impartial view of passing events in their respective territories, and they generally succeed in doing so, according to their lights. In addition to these newspapers there are weekly and monthly publications, of large circulation and national character, edited by able men, who are as familiar with European affairs as they are with those of their own country. The reading habit is universal in America, and it is an exceptional home which is not reached weekly, if not daily, by some good-class journal of high standards as to literary quality, editorial honesty and impartiality.

Before the war between the United States and Spain in 1898 the people of the United States, with the exception of those who lived near the seaboard or had personal or business reasons for being interested in foreign affairs, were extremely indifferent to events abroad unless they were of sensational interest. With that war came more or less of an awakening; and it is

quite reasonable to believe that, had the war of 1898 not occurred, it would have taken even longer than it did to bring the American people into the war of 1914. The period between 1898 and 1914 was remarkable for the growth of American interest in foreign affairs, as is well known to every writer and author familiar with the literary market of those years. There was a great educational movement observable during that time.

An apparent attitude of remoteness or indifference to the political controversies of Europe is often mistaken, not only by foreigners, but by American observers as well, for a lack of knowledge and lack of interest concerning European affairs. There is a fundamental difference between the American and the European point of view which is not always appreciated. The people of Europe are, naturally, either for or against whatever may be proposed as a policy in European affairs. The American, so far as European affairs are concerned, may be neither for nor against; he may be merely trying to get at the merits of any controversy which may arise. He is in the position of a spectator at a great game; and, unless his personal feelings are involved in some way in the outcome, he views the efforts of either side with impartial and more or less critical eye. One reason why the European is either for or against is that he is closely concerned with all controversies which may arise, and is liable to become involved at any moment, even if he or his country had nothing to do with the question originally. The American knows, on the contrary, that there is a very remote chance of his country being forced to take sides in any argument between European nations over European affairs. He knows that unless he elects to become an active participant he will not be called upon to take a hand in the game. Hence his attitude is more or less judicial, until his reason or his emotions put an end to his neutrality.

The American people came in to the Great War wholeheartedly. Their attitude towards the affair was well expressed by an enlisted man who, landing in England on a cold and foggy day from an uncomfortable and disease-stricken transport, was asked by a British officer if he did not want to go home. "Yes," he said; "I wish I was home; but there is a job to do over here, and we can't go until it's finished." That

was it. There was a "job" to be done in Europe. America came in to help do it. Once accomplished, that was the end of America's active participation in European affairs, in the sense of being a party to any European controversies or international squabbles. To make a clean-cut entry and a clean-cut get-away, involving no post-war commitments or complications that would make the United States a party to any European political disagreements, was the idea, and it has been carried out with a marked degree of consistency.

All the Governments of Europe have been held by their own nationals to share to a degree in the responsibility for conditions which led to the outbreak of the Great War, or, rather, which made it possible. The American people felt that they had no share in this responsibility, and the war being ended satisfactorily from the American point of view—that is to say, the Central Powers being defeated and self-governing republics being constructed upon the ruins of unlimited monarchies—they wanted no subsequent responsibility for events which might arise during the political reconstruction of Europe. The unfortunate episode of an American President, on his own initiative and without a mandate from the people or from that governing power of the country the Congress of the United States, entering into conversations and agreements which could not be made authoritative brought in its train many unforeseen difficulties, and led to serious misunderstandings of American policy in Europe, the reactions of which will continue for many years.

The only remedy for this lay in prompt repudiation of all that conflicted with the American idea; complete withdrawal from the danger zone, and refusal to become involved in any way, through the acceptance of mandates or the assumption of any position which would make America appear as an arbitrator or referee in the settlement of European affairs. This policy was adopted by the voice of the nation immediately following the signing of the Versailles Treaty. It was shaped, emphasised and carried out in detail by the next national Administration, and was supported by a large majority in the Congress of the people's representatives.

In the confusion which followed the attempt to carry into effect the terms of the Versailles Treaty every possible effort,

not to say subterfuge, was being employed to induce America to change her policy, or to engage attention in such a way as to involve her in passing European events. All political possibilities having been exhausted, the avenue of approach then most in favour was that of finance, with the lure of profit and increased foreign trade as the inducements. Even this failed, however; and with considerable stubbornness of purpose America declined to enter a field where conditions were so confused and, in many cases, motives were so open to question. The answer of America, both from Government and private sources, was to the effect that the question of reparations must be settled in such manner as to bring about some degree of stability to European affairs before American energy or money could be expended in the attempt to restore more or less normal economic conditions in Europe.

It is difficult for a European to thoroughly understand the detachment with which Americans are able to view foreign affairs notwithstanding their participation in the Great War. It is a matter of heredity, education and habit of thought, originating in the circumstances under which the American Republic came into being, progressively confirmed and accentuated by events in Europe during the past century and a quarter, and assisted in every way through geographical isolation. It is also due to the fact that few of the many problems which are constantly arising in the conduct of European Governments owing to the juxtaposition of alien peoples find a likeness in those with which the American Government or people are concerned.

For these reasons the American must be conceived as a man who looks upon European affairs as more or less a single proposition, in which, however, there is always the interplay between the different countries and nationalities of that section of the earth's surface. To say that he is always judicial, and therefore impartial, would not be true, for every human being has his prejudices, sympathies or leanings, of one sort or other. In a great community like America, however, where education, racial origins and varied environment create mental differences to a marked degree, the leanings of one largely balance the leanings of another, so that the net result is a composite neutrality of judgment. Add to this a large element of what is known as practical common sense and directness of method,

and the verdict given by such a nation would at least merit the careful consideration of those interested.

It is not that the American is cold-blooded, mercenary, ultra-practical or lacks idealism. He shows none of these qualities when questions come home that affect him personally in the same manner as Europeans are affected by European questions. He judges Europe in the same manner that Europeans judge America when the matters at issue do not interlock with personal affairs. It is the judgment of the disinterested onlooker, tempered only by the methods he employs in analysis and the direction given his reasoning by environment and education. When Europe demands that America shall take a hand in European affairs, and is surprised, and more or less pained and disappointed, at a refusal, it is because the American point of view is not understood, and it is doubtful whether it will ever be given due credit for its real honesty and desire to be fair to all.

If Americans do not understand the European situation and are unfair to the Allies, as is claimed, it is not for lack of instruction on the part of the many foreign representatives who have gone to the United States and told them what they ought to do. Those gifted admonishers have been eagerly and respectfully listened to, and handsomely remunerated for their coming. What they have said has not been ignored. It has been widely discussed and carefully considered, but in the end America has formed its own judgment and the Government, being of the people, has acted accordingly. The action has seldom pleased anyone, and certainly has never pleased everybody; this being an entirely natural result of considering the interests of Europe as a whole and those of no single country to the exclusion of others.

In considering the attitude of America towards Europe after the war it is necessary to eliminate all that was said or done during the war period, and to take into account only the reactions of post-war events upon American opinion. At the end of the war France probably stood highest of all the Allies in the love and sympathies of the American people. England commanded a tremendous degree of respect and admiration, and also inspired the conviction that a determination of the immediate future of mankind would rest largely in Anglo-American

relations; that if these were maintained at the desired pitch things would go very well indeed. This latter conclusion is considered to have been already justified.

Unfortunately the same cannot be said of France. That country has fallen from its former high estate in American opinion. For some time prior to the Washington meeting on naval disarmament a feeling had been growing in America that France was showing considerable militarist spirit in the conduct of her Government. The French attitude at that meeting came as a great disappointment, and it has been generally asserted, and it is generally believed, that this attitude minimised the good results that might have been obtained. Then came the more pressing—and even more immediately important—question of German reparations. The work of a group of international bankers, dependent largely upon American financial resources, was rendered negative through French action, and it soon became apparent that England and France were drifting rapidly towards a hopeless disagreement as to the policy to be pursued towards Germany.

As has been shown at some length, the American nation is not “pro” anything in Europe, nor is it “anti”; it is certainly not pro-German in the sense that term is generally used. The national mind had been made up for some time that Europe must get together—or, in other words, the question of German reparations must be settled—before America could even consider participation in reconstruction work. The French advance into the Ruhr further alienated American sentiment from France and drew it closer than ever to England, as the position of the English Government in the matter of German reparations was very largely the view taken in America as to what might be possible, or at least what might be accepted as a basis for discussion of practical measures which would be just to all and yet make good to the Allies a large percentage of their losses through German culpability.

The action of the French Government in forcing Germany into a legal bankruptcy and then taking over a large—and the most productive—section of German territory gave rise in America to serious question as to French motives. America came into the war to help destroy the Prussian system, which was founded on force. It was not anticipated that the power

given to France by her Allies, without whose help she would now have had no power, should be used to impose the will and ambitions of France upon Europe, notwithstanding the disapproval of their Allies. This move on the part of France has postponed indefinitely any American participation in the economic reconstruction of Europe, and it marked the opening of a new chapter in the story of what happened to Europe after the Great War that is likely to furnish interesting reading matter for the rest of the world for some time to come. America did not come into the war—in fact, neither did any of her other Allies—to make it possible for France to become, through force, a great imperial and imperious power in Europe, a power undertaking to govern alien peoples against their will for the material benefit and greater glory of France. By the move into the Ruhr France laid herself open to the charge that her demand for reparations, and reparations only, was insincere, and that it cloaked great ambitions of more imperialistic and militaristic character.



## CHAPTER IX

### THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS EUROPE

THE American Government and a large proportion of the American people were fully convinced that Germany could not comply with the original French requirements in the way of reparations. This belief was founded upon information secured not only from official agents or observers but from some of the ablest business men and financiers of America. These reports showed conclusively and without bias that Germany was economically and financially exhausted, that the health of the people was deteriorating through under-nourishment, and that the mental state of the population was not favourable to a general recovery under existing conditions. These reports also showed that Germany was still potentially rich, and that with some encouragement would be able in the near future to make considerable returns to her creditors. Had France agreed with the British Government upon some plan which would have enabled Germany to realise upon her assets there is no doubt but that American financial aid would have been forthcoming. No loan proposed for the betterment of Europe was possible in America so long as the proceeds, directly or indirectly, were to be used for the maintenance of armaments, and the American people did not believe that the standing army of France was the minimum needed for safety.

The French attitude towards the financial state of France has not inspired trust or admiration. The French people practically refused to pay such taxes as prevailed in Britain, and the only way the French Government found possible was in the depreciation of the franc. This is a tax which is imposed upon every inhabitant without the aid of a tax-gatherer. The Government paid its way with cheap money, the low value of which is not so obvious so long as it is used within the country. The contrast between the French and English position in regard

to the value of the monetary units in these countries respectively was fully noted in America, and widely commented upon, not entirely to the credit of the French. By a process of deflation in England, assisted by some inflation in America, the pound and the dollar returned nearly to parity. The agreement reached between England and America as to the funding of the debt to the United States reflects credit on both countries. England agreed to pay, and America agreed to an interest less than that at which the Washington Government could borrow money in the usual way.

There are certain issues of United States bonds which draw less interest than that imposed upon the English debt; but, as is known to English financial experts, these bonds are used, as provided by law, as security for bank issues of paper money, and they are the only security allowed for note issue, hence are in exceptional demand. The prompt acceptance by the British Government of the terms agreed upon was a move of the highest importance and greatest value, politically as well as financially, and it is not beyond the bounds of probabilities, if financial conditions in the future warrant an era of cheap money such as prevailed before 1914 for gilt-edged securities, that the matter will again be reviewed, and the English debt given the advantage. The point made in the agreement to the effect that no other country indebted to the United States should receive any better terms than are given to the British Government gave the financiers in Paris something to think about. The immediate effect of the settlement of the English debt to the United States was excellent, for it removed the only possible ground of serious controversy between the two countries then in sight.

The attitude of the British Government towards German reparations, and British disapproval of the French advance into Germany, was in harmony with American opinion on those matters. That there was a difference of opinion in the United States concerning the same was a matter of course; but a majority of Americans, and official America, believed that the British Government was more nearly right than the French Government, and this in itself emphasised the similarity of British and American ideas on such questions. In the action of the British Government there was also an echo of that oldest

of British foreign policies which, in times past, had restrained the advance of the French to the Rhine when Germany was weak and France was strong. In the case of America it was an assertion of a vaguely defined national policy, but a generally accepted and clear-cut idea among the people, as to the inviolability of a country's boundaries in times of peace, technical peace at least. It was not any particular tenderness for the Germans which caused the protest, but an honest belief that no good could come out of an armed invasion into a foreign country ostensibly for the collection of debt but giving rise to suspicion as to other motives.

American opinion was also sympathetic with the British belief that no real settlement of German reparations would come about that way; in fact, that it at least postponed a settlement beyond original probabilities, and might possibly lead to further confusion in Europe, thus retarding the progress of the world towards that goal all nations were hoping to reach—one of approximately normal conditions. If the question of German reparations had been a purely business proposition there would be no difficulty as to American participation. A commission of experts, such as suggested by the American Government, would have evolved a practical plan, profitable to the Allies. Such a settlement was, still is and ever will be impossible, for the matter was not a purely business proposition, nor was it a business proposition at all. It was a situation controlled absolutely by politics, nationalism, passions and prejudices, and being such it could only proceed along the nature line of evolution, bringing further disaster and more suffering to all the nations concerned. There may be triumphs by one party or another to the controversy, but these will be but temporary as time goes. If this generation does not pay the bill the next will. No humanitarian with international sympathies can fail to feel a degree of hopelessness at the perversity of mankind, for when Prussianism was laid low through the combined moral force of all the nations a glimpse was had of the beneficent possibilities of the near future.

It is not difficult under these circumstances to understand why the American people, as represented by their Government, desired to stand aloof from European difficulties. The conditions they would have imposed for participation were possible

of fulfilment in 1922. The action of the French Government destroyed this possibility beyond recall until the people of Europe, and of the whole world for that matter, demonstrated the futility of the methods employed; and it may be long before the evidence becomes conclusive, and the bill of costs more than the disputants can bear, but the proof will come in the end. The guiding principles of events upon the European continent in 1923 were contrary to all American beliefs as expressed in their own system of international relations. The American people are a nation of conscientious objectors when they do not believe they are advocating the cause of humanity.

When the draft brought 5,000,000 men into the American army, created to fight in what the nation believed to be a holy cause, there were only fifty real conscientious objectors to army service. Having assisted to the best of their ability in winning the fight, and thus giving the world a chance to start afresh with what seemed to be the poisonous element removed from international relations, they waited to see what those would do who had been freed from menace. The results were bitterly disappointing, and with quite natural appreciation and sympathy they felt the ties growing stronger between the only two countries in the world between which there can be a natural, logical and permanent alliance of spirit—that is to say, the United States and the British Empire. With a full realisation by America of the dangerous position occupied by Great Britain in her relations to the countries of Continental Europe, the American people noted the fact that the British Government did not sacrifice its well-established principles and the beliefs of the nation to political expediency and join with the French in their German adventure, and to them it bespoke a serene confidence in the support of the British people for what they believe to be right no matter what might be the cost at the moment or what it might portend for the future in new political alignments in Europe.

The foreign policy of the British Government has always been one of more or less isolation, but with freedom to arrange alliances or ententes whenever necessary to the maintenance of a balance of power which neutralised unfriendly combinations or assured the dominance of British will on international affairs. British statesmen foresaw the rise of the Central Powers to

wealth and power through the energy and ambitions of Germany. Some of these statesmen favoured an alliance or an entente with Germany, as it had been the general policy of England to arrange advantageously with the stronger rather than the weaker power. A realisation of what Germany might become if the progress made during the fifteen years preceding 1914 was maintained overcame this policy, however, and every effort was made to form an international *bloc* to counteract this threat of the future and to ensure safety in case of armed attack. This led to the so-called Dual Alliance with France and a strong pro-French policy. In 1908 Lord Rosebery said he feared that British foreign policy was being sacrificed upon the altar of the French entente, but those who thought as he did were in the minority, or not in power, and an anti-German grouping of European powers came into being, the demarcation becoming more evident every year.

Strong anti-German feeling was aroused in England from various causes, and through the premeditated effort of those who believed a war between the two countries was an inevitability of the future. The building up of Germany as a naval power added to the feelings aroused by German success as a foreign trader. Public feeling ran so high that men of high position openly advocated the destruction of the German fleet without a preliminary declaration of war. Letters advocating this action were published in British newspapers of the highest standing. Hence it was that when Germany, apparently bent on suicide but in reality intoxicated with the rapidity of her rise to wealth and power, struck at what was considered an opportune moment, and in a manner deemed irresistible, the people of the British Empire were mentally prepared for the blow. That they were not physically prepared was due to the belief of many that the time for German open aggression had not yet come and to a disinclination to incite to war by apparently asking for it.

The Germans were defeated before they mobilised their military forces, for they were going to war with a machine against an ideal. They were attacking a spiritual force which would inevitably triumph in the end, even had the military arms of Germany been satisfied for the time being. The defeated peoples would have risen in time against the dominance of what

is known as Prussianism, and if defeated again would have but paused to gather new strength. Germany was from the beginning up against the rising tide of democracy that was gradually, throughout the world, submerging long-prevailing ideas as to the relations of man to man. The truth of this was acknowledged by many Germans during the war and since the Armistice, among them being some of those who led the German nation in its blind and headstrong attack upon an undefeatable though intangible force. In this can be found the appeal made to the American people, and it was this, in addition to the actual material danger threatened by a triumphant and ruthless Germany, which brought America into the war in spite of a national antagonism to armed conflict which is inspired by a belief in its wickedness and futility.

In 1915, when the European conflict was apparently reaching the stage of a deadlock, the people of Europe who were fighting Prussianism turned their eyes inquiringly towards America. They visualised that country as the greatest and most powerful democracy in the world, and they felt, as this was no ordinary war between nations equally bent on plunder, that the American people must have a vital interest as to the outcome. The question was asked continually as to when the United States was coming, not especially to the aid of England, France, Italy or Belgium, but to help in keeping the democratic ideal from becoming, at least temporarily, eclipsed in Europe. The author of this book, an American, but then serving the Allies to the best of his ability, invariably made reply to the effect that if the war lasted three years the American flag would be found on the Allied front. This reply was based upon a knowledge of the American people and their psychology acquired through many years of close contact and observation with every type of community that lies between the Atlantic and Pacific seaboards. This estimate was published in the Allied countries in 1915, and proved in time to be as nearly accurate as such things can be. The American people had first to be convinced that the war was not of the usual type of marauding adventures against which they had set their minds. They had to become convinced that some great principle to which their national life was devoted was at stake, and incidentally to believe that, if the forces of evil, as they conceived them to be, conquered in

the territory then involved, that the time would come later when the challenge would be heard nearer home.

Against their reaching such conclusions powerful influences were at work. The German element in the population of the United States is large and influential; the anti-British element, largely of Irish extraction, is also large and influential. These two great forces at work to keep America neutral were aided by the general disinclination to war, fear of resulting political complications in Europe and such element of selfishness as is found in every community safe and comfortable itself while others are embroiled in devastating controversies. To fully understand why it took such an apparently long time to bring America into the war it is also necessary to have actually experienced that sense of security, and that freedom from all the restrictions and disabilities which afflicted the people of Europe, such as prevailed in America while the Allies and the Central Powers were at war in 1914 and the two years following. A tremendous inertia would naturally prevail in any country under similar circumstances, and the wonder is, not that it took nearly three years to overcome everything that restrained participation, but that it was achieved in so short a time. The entry of America into the war was no involuntary gesture of defence. The danger to the United States or American territorial rights in any part of the world was remote. Even this remote danger could have been indefinitely postponed by guarantees Germany—or in fact any of the countries at war—would have been willing to give to secure a continuance of American neutrality, or to secure American aid, whichever might have best served the purpose in view.

The American phase of the adventure was that of a man who, aroused by cries for help, leaves the security and comfort of his own fireside to volunteer in a struggle in which he believes right is in danger of succumbing to might, or conclusions obnoxious to the theory of American life, and which if triumphant threatened to make it more difficult eventually to resist that conclusion in his own affairs. In that sense America went to war for her own protection, but it naturally required a longer time to bring the nation to its feet in fighting mood than if the enemy had suddenly appeared on American frontiers. Again it must be recalled, in considering this matter, that

those large and influential elements in the population already mentioned were all the time trying to deaden the voice of the conflict without, and to convince the American people that it was none of their affair.

Probably no single aspect of the affair did more to hasten American participation than the quick response of the British to the call of Belgium and France. The fact that those countries constituted the European frontiers of Great Britain, and in their integrity acted as a buffer state between Great Britain and Germany, was used as an argument by those who were anti-British. The fact of the more or less bitter rivalry which had existed between the British and the Germans before the war was cited as evidence as to the lack of disinterestedness on the part of Britain. But these arguments were swept aside in the strong and rapidly rising current of popular feeling which, after all, grew in volume and insistency because of the blood-brotherhood of the two peoples. The English-speaking peoples were threatened in the danger that had come to the British section of that unformulated union, and a vast majority of the American people felt they must share that danger in hopes of averting it.

When the United States Government called upon the nation to give it the money to carry on the war against Germany over 60,000,000 people gave of their earnings or their income to further the cause. Every man or woman who bought a United States bond issued for that purpose was aware of the fact that his or her contribution meant help for the Allied as against the Central Powers, and barring the small percentage of those who bought these bonds for purely financial reasons, or for reasons of expediency, the wide and rapid sale of these securities was a revelation as to the real sentiments of the American people and their true attitude towards the merits of the struggle then in progress in, to them, far-distant lands.

It is not difficult to realise the reaction that came about in America following the Armistice as the people realised more and more, with each passing year, the inadequacy of even the Great War to bring peace, justice and contentment to humanity in the face of the political ambitions, international jealousies and rampant chauvinism which developed on the European continent after Prussianism met its defeat. America came into the war with the declaration that, no matter how much the



effort cost, or what might be the outcome, the United States would ask no new territory or reparations. The objects for which the Allied and associated peoples fought having been accomplished, and a German republic having taken the place of that form of government most obnoxious to American principles, an unlimited monarchy, the American people, in the simplicity of their way of thinking about foreign affairs, cannot fully understand why the European cauldron continues to seethe, and the peoples of that part of the world appear to get deeper and deeper into the mire with the passing of time, instead of beginning at once to reorganise for recovery, and eventually for betterment even over the pre-war state.

Here again they find themselves more or less in accord with much that the British have attempted to do in what they consider the right direction, and also in accord with the attitude of the British Government towards reparations. They have noted that the only people in Europe who, notwithstanding their enormous losses and damage sustained, are willing to waive rights given them under the treaty of peace are the British. To say, as was said, that both Americans and British deplored the invasion of Germany by France because it postponed a revival of markets for the goods of the English-speaking peoples is to fail of a comprehension of the unhappy state of the European peoples.

Both British and American Governments were well aware that international commerce would be restored only by the people of Europe regaining a guarantee of peace and safety, but the actual revival of that commerce was incidental to larger questions, excepting for its significance as an index of returning stability. In 1923 France was the only country in Europe which had achieved a likeness to pre-war prosperity. Her foreign trade then surpassed her trade of 1913. That people were prosperous was shown in the fact that they were saving and investing at the rate of about 2,000,000,000 dollars a year. In this same year Great Britain still showed a loss of nearly forty per cent. in foreign trade as compared with 1913 and over a million workers still vainly sought employment. The feeling aroused among the English-speaking peoples on both sides of the Atlantic by this comparison was one of reproach to France for the selfishness of her policy.

## CHAPTER X

### SYMPATHETIC EVOLUTION

THE apparently incomprehensible features of life in Great Britain to the American and of life in the United States to the British are many, and understanding is not always attained by the casual visitor to either country. These things often reach back into history, or into the very character of a people, and a clear conception of background is seldom secured without long residence, careful observation and logical deduction. It is of interest and considerable importance to make note of some of these phenomena, for they are oft-times indicative as much—or more—of character or temperament as they are of physical conditions, political or social systems. International comprehension and understanding of the public men of any country is rare, and especially so as between Great Britain and the United States.

Occasionally some figure appears upon the stage whose personality all the world is able to grasp, the reason being, in some cases at least, that his character, as revealed in his words and actions, makes appeal to feelings, to desires and aspirations common to all peoples. Such a man was Abraham Lincoln, and no people in the world are more appreciative of his quality than the British. Then again there are men who rise to power in one country by force of character, opportunity and circumstances who are understood by the people of another nation because they are of a type familiar to their own national life. Such a man is David Lloyd George. In recent years the one person in British public life comprehensible to the average American is this Welshman, who, though more or less of an exotic in British politics at the time of his advent in national affairs, deposed the erstwhile ruling class of Great Britain from its monopoly and had things his own way for a long time. He came into politics through the law, as is the American custom, and likewise from humble beginnings. He possessed no

hereditary rights as an overlord ; no family connection gave him a leg up for his political journey, and no vested interests were behind him. In fact, he had all these elements against him. A magnetic personality, a great gift of speech, and an opportunist of adroitness, great imaginative power, and the ability to put into words the dreams of the people, all combined with political genius of a high order, made him an outstanding figure in American eyes, for the simple reason that they knew him.

American political life produces many men resembling him to a remarkable degree, although it may be said few who are as great in his way. Had he been born in the United States, and chosen that country in which to develop his career, he could have become President, or at least risen to great political power. It does not follow, because of these things, that Americans set him upon a pedestal, or find no flaws, for the American electorate is not given to hero-worship and is rather cynical as to politicians. In a good-natured way they would discount any claim to perfection, but would whole-heartedly give him credit for his talents, and would probably give him wide opportunity to exercise them in the public service. A politician is not necessarily a great man, but it is equally true that a great man can be a politician, and that David Lloyd George is a great man and a politician is proved by a mere recital of his occupations during the decade which ended in 1922. Of another type was the late Theodore Roosevelt, another great man who was a master politician. He was an aristocrat, however, and lived a life physically and mentally in sharp contrast to that followed by David Lloyd George.

The one incomprehensible person to the average American is a representative of the British governing class as he is to be found in Parliament or holding important office under the British Government. The American people need no introduction to David Lloyd George, for they have in their midst many editions of the same man—smaller editions, at the moment, in all probability, but presenting possibilities along similar lines. A man they do not know, and never could know, is Lord Balfour, another is Lord Robert Cecil, another is Earl Grey of Falloden. There are scores of others who, for the same reasons, are, and will always remain, beyond the consciousness

of the American public. There are no men in American public life like these, for conditions have not been such as to produce them. America has never had, and will not have for another century at least, a cultured leisure class which goes into politics for the love of the game or because of inherited responsibility. It has been said of such men as these that they are the most finished product of modern civilisation. This is probably true, but they are also the product of a political system based upon the existence of a governing class. No country without such a system many generations in force could produce this type of public man, and in no country of importance other than the United Kingdom have political and social conditions been sufficiently stable for a long enough period to yield any like product. The human mind, being comparative, yields no knowledge or understanding of this type of statesman outside of Great Britain, and especially in America is he remote from the political world of the people. When such a man visits the United States he is viewed with curiosity and interest, tremendously admired, and the country which enjoys his services is openly envied, but as for holding that he or his like could find a permanently useful place in the American political system, nothing would be farther from the thought of the American voter.

This foreign cultured product is looked upon as a survival of historical interest possibly soon to become extinct, crowded out of public life and service by those of more democratic origin. It is not a question of loss or gain, merely an inevitability. Even before 1914 the fate of the so-called governing class—in other words, the land-owning aristocracy of the United Kingdom—was in the balance. Its history had been written, and the only questions were as to what should follow, and as to how long before a substitution took place. The advent of David Lloyd George into national and Imperial politics was the outward and visible sign of the approach of a new epoch. It was probably a more or less vague realisation of this which inspired the intense bitterness of the Conservative section of British society against him, his ideas and his followers. The war hastened the evolution in the British body-politic. It would have come about had there been no war, but it would have taken longer for the process to operate. The old-time,

well-entrenched governing class was defeated, and individually they acknowledged the new order.

David Lloyd George did not bring it about. He was a symptom rather than a cause. In the same manner the late Theodore Roosevelt did not bring about the great revolution which took place in American politics when he succeeded William McKinley as President of the United States. Being a great politician he saw what was coming, voiced the then unorganised demand of the nation for a change in political methods, and thus became identified with the subsequent upheaval which eliminated much of the commercialism in politics which had characterised the days of his predecessors. There is rather an interesting --- not to say remarkable --- coincidence in the beginnings of both these movements, one in the United States and one in Great Britain. In truth they, in turn, were but phenomena of a mighty movement that was world-wide in its manifestations. No thoughtful observer who travelled in many countries during the years immediately preceding the Great War could have failed to take account of the general unrest which was a marked feature in all communities, whether those of the highly developed modernised nations, those which had long passed the meridian of their greatness, or those in which modernisation was just beginning.

In the United States Roosevelt was spokesman for a people determined to throw off the rule of capitalistic vested interests. In the United Kingdom Lloyd George was the leader of a revolt against vested interests of another sort. In China age-old dynasties were falling into disuse. In Japan labour was uniting and becoming articulate in its protest against exploitation. In Germany suddenly prosperous people were becoming intoxicated with their success and communicating that intoxication to the nation. In Italy it seemed it would be but a day before another monarchy would fall to make way for a republic. Then came the war, and for the time being everything went into the melting-pot. As the world emerges from this cauldron it is found that in some countries the process at work in 1913 has continued, and will persist to the end, and that in others there has been a set-back which will take time to overcome. The character of this process and its apparent object varied in different countries, but generally speaking the world-wide

unrest of that period was due to a rising tide of democracy or self-consciousness amongst the masses of the people. This came from more widespread education, the increasing power of labour organisation and its general demand for more universal representation in government.

These things may appear remote to the matter of British-American relations, but they are far from being so. Had the people of the United Kingdom given no evidence during such a period that they were concerned with these matters it would have widened—or at least hardened—the gap existing between them and the people of the United States, a gap entirely natural as between a nation given over theoretically to a complete democracy and one still retaining at least the outward form and many of the characteristics of a device of Government long rejected as undesirable in American eyes.

It was the stirrings manifest in British politics during the ten years prior to the recent war which aroused new interest in America in British affairs and led many Americans who had accepted the older shibboleths without question to revise their opinions. They realised that politics in Great Britain were no longer in a fixed state, that it was no more a mere question of ascendancy between two political groups both standing largely for a continuance of the same political and social order. For generations America had been taught in such a way as to give the impression that the England of even 1900 was largely the England of George the Third so far as its Government, its attitude towards foreign affairs and the complete ascendancy of the so-called governing class over the great majority of the people were concerned. The outspoken opposition of many British to the Boer War, and the discussion arising therefrom, attracted considerable attention in the United States, and occasioned not a little surprise. Then came the advocacy of the cause of the workers, the discussion and adoption of more or less socialistic legislation, the attempted changes in the House of Lords, the various extensions of the Franchise and the serious consideration of votes for women. This was a Britain of which few Americans had any knowledge.

Students of international and foreign affairs, exchange professors and those who lived part of their lives abroad were perhaps not surprised, for these things did not come suddenly

to the British people. The average American was not a student however. What he knew about Great Britain originally was what he was taught in school, and his familiarity with current events was measured by the diligence of his reading, which with the ordinary mortal deeply occupied with his own affairs of the day is more or less casual. This reading was also largely confined to newspapers and periodicals, which seek to entertain rather than to seriously inform their readers. The importance and significance of political events in Great Britain just prior to 1914 triumphed over even preconceived ideas and indifference of spirit, and a very large number of Americans thus acquired an interest in British affairs up to that time entirely lacking, in the lifetime of this or the past generation. It was not only that things were stirring in Great Britain, but that they were progressing along lines familiar to the American mind, and which met with approval as being in harmony with American theory as to the relations of the State to the people.

There is little doubt but that the American and British nations received their really great impetus towards each other during the years 1900 to 1913 through the reactions of interest in the political events which were taking place in both countries, and that this interest had acquired considerable momentum when the war of 1914 came to a startled world. It is characteristic of certain nations that their labour pains are long and severe before they give birth to important political or social changes, and this is especially true of the British. A movement originating with the people may hesitate and falter at times, but it persists, and in the end brings forth its fruit. This doggedness of purpose is recognised and felt by Americans, and their belief in it was justified; for while in some countries the effects of the war were to almost completely side-track the agitations of pre-war days, in Great Britain they persisted even throughout the war, and came into full flower in the early days of post-war reconstruction.

It is really a matter of doubt whether the war itself, and the joint participation of the two peoples, did as much to arouse American interest in British affairs as the changes which have been taking place in the British political and social structure, which began to seriously attract American attention over twenty years ago. A suddenly acquired interest on the part

of one individual in the affairs of another, or on the part of one nation in the affairs of another nation, might easily prove to be ephemeral when the special circumstances commanding that interest faded into history, but a gradually aroused and more or less sympathetic interest will last indefinitely, and will even weather temporary antagonisms. The mere knowledge that a large number of British people are inclined to put into force certain principles of political and social government in which the American belief is enthusiastic and unquestioned would hold the interested attention and develop a nation-wide and lasting sympathy among the American people of far greater potency in bringing the two peoples into accord than mere co-operation in any single, and necessarily quickly passing, event, no matter how important or even world-convulsive in character.

This excitement of interest in each other's affairs was not one-sided. Up to the time of the Great War, when financial necessities enabled America to largely cancel her moneyed indebtedness to the British people, American securities were held by the British to the extent of hundreds of million sterling. The railroads and great industrial interests of the United States were built and capitalised to a large extent with British money. The advent of the Roosevelt administration in Washington was signalled by an attack upon these great industrial enterprises of enormous interest to the British, as they were large partners in these concerns. The onslaught of the United States Government upon institutions which had appealed so successfully to British capital, and which in the main were so favourably looked upon by British investors, brought bewilderment in its train, and at first aroused considerable indignation.

As very little was generally known in Great Britain at that time concerning American political conditions, and their close connection with industrial affairs, there appeared to be little or no reason for this violent upsetting of business apparently progressing so smoothly and satisfactorily. A new and lively interest was then awakened in what was going on in the New World, an interest which continues to this day, with varying intensity, depending upon the degree with which the recurring reactions affect British interests. The first effect of this newly aroused attention was a sudden realisation on the part of the



now interested British that an industrialised political situation prevailed in the United States of which they had no general knowledge, and for the correction of which no possible blame could be attached to the American people. The secondary reaction was a realisation that there was no intention of destroying property by trying experiments in socialism or through any vindictiveness on the part of the political prosecutors. That some damage might be done, as was the case in the end, was realised, but that as a rule the property of the investors was more likely to be enhanced in value than lessened was soon realised, and British capital remained content, the more timid wishing to dispose of their holdings easily finding buyers.

The action of the New York State Government against insurance companies and the action of the United States Government against the railroads, and then against the great aggregations of industrial capital commonly known as the "trusts," were followed with as much interest in London as in any part of the United States, and through this interest the British reading and investing public acquired more knowledge of conditions in modern America than it seemed a short time before they would ever take the trouble to absorb. Before the days of general enlightenment such knowledge of American conditions as was to be found in Great Britain was confined to specialists, the general public either blindly following their lead or with equal blindness gambling in American shares.

It may be said, therefore, that the first real impetus to learn more about British affairs in recent years came to the American people through their interest in an apparent development in the British Isles of certain ideas akin to the political creed of the American people, or perhaps it would be more exact to say that interest was aroused by an apparent attempt to change, or even destroy, certain features of the British scheme of government and society with which Americans were not in sympathy. It can also be said that the first real impetus in recent years towards a greater knowledge of American affairs by the British came through sudden alarm at the possible fate of millions of British capital then locked up in American industrial enterprises, manifestly sound in themselves, but now ferociously attacked by a political force originating no man knew from

where, and with no apparent guarantee as to its wisdom or responsibility.

It did not take the British investor long to realise, however, that he was not to be the victim of an irresponsible political agitation. He was brought to realise, if he really went into the matter, and many did, that in fact he may have had a narrow escape from a vast depreciation in the value of his securities if things had been allowed to run their course. Many thoughtful Americans believe that at no time since the civil war of over sixty years ago has the Republic, as it was designed by its founders, been in greater danger than it was at the dawn of the twentieth century, through the commercialised politics of that critical period. Fortunately for all concerned, an intellectually honest man came into the White House, whose interests and mental activities were not particularly concerned with business, a man with supreme political courage, which no vested interest or political ring could bully into subjection. Theodore Roosevelt had his grave faults, and made serious mistakes in policy and in action, but the people of the United States owe him an enormous debt of gratitude as the man of the hour in a great national crisis. No ordinary or conventional politician could have performed the task which lies to his credit, and the master minds of the British and industrial world soon realised his value to the financial responsibilities of which they were the administrators.

The American people look upon David Lloyd George as the clever instrument whereby the current and impending changes in British national procedure were brought about or made possible, and so it is to these two men, so different in character, personality, in fact differing at every point on which two men can be compared, that the British and the American people, indirectly at least, owe their revival of interest in each other, and their consequently greater mutual knowledge and understanding. From the British point of view it took a great effort and a long time to bring America into the war in 1917. How much longer it would have taken about the year 1900 it would be impossible to say, but it is extremely doubtful whether the United States would have sent an army to Europe within three years of the European outbreak had it begun, say, in the year 1897. It was not until several years after this that real

American interest in British affairs was aroused in a friendly spirit, and this friendly interest was very much alive by 1914, although those who are not familiar with the attitude of Americans towards England, and foreign affairs generally, before 1898 may find this difficult to believe.

By 1914 there was far more stirring in British public life congenial to the American political and social spirit than ever before in the relations of the two peoples. The effect of this was to intensify the feelings of those who were pro-British in 1914, and it served to weaken the arguments of those who were anti-British. With a monarchy almost purely social in its functioning, a House of Lords shorn of its powers, the hereditary legislator in daily fear of losing his political power, an increasing representation of the proletariat in the House of Commons, and the Irish question eliminated from American politics through the action of the British Government, much of the ranting of the American political orator of older days had lost its force. Whether he be correct or in error the average American notes that most of these things came to pass under the political leadership of David Lloyd George, hence his personal interest in the man, and to him is given the credit for arousing the more intelligent and sympathetic interest now felt by the mass of Americans in British affairs and the British people than existed a few years ago; and it is true that this began long before the possibility of the war of 1914 dawned upon humanity. The effect of the war upon that interest was tremendously important, but when the pro-British and anti-British war influences are balanced, the result being in all probability somewhat in favour of the first named, it will be found that the war as a whole was merely contributing to the interest of the two nations in each other, the movement being already well under way in 1914.

It is recognised in America that, notwithstanding the fact that the people of the United States have now become a creditor instead of a debtor nation and that instead of sending vast sums of interest abroad each year they are to receive almost equal amounts, London still remains the international money-market of the world. The British and American people have become ~~the~~ two great creditors of the world, this implying a necessary co-operation in the future in the field of international finance.

It is realised on both sides of the Atlantic that if either country is going to salvage even a considerable part of the money loaned they will have to work together. This in itself constitutes a notable bond of interest in each other's welfare, prosperity and foreign policies. A great strengthening of this bond resulted from the adjustment of the British-American debt, for if this matter had remained unsettled the two countries would have faced each other with suspicion and animosity, instead of being able to stand side by side with no really serious matter at issue between them. No greater blow was ever dealt to anti-British forces in the United States, for by this agreement a prolific source of unfriendly argument and abuse was swept away. Having adjusted their own mutual financial difficulties, it is now possible for the two nations to discuss without heat, or even embarrassment, their mutual relations to other creditors. This phase of the matter was unquestionably the driving force which impelled both Governments to a speedy decision.

## CHAPTER XI

### DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION

UNTIL very recent times at least British comprehension and understanding of a common type of American politician who sometimes has an extraordinarily successful career was limited. Men like the late John Hay or like Elihu Root are comprehensible to the mentality of the British governing class. Men like the late William J. Stone of Missouri, who was chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States Senate, or men like William Jennings Bryan, oft-times candidate for the office of President and once or twice nearly successful in his candidacy, are beyond the understanding of those who have been successful in the past in British public life. When, through circumstances of international politics or courtesy, it has been thought advisable for this type of American politician to be dealt with personally by British statesmen, it has only been made possible for them to confine their expressions of wonder and bewilderment to private conversations with their friends by the natural reserve of manner and control of emotions characteristic of the upper-class British of the older school.

What they do see and realise is the vast inherent power and wealth of a nation of over one hundred million people in a land of tremendous natural resources developed through a real genius as expressed in material accomplishment. Their bewilderment arises from the fact that among those who govern that country politically are men whom they would deem utterly unfitted, and to be without equipment for political position of any importance. It comes as a greater shock to find such men highly placed in American Government affairs at home for one reason; because of the quality of the men who have been sent by Washington to represent the United States at the Court of ~~St~~ James's. The choice of men for this position has been remarkably successful. As a rule they have been possessed of

exceptional attainments and unusual culture. They have not always been sufficiently adept to keep track of the intricacies of European politics, and a little more sophistication would have enabled some of them to be of more service to the Washington Government than they were. Secret diplomacy pursued its devious ways all about them and they remained serenely ignorant. Even treaties have been made between European nations of which American ambassadors remained unaware, although the chancelleries of every other foreign embassy were sending full details to their Governments at home. Too often have official assurances been accepted by American diplomatic representatives as the facts in the case, and their credulity has at times been a joke in the family circle of other diplomats.

While this is true it is also a fact that in many instances these same men have been popular with the nation to which they were accredited, and have helped to strengthen the bond between the two peoples. It may be argued that this is really a greater service to the United States than to be completely informed as to secret events in the diplomatic world. This has hardly been so in the past, however; nor will it be even as much so in the future, for the relations of the United States to Europe are now more influenced by the secret diplomacy which still prevails in some countries, and a true analysis of motives and purposes of foreign Governments, than by the popularity of the American ambassadors with the nations to which they are sent.

It is the kindly and forgivable fault of the amateur diplomat to become an enthusiast over the people and institutions of the country in which he represents the United States. This attitude is useful to a certain degree, but beyond that point it merges into a blindness more likely to be of disservice to his own country than of benefit. All the European countries treat American ambassadors with distinguished consideration, and their social life is made as interesting and important as possible, for in Europe politics and society have, in the past at least, worked together for the advancement of home policies. It is indeed a strong character and a level head which is not lulled to a sense of security, comfort, personal importance and an optimistic view of international relations by the consideration and entertainment offered to the man holding an ambassadorial position.

A true reflection of the more or less private acts of a Government, and the discovery of its true intentions and objectives, are of incalculable value to Washington, and all too often what has been forwarded has been the obvious, created purposely as a smoke-screen under which to pursue activities in other directions. The trained European diplomat accepts what is offered him with a full understanding as to its real value though he may give no sign of his scale of valuation. He maintains certain reservations and cultivates the use of his mental antennæ to a high degree. It is not to be expected that an American chosen from academic or business life in the United States can suddenly become an astute diplomat fully aware of all that is going on in a world of endeavour utterly foreign to his scheme of thought. There have been some exceptions—men who have come to Europe with a highly developed sixth sense, destined to become the cause of much discomfiture to their foreign colleagues and of the greatest value to their Government. This is an unanswerable argument in favour of a merit system of promotion in the American Diplomatic Service, and it is apparent that if the ambassadorial positions are still to be left to chance this system should extend so as to include the next highest rank in the embassy. One grave fault has been, and still is to a great extent, that the American embassy is all too often a one-man affair, and that the success or failure of the mission depends entirely upon the personality and attainments of the Ambassador himself. In nearly all other services the Government represented owes the major part of its more valuable and useful information to less conspicuous members of the staff.

The United States Government has not been seriously in error in any of the men chosen in recent years to represent it at the Court of St James's. Some have made themselves popular through social activities made possible by great personal wealth. Others have commanded respect and admiration through the possession of culture or knowledge. Others have made themselves *persona grata* by reason of their enthusiasm for all things British. Society has taken them up, Royalty has unbent in their company, great universities have honoured them with degrees, and in the days when Europe rested in a state of peace and prosperity, and all international questions

could be handled by experts, unknown to fame but upon whose labours the Ambassador based his reports, all went well. The British Government, represented by the Foreign Office, treated them all with equal courtesy and deference, and kept its real opinions to itself.

What the newly arrived American Ambassador did not generally realise until long after his initiation was the close scrutiny of himself and his entourage with which he was favoured by those responsible for the carrying on of British foreign affairs. By the time he arrived in Great Britain his life-long record had been received and carefully considered. Probably more was known about him personally than in the State Department at Washington. Once in Great Britain, he came under the personal observation of those who were concerned with the conduct of his mission. His every act and utterance were considered as of importance in taking his measure. No sentiment was involved in this polite and discreet, but deadly serious, intelligence work. It was not at all unfriendly in character, nor was it ever guilty of impertinence. The British Foreign Office, an institution of mystery to the nation itself, does its routine work thoroughly, quietly and effectively, and at some stated moment this office is able, if called upon, to give an estimate of the man who has come to its home territory to represent a foreign Government. It has a notable knowledge of the life of the foreign representative before he came to England and of its course day by day as he functions in personal and diplomatic capacity on British soil. It is not long before conclusions have been drawn as to his real attitude towards British affairs, his strength and his weakness, his hobbies and his preferences, and it is fairly well known as to what will be his reaction under certain conditions.

All this is so because of the fact that the conduct of the foreign affairs of the British Empire is a profession, for which laboured preparation is necessary and a long apprenticeship required before the candidate is allowed to practise. Being such a profession, or business, it is carried on with all that thoroughness and attention to detail which is characteristic of most British undertakings with a history. The grave responsibilities of the British Foreign Office have always been taken seriously, and it is no haphazard system by which it has always acquired



intimate knowledge of the man who appears before it as the representative of a foreign country.

The British effort during the past twenty-five years to find just the right men for the important post of British diplomatic representative to the United States is an interesting phase of British-American relations during that period. The British mission to Washington was raised to the rank of an embassy in 1893 during the incumbency of Lord Pauncefote, and the American mission to London was simultaneously put upon a like basis, and Thomas F. Bayard was appointed American Ambassador by President Cleveland. The raising of these missions to the rank of embassies had long been under consideration, as the growing importance of the United States in international affairs demanded such recognition. For some years before this event the British Government had rather slighted the Washington diplomatic post, and it was not a position eagerly sought by ambitious members of the British foreign service.

To be sent to Washington was regarded by those who had achieved eminence as something of an exile, and life in the capitals of Europe was considered, with considerable reason from their point of view, as infinitely to be preferred. In the first place the amenities of Washington society were not considered equal to those of Paris, Rome, Vienna, Berlin or Madrid, and in any one of these places there was opportunity for diplomatic accomplishment which would result in personal advancement, a feature almost entirely lacking in the Washington position. The prominence given to Washington affairs when Lord Pauncefote was Minister, the rewards which came to him and the raising of the mission to an embassy brought a change of attitude towards the position. There was some surprise and some jealousy felt at this sudden development, of which Lord Pauncefote had taken prompt advantage and received a reward aspired to by men more prominent and with greater experience in the service. From that time on there was no lack of candidates for the Washington position, and the British Government began to give more serious consideration to the selection of a man to fill the place.

A very interesting series of experiments resulted, some of them successful and others not so happy, for the simple reason

that it was a comparatively new field for the British Foreign Office, in that hitherto the qualifications had not been considered as so exacting as those required of men sent to the European capitals. Personality, adroitness and adaptability were now required, to say nothing of the need to meet the conditions of environment like that of no other capital of an important country. Apparently there were few men available for the position, as it was in one sense an unknown field of operation. It was suggested to the British Government that Americans would be impressed and more or less pleased to have stationed at their capital city a member of the real aristocracy of Great Britain, and the suggestion was adopted. The Hon. Sir Michael H. Herbert was sent to pay his respects to the President of the United States in the capacity of British Ambassador. The pay of the position was large and the entertainment fund provided was liberal. No happier choice of that character could have been made, and but for the tragedy of ill health which cut short his diplomatic career Sir Michael Herbert would probably have remained long at his post, and made an even more enviable record than he did in the short time allotted to him. He was succeeded by Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, who served in Washington for about four years. This was a more or less uneventful period in British-American relations and no opportunity presented itself for unusually distinguished service. Sir Henry's period of service was not an entirely happy time for him, as several unfortunate episodes occurred during his administration. These were however more of a personal or social character than of international import.

In 1907 the question again arose with the British Government as to whom should be sent to Washington. President Roosevelt was then in the White House, and the situation was thus complicated for the British Foreign Office, as it was recognised that the President was a man of strong likes and dislikes, and it was desired to send someone there who would command his personal friendship. By this time the British Government had begun to realise the really democratic character of the American Government, the American people and, to a large degree, Washington society. There was also another reason why it was desirable to send a man to Washington whose character and attainments would bring to him the personal

as well as the official friendship of President Roosevelt. The power of Germany was then growing throughout the world, and especially valuable were Germany's relations and influence in America. Baron Speck von Sternberg, the German Ambassador, was a close personal friend of President Roosevelt, and in fact owed his position to that friendship, which had been formed in previous years, when Theodore Roosevelt was Assistant Secretary of the Navy and Sternberg was on the staff of the German Embassy in Washington in a minor position.

The German Emperor had taken cognisance of the friendship, and when opportunity came appointed Sternberg Ambassador to the United States, hoping to gain thereby certain advantages for German interests. The British Government was aware of this situation, and in sending a man to Washington wanted to select someone who might possibly be able to at least partially overcome the apparent advantage then held by Germany at the White House. It was finally decided that Mr James Bryce would make the required appeal to the nation, and to the White House in particular. Mr Bryce was well known in the United States as the author of *The American Commonwealth*, an authoritative work on America remarkable in its merits, and because of the fact that it was written by a foreigner. He was also a man of democratic habit, a lover of outdoors, a mountain climber and explorer, and in every way apparently a man who would make instant appeal to such a man as Theodore Roosevelt. So Mr Bryce went to the United States as British Ambassador in 1907, and remained until 1912. In that time he became personally well known throughout the United States, and no more popular visitor from a foreign land ever enjoyed such American hospitality as was extended to this man of simple but charming manners and profound learning held so modestly. He was in demand as a lecturer in every State. Universities showered degrees upon him. He performed his duties with ability over a wide range of subjects and during the more or less difficult time of the Spanish-American War. He even went farther than precedent had established in trying to bring the United States and Canada into close relations. In fact, so great were his activities in this direction that he was dubbed the unofficial "American Ambassador to Canada." On his return to England in 1912 he was made a Viscount in recognition

of his services to the cause of British-American amity. With all this, by some strange freak of fortune or personality on one side or the other, he never achieved any degree of intimacy with President Roosevelt.

This did not affect his usefulness to his Government, nor was any personal prejudice exercised against him in connection with any affairs of state, for it is a fact even yet to be fully realised by European foreign offices that to send a diplomat to Washington with the idea that he can influence affairs to the interest of his country by his personal charms or by close friendship with those in high position is to ask for complete disappointment. In fact this very episode yields an example, for the German Ambassador was at that time an intimate of the entire Roosevelt family, but there is no record or evidence of any kind to the effect that the interests of the German Empire were advanced a fraction thereby. Following Mr Bryce came Sir Cecil A. Spring-Rice, whose administration, even though it extended into the period of the Great War, was uneventful so far as he himself was concerned. Ill health was his portion, and when times of unusual stress arrived the burden was taken from his shoulders by special envoys. The first and most important of these was Sir William Tyrrell, of the British Foreign Office, who was practically acting Ambassador for a short time. The special mission of Lord Reading and Earl Grey are part of the history of the war, and it was not until 1920 that the British Government again essayed to find a man for the now most important post of British Ambassador to Washington. This time they followed the example of America and went to the academic field for their representative. Sir Auckland Campbell Geddes, appointed British Ambassador to Washington in 1920, is a Scotsman, with an American wife. He is by profession a teacher of anatomy, and has held leading positions in the colleges of Scotland, England and Canada. His knowledge of affairs is wide and understanding, and during the war he developed what amounted to genius in the work of organising the nation to its greatest possible effort. His administration of the affairs of the British Embassy in Washington justified his selection. He is a man of strong personality and individuality of character. The ultra-cautious diplomats of the older school predicted when he was appointed

that he might at times be indiscreet in his utterances. On one or two occasions there have been flurries over his speeches, and he has aroused some antagonism from time to time, but he soon made himself popular in the United States, for he was the type of man admired by Americans and under whose fostering care the British-American entente was more likely to grow in strength than to decline.

## CHAPTER XII

### ENGLISH GOVERNMENTAL METHODS

**T**HERE is naturally considerable difference in method in the conduct of various departments of Government in London and in Washington. Some of these differences have not always been fully appreciated or understood in either country, and they have at times led to mutual criticism which destroyed the opportunity afforded for valuable co-operation. It is less than twenty years since any real team-work was inaugurated with the machinery of both Governments in matters of international concern. It began in a small way with an exchange of information between the British Home Office and the United States Department of Commerce and Labour which had jurisdiction over matters concerned with emigration and immigration. This in itself was a break in precedent for the British Government, as it had previously been an inviolable rule that all communications with a foreign country should be made through the Foreign Office.

The British Foreign Office has been and still is a remarkable institution. It has always kept itself aloof from other departments of the Government, assumed an authority and independence commensurate with its important relations to the international interests of the British Empire, and no other department feels completely free of Foreign Office supervision in all matters excepting those of the most narrow domestic concern. Many a policy or action has been reversed for the simple reason that the Foreign Office "did not like it," and seldom did that office deign to give the reasons for its dislike. Any American having business of varied character with the British Government twenty years ago involving matters of policy or the relations of the British Empire to other countries, even in smallest matters of routine detail, received the impression of a mysterious and all-powerful influence which brooded over British Government affairs, jealous of its powers

and prerogatives, too reserved and dignified to explain its reasons, and which constituted a court of last appeal, beyond the decision of which it was useless to attempt to go. Other departments of the Government functioned more or less cheerfully, with a certain human element in their method of business, until they happened to come into conflict with the all-powerful F.O.; then everything seemed to flatten out, and humbled Government officials, with apparently chastened spirits, returned to their smaller and less mysterious affairs without wasting time in protest or arguments they knew to be useless no matter how passionately they might feel themselves to be in the right.

When the telephone came into general use all of the departments of the British Government utilised this method of communicating with the outside world—excepting the Foreign Office. When typewritten letters invaded the haunts of officialdom Government communications became less burdensome to their recipients by reason thereof—excepting those communications received from the Foreign Office, which still employed its skilful long-hand writers to convey its polite messages and sterner admonitions and ultimatums with the pen, or even with the goosequill of Shakespearean days. Leading London newspapers, although ardently and unreservedly supporting the Government in all its foreign policies, were unable at short notice to discover just what those policies were to be, owing to the impossibility of getting into satisfactory communication with the powers that be. The exigencies of the business required that something should be said at once, and dignified journals ready to be complaisant were often subjected unjustly to the humiliation of being compelled to print an official or “inspired” statement to the effect that they had, with the best intentions in the world, made fools of themselves.

It was in the administration of the then Sir Edward Grey, now Earl Grey of Falloden, that some attempt was made to “modernise” the methods of the British Foreign Office. Lord Hardinge was the instrument chosen for this revolutionary process, and as a result of his efforts the F.O. acquired telephone communication with the outside world of people engaged in ordinary occupations and the click of typewriters broke into the whispered silences of the austere quarters of the British Foreign Office.

The personnel of the Department of State for Foreign Affairs partook of the nature of its methods. To be attached to that department was a guarantee that the attaché was a man of excellent family connections and was possessed of a more or less classical education. Diplomacy was indeed a career under the British system, and while exceptional people might occasionally be employed on special work, or for reasons of temporary expediency, the permanent member of the staff was required to have certain qualifications, attainments and social advantages from the date of his initiate. Once accepted, an attractive road stretched its long length before the ambitious, for it opened up to such possibilities of high position and great honours, beloved of all mankind, depending for their acquirement upon ability, influence and fortuitous circumstance.

The American who, by reason of being attached to the Diplomatic Service or because of some special occasion, came into contact with the British Foreign Office was generally at first much annoyed at the apparent impenetrability of that institution, and the initial reaction was one of violent criticism, for when he compared what happened to him in London with his experiences in the State Department at Washington first conclusions generally favoured the American method. Longer experience generally changed his attitude, however, and it did not require undue familiarity to extract a perhaps unwilling tribute to the British Foreign Office as a unique institution possessing a certain mysterious immutability which set it apart from all other Government machines.

The importance which has always been attached to this branch of the British Government is due to the vastness and complexity of the foreign affairs of the British Empire. Its reticence and reserve, even to other departments of the same Government, is due largely to its necessary withdrawal from ordinary political influences, the necessity of maintaining a large degree of independence of action and the continuing character of its policies and work regardless of political changes in Great Britain or in any of the overseas dominions. The machinery of its ordinary occupations has been cumbersome in movement beyond doubt, and rapidity of execution has never been characteristic of the routine, but other Governments have never had much cause to criticise the British Foreign



Office for dilatory tactics when it came to the handling of the large affairs of British foreign policy. No matter what call has been made upon it, the machinery has never broken down. Be the occasion one of ordinary routine or the conduct of the diplomatic phases of a great international crisis the resources available seem always sufficient to meet the demand.

Government policies may change overnight, Foreign Secretaries may come and go, but under the trained guidance of the permanent staff, headed by the Permanent Chief Secretary, this silent, non-controversial, non-political institution functions steadily and without interruption in its advancement of British political interests the world over. Its Intelligence system is good, though far from being infallible. The Prime Minister or Cabinet of the day can generally depend upon it for the information it needs and instruction as to British precedents and interests. All the British Foreign Office requires from the head of any Government in temporary power is a broad statement of a policy to be followed, and it can turn the strength of its organisation into the channel indicated without a hitch in the operation, elaborating all of the necessary details to which the Prime Minister or his Cabinet may have given no thought, or which in fact had not entered their consciousness as a consequence of their decisions.

Such was the British Foreign Office up to the beginning of the war of 1914. It was some time before this, however, that a guiding principle had been adopted, perhaps insensibly and as an outcome of other principles common to British diplomacy, to the effect that every effort should be made to bring about closer, and if possible better, relations with the United States. Prior to the last decade of the nineteenth century the American section of the British Foreign Office was not looked upon as of very great importance. It was created much as a matter of course, and in the ordinary process of completing a continuous survey of world politics. After the mission at Washington had been raised to the rank of Embassy, and the important negotiations concerning an Isthmian canal had come up for consideration, this section of the work naturally assumed much greater relative importance, and it was strengthened from time to time. As the idea of closer relations with the United States developed, the American section attained a position in relation

to the other sections of almost equal importance. When the war came in 1914 the work of the Foreign Office in connection with American affairs became of supreme importance as compared with that in connection with any other country—excepting those involved, or apt to become involved, in actual warfare.

Even before this, however, a change had come over the spirit of the institution. Its mystery and aloofness were beginning to disintegrate. The change was not outwardly apparent, but to those who came in contact with its operations it had seemingly lost a certain degree of its authority with the Government, and evidence was to be had for the seeking that the most notable epoch, and probably the greatest, was coming to an end, through a process of evolution which was bringing more democratic ideas into Government administration as a whole. The outbreak of war marked with emphasis the end of its career as a department of Government all-powerful within itself and independent of control excepting for the dominance of the Prime Minister in larger questions of policy.

As the war progressed it naturally passed into a state of more or less eclipse in view of greater Cabinet interference in matters of foreign affairs and the supreme authority of the war-making departments of Government. With the close of the war in 1918 it did not come back to its original power or prestige, for the then Prime Minister, Mr David Lloyd George, carried on to a large degree the functions of office which had previously been the exclusive field of the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Foreign Office machine was controlled by him to strengthen his own policies and those of his Cabinet. Peace negotiations were carried on by special missions responsible to the head of the Government and not to the Foreign Office. Even the mission to Washington was lifted from the domain of the Foreign Office, and men were appointed to those missions to whom the Foreign Office was merely one of numerous other Government departments.

It is doubtful whether Lord Reading, Lord Northcliffe or even Earl Grey, although previously and for long the head of that organisation, conceived themselves as merely representatives of the Foreign Office. Their missions were given such added importance and authority as to warrant the assumption that they were personal representatives of the Prime Minister

and the Cabinet rather than professional diplomats to whom the Washington assignment was merely a tour of duty, an incident in a diplomatic career. In 1920 the appointment of Sir Auckland Geddes as British Ambassador to Washington signalled a return to conventional procedure. The day of super-missions usurping the duties of a regular appointee of the Foreign Office were over. It is also true that with the passing of David Lloyd George at the end of 1922 the Foreign Office again made progress in getting back into its own control the administration of the foreign affairs of the British Empire. In the place of conferences in which the Prime Minister was the head and autocrat of the British delegation, and in place of special commissions appointed to deal with foreign relations, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, then Lord Curzon, assisted by the Foreign Office staff, became the actual negotiator, making his reports to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet as in the days of yore.

The effect of the war, however, has been to change the relations of the British Foreign Office to the Press, the public, and the foreign missions stationed in London. The Press is much more free in its criticisms and less reverential in its attitude than it was before that disturbing event. The public, following the lead of the Press, shows much the same symptoms. During actual hostilities it became necessary to avoid all possible circumlocution in the transaction of public business, hence the foreign diplomats stationed in London got in the way of communicating directly with any department of the British Government with which they had business. The chancelleries themselves maintained the form of using the Foreign Office exclusively for international communication; but it was merely a form, for by telephone and by personal interview it became the usual thing for any foreign attaché to communicate with, or to exchange information with, officials of other departments without even going through the form of notifying the Foreign Office or of obtaining its permission so to do. The Foreign Office gave evidence at times of being irritated at such irregular procedure, but to no avail until post-war affairs had assumed a more normal aspect.

Under the Conservative régime there came a tendency to again tighten up the order of official procedure, and the

Foreign Office is slowly but surely getting back into its own hands the handling of all international communications, however unimportant. The immutability of the machine is again asserting itself. There will never be a complete return, however, to the pre-war status, and the foreign military, naval, commercial and other attachés stationed in London will probably always retain the direct access to the departments of Government in which they are interested, which came to them as a result of the strenuous times of 1914 to 1918 through the necessity for quick action and the preoccupation of all British officials at that time. It is no exaggeration to say that the American officials of all branches of service were largely responsible for the breaking down of long-established rules and regulations. At times they simply refused to conform thereto, and as it was no time for standing upon official dignity they had their way without serious controversy. Representatives of European countries were too long accustomed to the old-world methods of international communication, and too deferential to established customs, to initiate new ways of expediting Government business; but they followed the American lead with eagerness and satisfaction. Americans were not always as diplomatic, or even as polite, as the foreign officials thought they should be; but as it was recognised that their intentions were good, and that the objective to be obtained was of mutual value, they were given their own way to a great extent.

It is a fact, however, that the American who had dealings with British Civil Government officials only during the war knows little of what was the usual method before the war, and to which a return is now being made—with certain important modifications. In the strenuous and necessitous days of war he had an unwritten authority behind him which penetrated all official barriers. Those who attempted to do the same thing before 1914 were hopelessly defeated at the very start, because they were never able to get behind the suave but impenetrable front against which they could bound and rebound until they were exhausted and gave up the struggle.

It is this same British Foreign Office which is the focal point of all British-American official relations, and as such its character and methods are of interest and importance from the international view-point. It depends very much upon the

tactfulness and spirit of accommodation of its officials as to whether British-American affairs run smoothly and expeditiously, and there were in the year 1923 strong forces at work to bring about these conditions. Courtesy and tact are the first requisites of any highly placed official in the Foreign Office, and when behind all this is the driving force of a well-defined policy of friendship to the United States the situation becomes all that could be desired. The American Ambassador in his dealings with the Foreign Office is often accorded personal interviews with the Foreign Secretary himself, and if the American Ambassador be a man who attracts interest, is possessed of personal dignity and has a lively sense of the fitness of things, he is always welcomed by the cultured British aristocrat who presides over the destinies of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Fortunately it has been a long time since the United States Government has sent a man to the Court of St James's who was not able to make himself *persona grata* with the Royal Family or with the highly placed Government officials. All matters of routine are attended to by members of the American Embassy staff, and these come into contact with the permanent secretaries of the department, where the attitude of the Chief is reflected, and the personality of the American representative may help to carry him farther than a mere exchange of official information. Personal intimacies with foreign diplomats are not encouraged by the Foreign Office however, and that institution, as such, always maintains an air of reserve and formality which few foreigners are able to penetrate.

Training given in the State Department at Washington is useful to the young American who has chosen diplomacy as a career, but his real education does not begin until he has been stationed in some foreign country and knows what it is to be an outsider in competition with several hundred other embryo diplomats of all nationalities for concessions from the Government to which he is accredited. The American Ambassador himself may be a very useful representative without knowledge of the language of the country to which he is sent, but his secretaries are not of much use to him or their country unless they have such knowledge. This is one advantage appertaining to the American mission in London, but even there, owing to

the great number of other foreign missions, their usefulness is greatly enhanced by familiarity with some other language than their own. London is the greatest diplomatic centre of Europe, notwithstanding the claims occasionally made for Paris, and the question of British-American relations is often a triangular affair with some other country on the third point. This is particularly true of the present time, the year 1923, when the affairs of Europe are in a desperate tangle and the American position is greatly affected by the British attitude towards affairs upon the European continent. The British Government is now more likely to seek American co-operation in its foreign adventures and positions than ever before in history; in fact, this is really the first time in history that such a situation has arisen, and it now seems probable that a far greater intimacy between the British Foreign Office and the American State Department will result than has ever before been thought likely or seemed possible.

## CHAPTER XIII

### AMERICAN GOVERNMENTAL METHODS

**T**HE State Department of the United States Government at Washington is the American Foreign Office, but it bears little or no resemblance to the British Foreign Office as a Government institution, except for the fact that its activities deal with the foreign relations of the United States. Even in this direction it is not the same, for the authority, initiatory power, secrecy of operation and limited actual (not theoretical) responsibility to Parliament give it a far greater relative importance in the British Government than the State Department possesses in its relations to the United States Government.

As a whole, under the American system the crystallisation of a foreign policy which necessitates the making of an international agreement requires the actual co-operation of the State Department, the President, the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and, finally, a majority vote of the entire Senate. In fact it has become the custom in recent years, in all international matters of great concern, to allow the House of Representatives to play a part in the making of foreign policies by sending a treaty to Congress much in the form of an ordinary Bill, and allowing it to pass or be rejected in the same manner as current legislation. The Foreign Office of the British Government can do all of this by itself, so long as it has the backing of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet.

In 1905 Elihu Root became Secretary of State under President Roosevelt. Possessed of a great legal talent, with constructive ability, and with previous experience in Government work as Secretary of War, he came to his new office with a determination to thoroughly reorganise the Department of State and put it upon a more effective and modern basis. Among the things he accomplished was a scheme for the reorganisation of the Consular Corps, which was enacted into law, and the intro-

duction into the American Diplomatic Service of more or less of a merit system extending at least to secretarial rank. It was not long, however, before he found that he was in conflict with that strange and most powerful immutability of a great Government machine known as a Department. No Cabinet officer has ever been appointed in Washington who did not go to his department with the idea of introducing reforms and improvements and of correcting notorious abuses. It is equally true that no such officer has ever been able, in his limited term of service, to carry through more than a small percentage of these resolutions; for the machine is greater than he, and it has behind it certain influences, such as Congressional support in various forms, and a well-entrenched band of old employees who are able to retard proposed changes of which they do not approve and in the end to wear down the fighting spirit of the Secretary, for he finds the line of least resistance to be the easiest way, with the result that he leaves things as they are. It may also be said in his defence that to his desk come all very important matters, and he has little time or energy left to devote to readjustment of the cogs of the machine which serves his ends fairly well as they are.

Secretary Root soon lost his interest in the detailed work of the department, as he was much more attracted by the larger and more interesting tasks which came to hand and for which he was eminently fitted. The fundamental laws of three countries, Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines, were entirely his work, and to have done much to reform the Consular Service by abolishing the fee system and to have introduced the merit system into at least part of the Diplomatic Service is no mean record of accomplishment. It is more than any other Secretary of State has succeeded in doing in a single administration. The State Department of the United States Government as it operates to-day is a different affair from that limited organisation which functioned so simply twenty-five years ago. It has achieved an Intelligence service which is comparatively adequate to its needs, though it could still be improved. This has been accomplished by better liaison work with the naval, military and other departments of the Government, and through the superior class of men sent abroad as compared with days gone by, when the diplomatic and consular corps



were filled with men appointed for purely political reasons and without regard as to fitness.

There is still too much laxity in the choice of men to fill the higher positions abroad. They are all too often chosen as a result of domestic situations or influence rather than for their special fitness to be sent to any particular country. It has yet to be realised that because a man or his father was originally a citizen of a foreign country it is a very urgent reason he should not be sent to represent the United States Government in that country instead of being a reason in his favour, as it now seems to be considered. There is no more important question before the appointive power of the Washington Government than the selection of men as American representatives in Great Britain. British-American relations are the most important of all foreign relations politically, financially and commercially. This is an obvious situation, open to satisfactory demonstration from a review of the international situation for the year or from the figures to be found in the Statistical Abstract published by the United States Government, which gives in unargumentative form an annual review of American material activities abroad.

It would certainly appear that this needed no further demonstration, but judging from the apparent relative importance attached to foreign posts, and the varying importance and abilities of men appointed to them, American representation in Great Britain does not always get its just dues. The situation also possesses certain complexities which do not occur in dealing with any other country. Owing to past controversies between Great Britain and the United States, and especially the injectment of the Irish question into American politics, there is a sharper division of American sympathies, likes and dislikes, prejudices for or against, and general attitude towards the British Government than in connection with any other foreign country. The terms pro-British and anti-British are in common use in the United States. Such terms are seldom heard in relation to any other country or nation. The war brought into use the terms pro-German and anti-German, but at the end of the war they rapidly fell into disuse. The terms pro-French and anti-French, pro-Italian and anti-Italian, pro-Chinese and anti-Chinese would sound strange if used in ordinary conversation. The term anti-Japanese is heard occasionally,

but that is due to a racial antagonism and not to any particular animosity towards the Japanese Government. It is hardly conceivable that the British Foreign Office would send a man to the United States in official capacity, however humble, who was known to be anti-American, unless possibly he was to be used in Intelligence work; but it is a fact that Americans have been sent as representatives to Great Britain, generally not in high position however, who landed upon British shores with a far from impartial mind as to the faults or virtues of the British people or the policies and allegedly secret designs of the British Government upon the peace and security of other countries.

It does not follow that a man should be pro-British or, as the term goes, an Anglomaniac to make a good representative of his country, but it certainly is not necessary or advisable that he should be an Anglophobe, with a jaundiced view of everything British. In recent times the United States Government has been placed in a more or less embarrassing position through reports received from such sources. A man of sturdy Americanism with an open and logical mind, a keen sense of justice and a fine balance of judgment can be of enormous service to his own country, and to British-American relations, where a man of the opposite type can serve as a serious stumbling-block in the path of an entente desired by all thoughtful men of American or British nationality. In the selection of men for positions in the foreign service this consideration would not be necessary in the case of any country except Great Britain, but in that case it is of the greatest importance, as experience has demonstrated.

There is little or no mystery about the State Department in Washington to Americans or foreigners. Those who administer the business of the various sections are well known to anyone who has occasion to seek them out. Even the Chief himself gives of what time he can to those who wish to see him, and the Press representatives are as familiar with the department machinery and those who control it as are the employees of the department, perhaps in some cases even more so. No disadvantages to this daylight atmosphere have as yet been discovered. The bore, the lobbyist and the special-interest representative get their dues. Anyone with real business to be attended to can generally find his way without hindrance to the man he wants to see. There is this to be said, however,

as a partial explanation of the difference between the methods of the British Foreign Office and the State Department at Washington: that where the latter has one question up for consideration the former may have a score, and owing to the far greater responsibilities of the British Foreign Office to its Government than those carried on by the State Department it could hardly be run on the same lines to advantage. It is also true that a large degree of the remoteness characteristic of the British Foreign Office is due to the form of Government under which it functions and the less representative character of that Government, at least until very recent years.

The British Foreign Office has probably seen the last of the days of its greatest exclusiveness, whereas the State Department at Washington will tend to greater exclusiveness and less of the happy-go-lucky spirit as its operations extend, its work becomes of more importance in the scheme of government as a whole and its personnel expands. It is possible in the years to come these two important Government institutions will acquire a similarity of nature which has been notable for its absence during the years when world problems were not so numerous or so complicated as they have now become. The functioning of the two Governments in the matter of foreign affairs is of great importance to British-American relations, and the closer they can get together in matters in which co-operation is possible the better for both peoples and the state of the world generally. One most favourable symptom of the times is a custom which is now being followed by both Governments, and that is the utilisation in departments, and in the Government generally, of the services of those who have been stationed in each other's capital. To bring a man into the State Department who has served in an important capacity in the American Embassy in London is to create a valuable asset for the Secretary of State. To have a man in the Foreign Office in London who has served in the British Embassy in Washington is of really great value to the relations of the two countries if that man is at all serious-minded, has acquired some knowledge of the United States outside of Washington and New York, and has utilised his time in intelligent and unprejudiced observation.

A British diplomat who goes to Washington has some advantage over the American who comes to London. The former

may not be enamoured of his new assignment for personal reasons, he may even not like Americans in a general way, but he goes to Washington with no seeds of suspicion ready to germinate in his mind. He has not previously been embroiled in bitter controversies as to the honesty or duplicity of the American Government. No large faction of his fellow-countrymen has been plotting and conniving for the discomfiture of the Government. He can have no deep-rooted prejudices against the American Government for its treatment of any part of the territory under its control. In fact, he is far more apt to sympathise with that Government in its attempts to remain neutral in a controversy such as that between the English and the Irish which raged so fiercely not so long ago. He can have no suspicions but that the American advocacy of disarmament is sincere, and he has no difficulty in assuring himself that territorial aggrandisement and political control of foreign countries are the last things thought of in Washington, or in the country at large. Being the man he is, and from the class of society which generally produces Foreign Office representatives, he goes to the United States satisfied with his own country and his own citizenship, and remains so to the end, but he also becomes more cognisant than ever as to the possible value of a British-American entente made as co-operative and practically useful as possible. It would hardly be necessary for the British Foreign Office to even inquire into the sentiment towards America of anyone under consideration for a post in Washington, whereas it is most important that the United States Government should go into the matter most thoroughly in filling the post of an American representative in London, in whatever branch of the service, or no matter how humble the position may be.

The State Department at Washington has always had a great amount of information sent to it from foreign countries, but it has never maintained a real political Intelligence service, or at least not until the war of 1914 made it more or less necessary. Much of the information sent was of great interest and value, but owing to the system of office routine little of it ever reached the men who were really responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs. When the late Philander C. Knox was appointed Secretary of State under President Taft he had not had

much experience of foreign affairs, although he was a very able lawyer and a shrewd politician of long service. When he came into his new position his first thought was to get matters of concern to his department into his own hands and to improve the service in every possible way. He soon discovered that there was a lack of co-operation in assembling the information received from abroad, and he consulted the author of this book as to how it could be brought about. The suggestion was made that a central bureau should be created which should codify this information as it came in and see that a memorandum of everything of importance should reach his desk each day. He adopted the suggestion, and asked Congress for the money necessary to put it into effect. Congress, always niggardly in matters of this kind, gave him only enough money to employ a clever newspaper correspondent to carry out the scheme. It was begun, however, on that basis, and flowered into something really important when war time allowed practically unlimited expenditure and placed no limit on the size of the staff. Considerable deflation has resulted under the post-war effort for economy, but the better utilisation of information has now become a feature of State Department work.

Under the American system of Government expenditure all the money allowed is for specific purposes. There are seldom any funds available for the carrying out of new ideas until Congress has set its seal of approval upon them, and then they become public knowledge. This is one of the reasons why the United States Government has never had a political or other foreign Intelligence system anywhere approaching that maintained by nearly every European Government of importance. Before any attempt was made to collaborate the information sent to Washington each department of the Government depended entirely upon its own resources for what it obtained. The war brought about a much better co-operation between the departments, and if one department received information of possible value to another it was passed along. There is still, however, a vast amount of useless duplication and lack of collaboration, and this is true of this service as performed for every other Government in the world. Much of this is due to interdepartmental jealousies and rivalries, and for some unknown reason the Foreign Affairs departments of all Govern-

ments are more seriously at fault in this respect than any other. This department ranks above all others in matters of precedence. In the United States, if the President and the Vice-President should both die, the Secretary of State becomes acting President until the positions can be filled. As a rule also the staff of this department generally comprises men of superior education, and possibly better social position, than the staffs of other departments. Secrecy is necessarily a feature of the work in connection with foreign affairs. All of these influences tend to give this department a certain feeling of superiority over the others, which is reflected in the manners of the staff and the methods of transacting its business.

It becomes unduly jealous of its prerogatives and consciously mysterious as to its most ordinary transactions. While it is always ready to receive information, with an air of kindly toleration, it seldom unbends sufficiently to impart the information it has gathered to other departments of the same Government where it might be of great value. The taxpayers of all the large countries are entirely unaware of the enormous annual waste of money of which every Government is guilty in the matter of duplication of work, generally for the reasons above stated. Up to a few years ago the State Department of the United States Government had not been seriously tainted with this disease characteristic of old-world diplomacy, but of late years there are signs that it is developing in the American system, due in all probability to the increasing importance of that system, the growth of the staff and the absorption of all the energies of the Chief in the larger questions arising. The dangers which come out of this attitude are international, for it is one of the features of secret diplomacy that, although it can never become an actuality under the American form of government, opportunity is thus given for the practice of some of the black arts so popular in diplomatic circles and so dangerous to the peace of the world. It would be better for both countries that all things concerned with British-American relations were given the light of day. There would be less chance of the constant recurrence of irritating incidents common to the present time, and which are discouraging to that state of serenity and confidence necessary to a really effective entente between the two nations.

Before the war the members of a diplomatic mission were expected to refrain from espionage upon the affairs of the country to which they were accredited. War conditions nullified the force of this tradition to a large degree, and these have also left their influence upon post-war diplomatic work. It has been deemed advisable by all Governments to maintain an unusual amount of Intelligence work, and the regular Intelligence service, having been seriously curtailed by necessary post-war economies, has been superseded in some ways by the regular and conventional foreign services of all Governments. In Europe the consular officials and attachés of the embassies or legations of the various European Governments have come to look upon each other with considerable suspicion, which makes not at all for international co-operation. It is probable that the foreign services of the American Government are less concerned with such matters than those of any other important country, not through any superior moral qualities but because it is not so necessary for America to keep close watch upon the movements of other Governments as it is for those who are crowded together in Europe, each actively suspicious of the intentions of the other. There is considerable unsophisticatedness in the work of this kind done by the American Government, due first to lack of experience and men trained to carry it on, and also to the belief in Washington that it is unnecessary so far as the interests of the United States are concerned. In all industrial and commercial matters the American Government gets the benefit of volunteer work, done through self-interest by the numerous large American business enterprises which are represented in every country in the world. When the interests of one of these international trading corporations is threatened through the machinations of any foreign Government, Washington is quick to hear about it, and may take action if deemed advisable. For many years it has been the complaint of all such Americans concerned, however, that it was very difficult to get the American Government to move on occasions of this kind, and as a result it is only where private enterprise is helpless to correct the situation for itself that Government aid is sought.

The custom of using the regular foreign service of a Government for secret Intelligence work is one that cannot be too

seriously condemned. It was done in Europe before the war to some extent, but as a result of the necessities of war and the confused post-war state it has developed largely, and practically every Government has fallen under its malign influence. There are certain Governments, not all of them in Europe, which make this work an important feature of their diplomatic operations abroad, and the result has been that their attachés are regarded with so much suspicion by other Governments as to largely destroy their usefulness along legitimate lines. When such an impression as this prevails the diplomatic representation of one country in another loses its beneficent character almost entirely, and in the end becomes a burden upon the Treasury in great excess to the services rendered. Such work became almost an obsession with some Governments during the war, and clarity of vision has not yet been recovered. With the exception of certain notable situations there is little to be gained, and much of value is endangered, by this prying into the affairs of another people. Psychological and political Intelligence work, which can be legitimately carried on by any diplomatic mission to the entire benefit of the relations between any two countries, is of far more value to the nations concerned than anything which may be accomplished by material espionage, but it is evident that the world will have to live down the jealousies and suspicions generated or influenced by the war before there is any hope of a complete realisation of this truth. When this is realised it will not be necessary for one country to regard the members of a diplomatic mission from another country with that distrust and suspicion which destroys all valuable personal association and the free exchange of experience and opinion.

There is no doubt but that the section of Government which deals with foreign affairs has been given a very great additional importance as a result of the war and its reactions. For one nation to understand the workings of this section in another nation in which it is concerned has become more important than ever. It is even yet not uncommon to read, in an otherwise well-informed European Press, ingenious deductions as to the operations of American "secret diplomacy." It seems almost incredible that after all these years it should not be realised that secret diplomacy is impossible to the Government



of the United States. The exigencies of war might possibly prevent the publication in America of all the acts or intentions of the American Government, but except in times like those, when ordinary and lawful procedure is subordinated to the needs of the moment, he who runs may read as to the facts of American foreign policy and American participation in the affairs of a foreign country. A secret treaty with a foreign country is an impossibility to the Government of the United States, for before it could become binding or effective in any way it must run the gauntlet of Congressional action.

There are occasions when the executive branch of the Government refuses to Congress the details of negotiations in progress or completed as being "against public policy," but the results of such negotiations, if there are any, must come to the light of day to become an actual part of American foreign policy. It may be held that this is a disadvantage or an advantage to the nation, as the controversialist may happen to believe, but it is so written, and it will be many years, if ever, before the American people will consent to a change of method. They believe, rightly or wrongly, that out of the secret diplomacy of the Old World has arisen most of its international disputes and disasters, and notwithstanding the complex character of the affairs of the British Empire many able British statesmen now incline to subscribe to this belief. This in itself is one of the most hopeful signs for the future of British-American relations, for when the American people are convinced that the British Government has adopted completely a similar attitude towards international relations it will do away with the suspicion with which the British Foreign Office is regarded by a considerable section of American opinion.

## CHAPTER XIV

### THE UNITED STATES AND THE BRITISH DOMINIONS

**B**RITISH-AMERICAN relations are very much affected by, and constantly concerned with, the relations of the United States to some of the British overseas dominions. Canada is the only British dominion in which the political phase of these relations plays any serious part. American trade relations with all the British overseas dominions are important to all concerned, and the exporters of the United Kingdom are not at all pleased, to say the least, with the large American trade so successfully conducted with these sections of the British Empire. Some attempt has been made in the United States to interest the American people in the political situation in India and South Africa, but such interest as has been aroused has been more or less spasmodic, and never very extensive. It has been the habit of the anti-British influence in the United States to use the ever-present controversy over British rule in these far-away places as material for their propaganda, and certain perfectly honest and well-meaning people have lent themselves to this purpose.

Every movement for independence or for a republican form of Government, wherever it may originate, turns naturally and expectantly towards the United States for encouragement and support, and generally with some result among the people, acting however in purely private capacity, for the United States Government has always maintained an attitude of rigid neutrality in all disputes within the British Empire, notwithstanding the determined and continued efforts made in some instances to secure some form of intervention. It was not so many years ago that a defeated candidate for the office of President of the United States made a hurried tour of the world, for his own pleasure and the profit to be gained by writing a series of newspaper articles. He crossed India *en route* from the Far East to Europe, and one of his published letters was a

severe criticism of British rule in that country. This naturally caused considerable newspaper discussion, and the Indian Nationalists took comfort therein. Needless to say the British Government did not, for it made its position in London more difficult, and British resentment was aroused over the rather dangerous superficiality of the criticism. This incident was taken more seriously in Great Britain than it was in the United States, for its reactions took place there rather than in America. In the latter country the public has a way of discounting the utterances of politicians and public men which robs them of much of their force, and any remarks about India could have no effect, one way or another, upon American affairs owing to the remoteness of the whole question from any real American interest.

Owing to the complexity and difficulties with which the British Government is always struggling in the conduct of its Imperial rule of other races, and owing to the fact that this criticism came from a man who nearly became president of the largest republic in the world, it was a rather serious affair, in which, however, there was no ground for protest to the United States Government, and in connection with which the British nation had no recourse so far as America was concerned. It is difficult for an American to realise how very serious such an incident can become to the British Government, hence there is an inclination to cavil at the irritation and animosity aroused thereby. The only way in which an American can appreciate the position is to imagine that some prominent British politician and publicist should choose a critical time in the American administration of the Philippines to make a visit to that country and publish a bitter attack upon the American administration, as it was being conducted, at the same time giving aid and comfort to a party of Philippines in revolt against the power of the United States. It is safe to say that such an action would arouse tremendous indignation from Maine to California, and it is not at all unlikely that Congress would pass resolutions which would embarrass the executive branch of the Government in its dealings with Great Britain.

These things are unfortunate, but they cannot be helped, and they must be endured as best may. The only palliative is such good and understanding relations between the two nations

as will rob the incident of any danger to international friendship. This incident, however, has had an effect; for, through its anxieties over the possibility of even more serious trouble in India than has yet occurred, the British Government is somewhat particular as to who visits that country for the purpose of getting material for work of publicity. Several American writers of rather Radical tendencies who have desired to visit India, with the probable intention of giving aid and comfort to the Nationalist cause, have quietly but firmly been defeated in their efforts to reach that country. No American who had any real knowledge of the situation could blame the British Government for attempting to lessen the chances of trouble. It is not a question of suppressing news or of secret measures. It is merely an attempt to limit the importation and exportation of inflammable material. American trade interests in India are large, as ten per cent. of all imports into India are from the United States, and that country takes fifteen per cent. of all Indian exports.

The British commercial interests in India are far and above those of any other country however, as two-thirds of Indian imports are from the United Kingdom and twenty per cent. of Indian exports go to that country, and India is one of the few countries in the world which shows a gain for British export trade over pre-war figures in bulk and in real value. There is nothing in the American interest in India which can have the least effect upon British-American relations, unless possibly in the future international jealousies over the control of oil-producing territory, which may lead to friction between the two Governments. This is unlikely, however; and as there are no political interests which conflict, and never will be, India can be looked upon as a part of the British Empire over the administration of which no serious controversy can ever arise between Great Britain and the United States.

American political interest in the Union of South Africa is now negligible. There was some sympathy with the Boers during the then war for independence, but the measure of self-government given to the Union by the British Government in 1910 put to rest all American sentiment against British rule. In 1920 the United States acquired a very large percentage of the import and export trade of South Africa, to the dismay of

the British exporters, but in 1921 this American trade fell away to less than a third of what it was before, showing that the increase had been due to special and temporary conditions resulting from the war. British-South African trade has now come back into its own, and causes no anxiety to the industrial interests of the United Kingdom. American political relations to Australia and New Zealand are interesting inasmuch as those countries are possessed of an extremely democratic form of government of great interest to Americans, and there is a sympathetic link between American and Australasian policies brought into existence through a mutual dislike, antagonism and fear concerning the designs and ambitions of Japan.

The tolerant—and even friendly—attitude of the British Government towards Japan has had a tendency to alienate the people of Australasia from the mother country and to turn their attention toward the United States. Just before the Washington Naval Armament Conference, when the Anglo-Japanese alliance was in the melting-pot, one of the principal Government officials of New Zealand, when on a visit to London, made the statement, with more or less official authority, that there was a large section of opinion in New Zealand to the effect that if that alliance was renewed New Zealand would appeal to the United States to be taken under American protection—in fact, would ask America to undertake a protectorate of New Zealand. The impossibility of such a plan being carried out was evident to anyone familiar with American political conditions and the relations of the United States to the British Empire, but the sentiment of Australasia towards the Japanese undoubtedly weighed heavily with the British Government, for Australia was not far behind New Zealand in its attitude towards the “Yellow Peril.”

The results of the Washington Conference and the doing away with the Anglo-Japanese agreement put the people of New Zealand in a much better frame of mind than they had been, and again tightened up the bonds of Empire, which had slackened under the influence of this alleged danger. It is a favourite theme of anti-British influences to enlarge upon Anglo-Japanese relations and to question the sincerity of the British Government in its declared efforts to disentangle itself from the close relations which had come about between England

and Japan through political and military expediency. No one familiar with the situation, however, ever believed that the British Government was enamoured of this entanglement. For reasons of foreign policy and national safety an agreement had been made with Japan which proved of enormous value to the Allies during the war. The value was perhaps more negative than positive, and Japan was the only country engaged in the war which gained largely thereby with little or no loss to offset.

The constant danger to British-American relations through the existence of the Anglo-Japanese agreement was also fully realised, though it is inconceivable, should any real crisis have arisen between the United States and Japan, that British influence would have been exerted in any other way than in an attempt to mediate as a Power friendly to both countries. Even during the existence of the Anglo-Japanese agreement there was a large body of British sentiment strongly opposed to its continuance, and suspicious of Japan. During the war, when Japan was an active ally, this suspicion continued and increased in strength. The Japanese have laid themselves open to such suspicion through their widely developed system of espionage, and to this is due the reluctance with which the Japanese representatives were taken into any degree of confidence during actual hostilities. It is also significant that all attempts on the part of the Japanese Government to get a foothold in Europe through military operations were politely but firmly denied by the Allies.

The details of the Japanese organisation for obtaining information are fairly well known to all Governments, and as it includes the use of the diplomatic and consular services, contrary to the theoretical purposes of these services, it is not popular with other nations. The Japanese are really responsible for a great deal of the suspicion which has been characteristic of post-war diplomacy, as they have forced other Governments into more extensive contra-espionage than would otherwise have been necessary. In international affairs they have occupied much the same position as the so-called "Yellow Press" has occupied in its relations to the world of journalism. The British Government has never shown any signs of being any more unsophisticated in international affairs than any other Government, and is probably as well, or better, aware of

what is going on throughout the world. It is very doubtful whether any fear on the part of Australasia that the interest or prejudices of that section of the Empire were in danger of being sacrificed to expediency had any justification, and it is just as doubtful whether the American feeling that Great Britain was likely to be more friendly to Japan than to America in case of trouble between the two countries had any more, even during the existence of the Anglo-Japanese agreement.

There is even reason to believe that the British Government has, during the past few years, been more suspicious, more guardedly watchful, and more concerned generally, as to Japanese intentions and movements than any other Government, not excepting that of the United States. The quick and magnificent response of Australia to the call of Empire in 1914 was real evidence as to the relations of the overseas dominions to the mother country. There was no damage to be feared from Japan; for, notwithstanding the powerful pro-German element in the Japanese Government, it had joined the Allies, and its hands were tied so far as Australasia was concerned. Various weapons have been used by the overseas dominions to force the Home Government to give them what they wanted, and at times superficial relations have become so strained as to suggest the possibility of a final break. The dominions have acquired for themselves varying forms of, to all intents and purposes, independent Governments, and it seems that as a commonwealth of practically independent nations the British Empire is more strongly bound together than it would have been had domination continued to be the force that held the links of the chain of British Empire together.

The attitude of Canada and the United States one to the other is an important element in determining the character of British-American relations, for many and mostly obvious reasons. At the present time the United States and Canada appear to be drawing closer together politically and industrially than ever before, but there is not nearly as much annexation sentiment in Canada as there has been at times in recent history. Canada has entered into a full consciousness of her own independence and potentialities during the past twenty-five years. Her people have always been in the vanguard of the overseas populations in their insistence upon freedom from Imperial

control, and through the making of a treaty with the United States, in 1923, in which the signature of the British Ambassador at Washington was not allowed the seal was set upon Canadian independence.

Canada yields of her own accord full allegiance to the principles of Empire, but her people have slowly but firmly progressed towards a position in which all this allegiance and all contributions to the welfare or strength of the British Empire have been placed upon a voluntary basis. This is a far cry from the days in which Sir John Macdonald rebuked a member of the Canadian Parliament for referring to the people of Canada as a nation. Canada has acquired independence for herself, and a separate nationality for her people, by constant pressure upon the British Government. Step by step, without violence or rancour, has this been achieved. As, through force of circumstances or reasons of expediency, the British Government has yielded each point of insistence the path has been paved for the advance of a Canadian autonomy closely resembling independence, and with the attainment of an independent treaty-making power practically everything has been secured which her people set out to gain but a few years ago.

The voluntary annexation of Canada to the United States came nearer of accomplishment at one time than the people of the United Kingdom care to believe, and, what is more, it was defeated by antagonisms in the United States and of American interests in Canada rather than by purely Canadian desire or effort. It is also true that when trade reciprocity was proposed between the United States and Canada the accomplishment of this economic partnership was defeated by industrial interests in the United States, and not by Canadian or British antagonism to the plan. President McKinley was a firm believer in the advantages to the United States of closer trade relations with Canada, and he was supported in this position by Sir Wilfred Laurier, then Prime Minister of Canada.

It is not a matter of official record, but it is believed by those who should know, that President McKinley authorised the American Commissioners who were negotiating with Canada to propose absolute free trade between the two countries. This was too radical a programme for the Canadian Commissioners to accept, for they feared that Canadian industrial



development would be overwhelmed by cheap production in the United States, and there were also matters of British trade preference to be considered. It is also probable that, as Canada had not then achieved such a degree of independence as is now possessed, the Canadian Government feared British opposition, and possibly absolute refusal to accept such a situation, on the ground that it meant the economic absorption of Canada by the United States. A liberal degree of reciprocity was finally agreed upon by the negotiations, but the entire scheme was rendered abortive by the opposition aroused in the United States. The agricultural interests were incited to oppose it. American industry along the Canadian border feared increased competition, and American capital invested in Canadian industry to take advantage of the Canadian import duties was antagonistic to any such curtailment of their existing advantages. Having come into power upon a platform of better relations with the United States, and been defeated in his purpose through the antagonism of the Americans interested, Sir Wilfred Laurier became very bitter towards Canada's neighbour to the south, and finding it necessary to produce some substitute for his lost cause he reacted to the slogan of a greater Canada and closer relations with the British Empire.

Thus was born the "All Red Route," the increased preference for imports from the United Kingdom, the more strident assertion of Canada's individuality, the potentialities of her future and of the existence of the Canadian people as a separate nation. Thus passed the greatest opportunity ever presented the United States for the economic annexation of Canada, which would probably have led in a short time to political annexation by the will of the Canadian people. The British Government and the people of Great Britain most naturally watched the progress of these events with keen interest and considerable anxiety. As Canada and the United States receded from each other—instead of drawing closer, as had been feared—considerable relief was felt, and the London Press explained to the people of Great Britain that the loyalty of the Canadian people and their Imperial consciousness had triumphed over more sordid considerations. There is little doubt, however incredible it may appear, that the British Empire owes this return of Canada to the fold, after her expeditions of exploration,

to the short-sightedness of the people of the United States, their absolute lack of Imperialistic ambitions and their absorption in the affairs of the land over which they already had dominion.

American industry was expanding and still had room for further expansion. There was no surplus population seeking new outlet, and the strong Protection sentiment among the people made them antagonistic towards the absorption of any new competitive territory or industry. The argument was also used that, as Canada already had the largest *per capita* national debt of any country in the world, the people of the United States would not gain by taking over a guarantee of this responsibility. Sixty years ago one of the best-known publicists of the United States predicted that within a hundred years the American flag would float over all territory between the North Pole and the Isthmus of Panama. This prediction may come true within the time stated, but it is significant that it seemed much more probable in the first decade of the twentieth century than it does in the third. The idea of Canadian annexation has receded from even an argumentative position, the flurry in Mexican affairs has apparently exhausted itself and conditions in both countries have reached a state of greater fixity than has characterised them for many years past.

This is also true of public opinion in the United States. Canadian annexation failed more because of indifference or opposition in the United States than in Canada; and while a vociferous minority demanded American intervention in Mexico it did not come to pass because a majority of the American people supported the position assumed by President Wilson, to the effect that it would be a bad policy in connection with Pan-American affairs, that it would mean war against the Mexican people and in the end annexation or an expensive and troublesome American Protectorate. There was considerable British criticism over the inaction of the United States Government in connection with the troubles in Mexico. This arose largely from British financial and industrial interests in that country. Like American interests in Mexico were also responsible for most of the criticism current in the United States, but they failed to arouse any nation-wide feeling over the matter. Subsequent events appear to have more or less

justified the policy pursued, and in the case of both Canada and Mexico present American opinion is distinctly unfavourable to any move towards increasing the territory of the United States, or even of widening the sphere of national activities by extending American protection, or a likeness to a protectorate attitude, towards any more foreign territory than that for which the United States Government is now responsible.

## CHAPTER XV

### CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

ONE of the reasons for American satisfaction with Canada as now constituted is the remarkable value of that country as a market for the products of the United States and the great advantage which American trade enjoys there notwithstanding the preferential duties allowed to British trade. With all its advantages, and the efforts made on its behalf, British trade in Canada loses ground each year as compared with American trade. This is entirely natural, and could hardly be otherwise, for reasons of geography, economic law and the intimate social relations of the Canadian and American peoples. There is only one section of Canada which is strongly British, and that is the region of which Ontario is the principal part. Here the loyalists settled who left the United States during the war for independence, and in this part of Canada the British tradition has been kept alive in greater intensity than in any other part of the country.

To the eastward lies the French Canadian territory, the population of which has no great national spirit, nor has it even a sentimental attachment to France. Its patriotism is largely local, and its political point of view, speaking of the population generally, is narrow and entirely provincial. A great many French Canadians have gone to the United States, and in the spring of 1923 considerable alarm was felt in Canada at this rapidly increasing migration. Many of these people go to the United States merely to work for a season, as they get more opportunity and better wages than at home, and then return to Canada with the money they have saved. It is estimated that nearly 2,000,000 French Canadians have gone to the country to the south to make their homes, and the Canadian Government has discussed ways and means of keeping this element of the population from wandering away. These French Canadians

are mostly lumbermen and farm labourers, and there has been a shortage of such labour in the United States, whereas in Eastern Canada opportunity has naturally been more limited.

To the immediate westward of Ontario there is a stretch of country, many miles across, which has never attracted settlers, and probably will not in many years to come. Beyond these barren lands, still farther to the west, is the beginning of the great agricultural section of Canada, the almost unlimited possibilities of which have been made generally known. The population of this section is originally of many nationalities, and Canada has here got back something of her own from the United States, for many thousands of American farmers have taken advantage of the opening of vast tracts of virgin arable land to increase their acreage holdings over what was possible for them to have in the land of their origin. Many of these Americans have become British citizens to be able to take advantage of the settlement laws. It is natural that the population of this western part of Canada, while loyal to the British Empire, should not possess that keen consciousness of British origin characteristic of the people of Ontario, and it is not until the far Pacific coast is reached, in the neighbourhood of Vancouver, that a more British character is perceptible in the population, and in its mode of thought and action.

The great task of any Canadian Government is to balance the interests of eastern and western Canada against those of the middle provinces, and, as several Governments have discovered, it is no mean task of statesmanship. Extending for three thousand miles, from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, is the boundary line between Canada and the United States. Not a single gun or armed soldier stands sentinel for either country along this dividing line. The custom-houses on either side are the only visible sign of this political division, and yet on one side of this line lies a great and powerful republic, with a population of 112,000,000, and on the other a vast country of enormous potential wealth, inhabited by about 9,000,000 people, who in turn have behind them as their sponsors the power of the British Empire. Probably no country in the world is so secure from foreign aggression, as the whole power of the Government of the United States, as well as that of the British Empire, would be exerted to prevent the alienation of

Canadian territory to any power other than the one in whose hands it now rests. Canada will either remain a part of the British Empire or become independent.

It is possible that, should any turn in the wheel of international events threaten the integrity of Canadian territory, the question of seeking amalgamation with the United States would again arise. Many years ago a now great and populous state of the American commonwealth achieved its independence from European rule and became a republic, and in a short time thereafter it voluntarily sought a place under the American flag. Conditions are different to-day from what they were then, and absolute Canadian independence seems unlikely for many years to come. It is not an impossibility of the future however, and if it does come it will be achieved without war, and if Canada should ever become a part of the United States it will be upon the initiative of her own people and as a result of mutually friendly negotiation. It will be the voluntary act of a people free to determine their own political destiny.

With conditions as they are it is highly improbable that any question can arise between Canada and the United States which would involve the British Government in any serious controversies with the United States. Canada has practically taken into her own hands the matter of Canadian-American relations, and whether the British Government be entirely pleased or not, the conditions of Europe are not such as to allow of any outward conflict. In truth, this most valuable and high-spirited overseas dominion can do much as she likes, so long as she does not actually sever the bond of Empire. The Canadian people have achieved a national consciousness as sincere and deeply felt as that of any other people. They have become a nation, with a political, social and economic life distinct from that of any other nation. They are still British in the wider sense, but they are Canadian first; and this has been made clear to the British Government by the works and actions of Canadian statesmen of all political parties since Canada made her tremendous contributions to the cause of Empire in the Great War. It was Sir Richard Borden who said that in future Canada would have to be consulted as to the making of all wars to which her people were expected to contribute, and it was the Government which followed his which intimated to the British Government that

Canada must be consulted when it was proposed to bestow British titles upon Canadian citizens, and it now proposes to make it prohibitive for a Canadian to accept hereditary honours.

It was also this same Government which made a treaty with the United States Government on its own refusing to allow Imperial participation, and it will not be long before Canada is represented by a diplomatic mission in Washington. That the British Government is not pleased at these manifestations of independence is manifest and natural, but that it has acceded with as good grace as possible was inevitable. To say that the United States and Canada will draw closer to one another, regardless of politicians, political situations and even of the wishes of many of the people of both countries, is merely to forecast the workings of economic and social laws, not made by parliaments. The juxtaposition of the two countries, one being merely a continuation of the other upon a broad line of contact, the similarity of physical environment of the two peoples, the constant social commingling of the populations, the overflow of capital from one country into another and the partnership in industrial development are gradually welding the two countries together with indissoluble bonds.

It is the fault of the United States rather than of Canada that these bonds were not created sooner and that they are not even stronger to-day than they are. For years Canada made overtures to the United States, and for an equal time did the United States not only ignore these overtures, but repulsed them in such manner as to cause unfavourable reaction. The natural laws of the social and economic systems are gradually overcoming this political antagonism however, and in spite of anything that can be done to prevent it the destiny of the two peoples is to come more and more into harmony in their relations. The effect of this situation upon British-American relations works both ways, for good and for evil. The interests of Canada and the interests of Empire demand a certain amount of complaisance towards the United States on the part of the British Government in its attitude towards Canadian-American relations.

American commercial success in Canada, in spite of the favourable differential treatment secured for the products of the United Kingdom, has aroused considerable trade jealousy

amongst the exporters of Great Britain, and this feeling is often reflected in Government action the world over. It has become so necessary that Great Britain should regain her hold, and then increase her foreign trade, that any set-back, especially in territory where British trade might naturally hold it has special rights, is unusually irritating to the community, and this feeling may quite easily have some direct or indirect influence upon the British outlook upon American affairs. British trade is now given a decided advantage by overseas dominions, and can hardly expect more. A certain hold is maintained by the necessary purchase for use in and export from the United Kingdom of raw materials and food, and this will always remain a guarantee of a large amount of reciprocal trade; but it is extremely difficult for the manufacturer to compete with the American in Canadian business, notwithstanding the preferential tariffs, for the American has a short haul, mass production and a vast selling organisation on the ground in his favour.

As is the case with all newly developing countries, the progress made by Canada is not as rapid as would seem natural. It is only when history is written, and a period is viewed as a whole, that the speed with which a great area has been made habitable is fully realised. It is then comparative, and a period which seems long to those who live in it is foreshortened by the passage of time and in retrospection. It was necessary that the vacant lands of the United States should be settled, and American industry developed until it had need of an overflow, before Canada could gain the population her ambitious and optimistic people desired. This era has dawned, and in the immediate future Canada will reap the benefit of a greater concentration upon the development of the possibilities of that country.

With that development will come a greater complexity of national life and an increase of international problems. There will be disputes with the British Government. There will be controversies between Ottawa and Washington. It does not seem possible now, however, that there will be any disagreements in either direction of sufficient importance to change the present political situation—or, in other words, to separate Canada from the British Empire or to cause a halt in the growing intimacy of Canada with the United States. By this same



token it is even more unlikely that Canadian-American relations can produce any incident of sufficient importance to alienate, even for a time, the people of America and the people of the United Kingdom. It is easy to conceive, on the contrary, that the growing interdependence of the United States and Canada will serve as a strong incentive to British-American good will in all international affairs.

This state of affairs is a marked contrast to the situation which prevailed only a few years ago. The importance of the United States to Canada was shown in the parliamentary debates at Ottawa. Hardly a day passed but what some reference was made to the "neighbour to the south," or "our great competitor at our door," and there was a strain of bitterness in nearly all this comment. In the congressional debates in Congress at Washington there was seldom any evidence as to the existence of Canada, and it was only on rare occasions that any reference was made to that country. Going from one capital to another when the two parliamentary bodies were in session was a curious experience for anyone at all interested in Canadian-American relations. In times of political campaigns in the United States the protectionists appealed to the farmers to support them for fear of Canadian competition in foodstuffs and to the industrialists for fear of ultimate competition from Canada in manufacturing. The low-tariff advocates appealed to the industrial workers on the ground that freer trade with Canada meant cheaper bread for the working man and to the farmer with the argument that more Canadian competition would break down the high prices and alleged monopoly of the American manufacturers of agricultural machinery and other farm supplies.

In the meantime Canada carried on, forming her own policies, based upon the needs of the country, and caught between the forces of the opposition of the United States and the apparent indifference of the British Government to Canadian affairs. For many years it was strongly felt by many people in Canada that the United Kingdom sought nothing in Canada but possible profit for home interests, and that in questions of international policy the interests of Canada were sacrificed upon the altar of British friendship with the United States. The Alaskan boundary dispute and its final settlement did little to soften this

feeling, for by a narrow majority the high British court sustained the contention of the United States as against that of Canada, and the decision caused an outburst of bitter feeling among the Canadian people. There is no question but that this feeling of antagonism to British foreign policies concerned with Canadian affairs fostered the growth of national sentiment in Canada, and led by a shorter path to what has become a national policy of almost complete freedom from British domination.

More anti-British sentiment was created in Canada by the apparent indifference with which Canadian interests were regarded in London than by any other cause. Naturally the Irish, nationalist and annexation advocates took advantage of these circumstances and fanned the flame to the best of their ability. The death of Queen Victoria had a notable effect upon the intensely British population of Ontario. A generation which had been brought up in the Victorian tradition felt it had lost its strongest tie to the Home Government. There was of course no real difference in the situation, but the reaction was real, and apparent to the most casual observer. From that time on the national aspirations of the Canadian people expanded, and constantly gained new recruits from among those whose sole political creed had been a fervent loyalty to the great Queen, whose reign had witnessed the growth of the British Empire to world-encircling proportions and the dominance of the British influence in all international affairs. The British immigrant was the least popular of all those who came to Canada. The experience of this overseas dominion was to the effect that Canada was looked upon by the people of the mother country as a convenient dumping ground for the waster and the ineffectual elements in the population of the United Kingdom. The remittance man was sent to Canada as a place where he could do less harm to his family than he could at home, and there was a vague idea that he might become a valiant and useful citizen under the influence of New World conditions. Many of them did; but what Canada really needed was men with money, to develop Canadian material resources, or men who were accustomed to labour of a productive kind, preferably agricultural.

The people of almost any other nationality than English appeared to the Canadians as more desirable, and the Germans

and Scandinavians, and even the Russians, were encouraged to come and settle upon the new lands. This Canadian experience was but a repetition of what had happened in the United States, in that broad tier of middle-western territory, where any man who was willing and able to put his hand to the plough was a more or less valuable asset to the community. In the United States, however, there were other outlets for those who were unfit for work upon the land, for industry was then getting into its stride, great railroads were being built and there was opportunity for any kind of labour, skilled or unskilled. In Canada all avenues of occupation other than that contributory to the development of the land easily became congested, the absorptive process necessarily being slow. Even to this time the Canadian immigration problem presents many of the same features it did twenty-five years ago, though a better balance has now been struck between the agricultural and industrial interests.

Canada is still encouraging immigration, while it is now discouraged in the United States; but Canada is now even more careful than ever as to whom may come to make their homes on Canadian territory, and capitalist and working farmer are the men she is still looking for with eagerness. One of the strongest ties now being created between Canada and the United States is that movement, previously referred to, of American farmers with some capital to the spacious prairies of Western Canada. In the more eastern middle states the price of farming land has risen, until the average farmer is unable to encompass a sufficient acreage to meet his growing requirements. By selling his small farm in Iowa or Illinois he can get enough money to reclaim a very large farm in the Canadian north-west, and when he comes to make provision for his family a division of this fertile estate yields a satisfactory acreage for each of his heirs.

The economic pressure which has come about in the United States has been of great value to Canada, for these men are the ideal settlers, to whom Canada opens wide her arms. These men do not feel they are going to a foreign country. The move involves no great uprooting. The physical conditions they find in their new homes are not entirely unfamiliar; they are among people who think and feel as they do themselves, and they are hardly more than a day's journey from their old habitat. This

Canadian-American leaven is working throughout the Canadian north-west, and it constitutes a powerful influence in drawing the two countries together, politically and socially as well as from an economic point of view. Western Canada has been Americanised by this influence to a certain degree, and that section of Canada is looked upon by the American people as a place where a friendly and sympathetic spirit is to be found.

As in all growing and still partially undeveloped countries with a "big brother" near by, there is considerable jealousy of American adventure in Canadian opportunities, but the relations of the two peoples are certainly as good as, if not better than, ever before. The enforcement of prohibition by the United States has led to some unpleasant incidents, due to the use of Canadian territory and Canadian vessels to assist the American bootlegging industry; but as the prohibition sentiment in Canada is almost as strong as it is in the United States the rum runners do not get much sympathy on either side of the line. The use of the British flag for the purposes of the law-breakers is not a matter of which British citizens are particularly proud, and if the situation were reversed it is doubtful whether the British or Canadian Governments would be as patient under the circumstances as has been the United States Government. If a fleet of vessels carrying the American flag were to surround the British Isles for the purpose of supplying shore-craft with opium or cocaine, or any other article the importation of which into the United Kingdom is restricted and heavily taxed, it is not difficult to imagine that the British Government would pay little attention to the exact location of the three-mile— or even the twelve-mile—limit in its efforts to put an end to the illegal traffic.

It is also probable that, even if in the United States the production of these drugs was a large and profitable industry, the people of America would fully justify the most extreme action on the part of the British in its efforts to restrict American foreign trade in this particular. That is the situation in the United States, only it is reversed. There is a law against the indiscriminate importation and sale of liquor. The nation is doing the best it can to enforce this law. Their efforts are seriously hampered by the presence in American waters of a large fleet of vessels, sailing under British and other flags, and

loaded with the exported products of a great British industry, using all means at its command to increase foreign trade. The fact that a large number of people in Great Britain do not approve of the American prohibition law does not alter the situation, for each nation has a complete right to control its own affairs, and no one would endorse this contention with greater promptness and vigour than the British.

There are a great number of people in India, China and elsewhere who do not approve of the restrictions upon the sale of opium in Great Britain, but any action on their part to evade that law would not be justified because of this belief. This matter affects British-American relations, and has some bearing upon Canadian-American relations, but in the latter case the Canadian people are much more in sympathy with the American effort to suppress the liquor traffic than are the people of the United Kingdom, especially those concerned with the prosperity of the great British distilling and brewing interests.

## CHAPTER XVI

### ECONOMIC RELATIONS

**I**N seeking the foundations for a possible entente between nations it is necessary to examine the practical or economic side of the question. If they had practically nothing to do with each other in a commercial way it would be difficult to bring about a good understanding between them, for there is nothing that so makes for knowledge of a man as a long series of bargaining transactions with him. In the course of these transactions he will probably appear at his best or at his worst, as occasion may offer. Interdependence is also an important link in the tie that may hold two nations together, for self-interest is the strongest and most general of all underlying human motives. For many years Britain and the United States have been economic complements one of the other, and the upheaval in the trade of the world brought about by the Great War has not changed this relationship, although it has altered its character in some respects. The interdependence of the two countries has been emphasised rather than decreased in the decade beginning in 1914. For many years Britain has depended upon the United States for supplies of raw cotton, the basis of the great British textile industries, and this dependence will continue for years to come, for, notwithstanding efforts made to develop a supply from elsewhere, slow progress has been made. On the other hand, notwithstanding heavy import duties and a notable development of home production, Britain has always found a large market in America for textile products, and this will undoubtedly continue for technical and economic reasons.

This is but a single item in the exchange of industrial facilities between the two countries, which have been and still are so great in proportion to the exchanges of either country with others that the United States ranks as Britain's best foreign customer in volume of purchases and Britain ranks first

as the best customer for American products in both raw material and manufactured goods. That this state of affairs should persist in spite of occasional depressions in each country, in spite of occasional trade controversies, in spite of great efforts made on both sides of the Atlantic to increase home products, and in spite of the high protection policy of the United States, speaks volumes for the strength of the economic bond which holds these two great trading and producing nations together in a mutually profitable commercial entente outranking in importance for both their commercial relations with others. In the past fifty years the world trade of Britain and the United States has grown to enormous proportions, but until the war of 1914-1918 destroyed the vast system of international exchanges that had been so carefully built up British foreign trade surpassed all others in magnitude and profit. The effect of the war was to reduce the British trading power and increase that of the United States, but this ascendancy of the United States in foreign commerce is not due entirely to the effects of the war, as many seem to believe. The war and its reactions may have hastened the coming of the inevitable, but that in time America, with its great population and unlimited wealth in natural resources, would become the greatest contributor to the foreign trade of the world has long been realised by British observers.

In 1879 Mr Gladstone in his book, *Kin Beyond Sea*, says in speaking of commercial relations between Britain and the United States : " I do not speak of the vast contributions which from year to year, through the operations of a colossal trade, each makes to the comfort and wealth of the other, nor of the friendly controversy which in its own place it might be right to raise between the leanings of America to Protectionism and the more daring reliance of the Old Country upon free and unrestricted intercourse with all the world, nor of the menace which in the prospective development of her resources America offers to the commercial supremacy of England. On this subject I will only say that it is she alone who, at a coming time, can and probably will wrest from us our commercial supremacy. We have no title ; I have no inclination to murmur at the prospect. If she acquires it she will make the requisition by the right of the strongest and best. We have no more title against her than Venice or Genoa or Holland has had against us."

Times have changed since Mr Gladstone wrote those words, and "the more daring reliance of the Old Country upon free and unrestricted intercourse" has been modified in notable instances and to a marked degree. Likewise has the United States become even more confirmed in the principle of "Protectionism," and still no other nation has risen to officially protest, for the reason that the application of the principle is universal and carries no discrimination against one country as compared with another. As a matter of fact, when the so-called McKinley tariff law was first drawn, it did exclude Britain from the benefits of the reciprocity clauses, in which it was provided that through mutual concessions a modification of import duties could be secured. As the United Kingdom was then even more of a free trade country than now, the result would have been that, as that country had nothing to concede in the way of reduction of import duties, other countries with a system of import duties could have obtained reductions of duty denied to the United Kingdom. This threatened injustice was brought to the attention of Congress while the proposed law was still under consideration, and the result was it was provided that all imports from the United Kingdom into the United States should receive favoured-nation treatment, or in other words no other country was to have any advantage in its trade with the United States not enjoyed by Britain. It is interesting to speculate upon the negotiations that might have become necessary between the two countries after the enactment of the most recent tariff law in the United States had reciprocity clauses been contained therein. Britain has abandoned her trade principle of "Free and unrestricted intercourse" to some degree, and the American import duty on motor cars for instance is little more than that now exacted in Great Britain. There would have presented itself a field for negotiation and mutual concession which did not exist in Mr Gladstone's day, or even in that of President McKinley. This of course has been the principal argument of many of the English protectionists. That is to say, a system of import duty was wanted as a trading asset or to be used as a weapon if considered advisable. It has been generally accepted in the United States that a preferential duty for products from the British overseas possessions would not be considered as discrimination against other countries,



and the United States has asserted this same right in the matter of American overseas territory and even in the instance of Cuba, which is a ward rather than a possession of the United States.

There is no antagonism to British trade in the United States—in fact quite the contrary. Every effort is made to supply the home market by American industry, and in nearly all lines protection is given to that industry; but British goods, when they are of unique character, as some of the textiles are, or of better quality or cheaper in price notwithstanding the import duties, are bought freely and without prejudice. Just after the late war, when it was realised by the American people how hard Britain had been hit financially, the unusual sight was witnessed in the United States of the American Secretary of Commerce making public speeches urging the American people to buy British goods. This action was so contrary to all established usages of international foreign trade as to cause considerable astonishment in England, not to say suspicion, for it was believed by many and openly stated by some that there must be some ulterior motive concealed in the procedure. It is doubtful whether the real reason was ever fully understood in England or credit given for the entirely worthy motive and reasoning that brought it about. Self-interest as well as a desire to assist was behind it, for the people of America have always appreciated the fact that the prosperity of Britain was to their own benefit, and that an impoverished and idle British people meant slack foreign trade and decreasing debt-paying power. It is this same thought and anticipation of future needs which led to American sympathy with Britain rather than France in the matter of German reparations, but in the case of Britain it was also a real sympathy for a country that had been in closer co-operation with America during the war than any other.

There is another point that is often overlooked in a consideration of American action, and that is the size of the country, its great population and the vastness of its daily financial exchanges. The American people are fully aware that their own industries are well cared for, and that there is no especial need to coddle them at this stage of the development of the country.

There is no great popular love for "big business" in the sense of there being any sentimental feeling of loyalty. There is no prejudice against foreign goods if they be better or cheaper than

American goods, and they will be bought by preference if they fulfil the purpose required. In buying these goods the American knows he is contributing to the public exchequer a liberal proportion of the price paid, and that in all probability he has been overcharged for the American-made article. The country is too big, there are too many people, and the aggregate of business is too large for the need of small considerations in such matter. Even if he did not think these things out for himself he would act as his own self-interest dictated, and let the American manufacturer look after himself, for if the trade was wanted by American factories they would, not unfairly under the circumstances, be expected to meet any competition that offered.

The American system of customs duties and valuation has one advantage, which was made particularly clear in the days of cheap manufacture in Germany in the years just after the war. German goods, no matter how cheaply produced, were taxed at the custom-houses on their value in the United States; hence by the time they were sold to the American consumer there was no such margin of profits as was made by the London merchant who bought German goods and put the selling price as near as he could to the English product. Behind this wall of high customs duties the American buyer feels entirely free to purchase goods without reference to the label of their origin; and not only is there no prejudice against English products, the fact that they are English attracts a large number of buyers in certain lines. The same cannot be said in all fairness of American goods in Britain, for every effort is made and every possible device employed to hamper the sale of American manufactured articles, not always with the results anticipated. A glaring instance of this is the cheap American motor car. Not only was a heavy import duty charged, but the system of motor taxation imposed a heavy penalty upon anyone buying such a car. The law proved a boomerang, however, and the British motor car manufacturers themselves asked for its repeal. They found that it forced them to certain restrictions in manufacture, and they also finally acknowledged the wisdom of the American axiom to the effect that the more cars used the more will be sold, and that if a prospective customer will not or cannot buy a car of one man, it is better he should buy of a rival than not at all.

All of these things, trivial as they may appear in a discussion of international relations, have a large and important bearing upon an entente between two peoples. When one American manufacturer can persuade one half of all users of petrol-driven engines in Great Britain to buy his American-made product it means something that a quarter of a million British citizens are directly interested in at least one phase of American affairs. It was once said before the war that the mere fact of there being three million cats in the whole of Germany and nine million in the United Kingdom was competent evidence as to the psychology of the two peoples, and this is true. It is not the ponderous utterances of statesmen or the "hands across the sea" speeches made at public dinners that bring nations in a close accord in either spiritual or material affairs. It is the matters of everyday life, the prejudices or likings aroused in each man, woman or child by some definite action or contact, direct or indirect, that determine the real friendship of nations. This is the real reason why the economic relations of countries are so important in the matter of international amity. Before the late war the relations between Germany and England were severely strained by the economic situation existing between the two countries. The British were intensely jealous and resentful of the rapid progress in world trade being made by the Germans. The Germans looked upon the British as their deadly enemies in all commercial matters involving competition, and were envious of Britain's leadership over all. This condition was reflected in politics, in the Press of both countries, and while it did not actually lead to war it helped to make it easy.

One of the finest tributes to English character is the English attitude towards Germany since the war, for there is no doubt but that the attitude of the British Government represents the attitude of the majority of the British people. They recognised the right of German industry to recover so long as it paid toll for the damage Germany had done, and accepted without question the probability of future competition in the belief that Germany could pay no toll in sufficient amount unless her people could again become industrially and commercially strong. With her foreign trade at a low ebb, her people harassed by heavy taxes, with a great army of unemployed,

and the future of her industry more than doubtful, Great Britain advocated a policy which would again build up a powerful rival whose competition was serious even when Britain was at the height of her industrial and commercial power. There is little doubt but that shortly after the late war, and even later to a more limited extent, the erstwhile jealousy of German progress in foreign trade was transferred to the United States.

A proud and once dominant people were sore in mind and body. They saw their trade gone, their boasted monetary unit, once the measure of the value of all the currencies of the world, at low value, their people out of work, and social agitation keeping the land in a ferment. They saw across the Atlantic a rich and populous nation practically unhurt materially by the war, directing its energies to the absorption of the business which had once belonged to Great Britain, and which they needed time to recapture. It required no great vision to picture the United States in a position to prevent the return of Great Britain to her original position of leadership. The feeling of pessimism which inspired jealousy has largely passed however. Its passing is due primarily to the triumph of saner judgment as to the American people and their purposes, to the discovery that the latent strength and wealth of the British nation was far beyond what even its possessors believed it to be, and to the realisation that even America, with all her wealth and energy, cannot construct for herself in a day a system of world trade that took generations of British to build up, and that although the superstructure was wrecked by the war, the foundations are gradually being uncovered and found intact as the rubbish is cleared away.

There is another bond of purpose existing between the British and American commercial, industrial and financial forces which does not appear in Britain's relations with any other country, and that is the belief that the economic condition of the continent of Europe must become somewhere near normal, or at least be well started on the road to recovery, before the rest of the world can hope for a large degree of prosperity. In 1922, in the course of an entirely laudable attempt to encourage a spirit of optimism, certain English newspapers called upon the people of Great Britain to forget the industrial and financial chaos of the European continent, and

attempt to regain an approximate pre-war state of prosperity by concentrating upon the development of overseas trade. Distinguished visitors to England, among them Americans, publicly endorsed this idea, probably in the same spirit and for the same purpose, and also because it gave opportunity to compliment the British people upon the truly magnificent resisting power and courage the nation had shown in times of supreme trial. Well-informed Englishmen received these efforts incredulously but politely, appreciating the motive, but remained convinced notwithstanding that until the purchasing power of the peoples of Continental Europe became more or less normal, as judged by pre-war standards, Great Britain would suffer from restricted foreign trade, consequent unemployment, and high taxation, accompanied by a corresponding degree of general industrial depression with all its attendant and widespread evils which react unfavourably upon the social state.

Never was there a time when trade figures needed more careful consideration or closer analysis than during the years following the Great War. Never was there a time when a wider and more comprehensive understanding of what the war had done to the world, and especially how it had affected the lives and affairs of the four hundred million people of Western Europe, was needed even to glimpse the programme of rebuilding that had to be carried out in Europe before those who lived through profit on international exchanges could find themselves on safe ground. The people of no great country have been or are to-day more dependent for prosperity upon foreign trade than the people of Great Britain. Before August 1914 this country was the great merchant of the world, buying in all markets and selling likewise, retaining for her people a percentage of profit which added mightily each year to the moneyed wealth of the nation—a wealth the magnitude of which it took a world war and subsequent years of trial to disclose.

In 1913 about 68 million tons of cargo left British ports, while in 1920 the total shipments amounted to about 37 million tons, or a little more than one half as much as in 1913. In 1913 the net tonnage of steam and sailing vessels engaged in overseas trade entering and leaving the ports of the United Kingdom was about 117 million, and in 1920 this tonnage was about 73

million, or about 65 per cent. The cause of these decreases is indicated in the present state of the trade of the world. The total foreign exchanges of all countries in 1913 are estimated to have been about 8000 million sterling. In 1921 they are estimated to have been about 6000 million sterling. Allowing 5 per cent. as a conservative estimate of the annual increase of world exchanges in normal times, the trade of the world that year should have been about 10,400 million sterling on a basis of 1913 prices. In other words, the commerce of the world, owing to the war and its after-effects, was about 4400 million short of what it would have been had there been no war. Great Britain's share of this deficit was about 655 million sterling—that is to say, Great Britain was that much short in 1921 of what her annual exchanges might have been had no war interrupted the normal course of events. The total loss to international commerce during the whole period of the war is not here considered; it is almost beyond human computation. Nearly all of such commerce as there was in Europe during actual hostilities was economic waste, as it was war service rather than legitimate trading, and added little to the wealth of the nations engaged therein, also because it was done on credit, a large part of which will be defaulted. This actual war loss will have to be written off as a bad debt. To recover it is not the legitimate hope of this generation or the next.

The greatest losses to British trade on the Continent as a result of the war were incurred first in the ex-enemy countries and secondly in the Allied countries, the cause being the same, loss of purchasing power. The loss to British trade in Germany alone is over 100 million sterling on a 1913 basis as to volume and prices, and the loss in Russia is about 45 million. Of the total loss to the trade of Great Britain of 255 million annually about 173 million is due to present conditions on the continent of Europe. The normal rate of annual increase in British trade in 1913 and years immediately preceding can be conservatively estimated at 5 per cent. The war caused, therefore, in addition to the actual decrease, an indirect loss of about 400 million, most of which gain would have come naturally from Continental Europe. In brief, Great Britain lost by the war in the amount of annual foreign trade the difference between what would have been done in times of peace and what is now actually done,

added to which is the loss of the possible increase which would have taken place, or a total loss for 1921 of about 655 million. If these figures of possible increase are considered too liberal there certainly remains sufficient indirect loss of this character to make a vast difference to British industry. It has been shown that about 70 per cent. of the present deficit in the foreign trade of Great Britain is due to conditions on the continent of Europe. Adding the proportionate share of normal annual increase, it gives a total direct and indirect loss of about 460 millions in the countries across the Channel. To believe for a moment that this loss can be recovered by immediate development of trade elsewhere is to ignore all trade figures of 1913 and the conditions so plainly in existence in 1923. Trade with the United States previously stimulated by war reactions has decreased rapidly since 1920, and British trade with the British overseas possessions, with the exception of India, was less in tonnage in 1922 than in 1913. The total annual trade of the United Kingdom with British overseas possessions just before the late war was less than the annual loss to British trade in the European continent incurred as a result of the war.

The British overseas possessions are also deeply concerned with the state of Europe, and in the prosperity of those possessions America is also interested, especially in Canada. The London market is the distributing point for British overseas products, and with the decreased purchasing power of the people of the European continent, London is not in a position to buy as freely as it did before the war.

American commercial interests are in close sympathy with the British interests in a mutual anxiety to see the purchasing power of the world increased. Over half of the foreign trade of the United States is with Europe. Of the total exports of twenty principal articles, Europe buys 75 per cent. Of American meat and meat products, Europe buys 85 per cent. Of the total corn and corn products export, Europe bought 65 per cent. Of the total cotton export, Europe bought 85 per cent. Of the oil exports, Europe bought 65 per cent. Of the copper sold, Europe bought nearly 80 per cent. In other words, Europe buys each year three-quarters of all American products exported. In 1922 these purchases amounted to over two billion dollars, or more than half of the total exports. The growth

of American export trade is therefore largely dependent upon an increase of purchasing power on the part of the European buyer. An interesting fact concerning these American exports that enter European territory is that a very small percentage are competitive with British products. They consist largely of food, cotton, oil and tobacco. Hence not only are American business interests sympathetic with British desire to see European conditions restored to normal, but there is every incentive to close co-operation in an effort to bring this about.

The evidence appears conclusive that neither Great Britain nor any other country can afford for a moment to forget the state of Continental Europe. The recovery of France or her decline will be measured surely and accurately by the rate of recovery or decline shown by her neighbours, Allied or ex-enemy. The foreign trade of the United States will show no great gain in volume or profit until European functions more or less normally. When it is considered that the area involved in the present confusion holds more than half of the population of the so-called civilised world it could hardly be otherwise. The Great War was a case of nationalism run amok. This poison has spread all over the world like a plague let loose. The mentality of mankind has not even yet recovered that balance acquired during an epoch of peace and destroyed in a moment of war. Harassed by debt and taxation, unemployment, the high cost of living, and with nerves on edge, jealousy and suspicion govern international councils and individual thought alike. The war and its consequences have been more than humanity could bear without sinister result. There is no longer any faith in the disinterestedness of nations or individuals, and where, in addition to this mental state, there exists imminent danger of collapse, there is apparently no incentive to carry on in the regular order. The material interest of all nations in the restoration of economic stability on the continent of Europe is obvious. The British Government and the British people are entitled to great credit for what they have done, what they have tried to do, and are still striving for. Risking serious criticism, alienation of sympathy in some directions, and even positive disagreement with home and foreign elements, the British Government has proceeded along wide and generous lines in its policy towards the countries of Continental Europe,



Allied and ex-enemy alike. It is the policy to which all Governments will have to come in time. The disastrous failure of the power of any other to achieve desired results is obvious. Mistakes have been made by all Governments, and prejudices have survived with individuals to such an extent as to warp otherwise sound judgment.

If it were possible to assume that a competent and disinterested board of directors was given charge of the world's affairs to-day with full powers, and told to go ahead and straighten matters out, this board would probably start their work by ignoring all that had been done since the war. It would soon be realised that there was really nothing wrong with any country in Europe, that the trouble all originated with artificial conditions imposed. The land and the mines are there. The railroad and all the machinery of distribution are in working order. Millions of people are ready and willing to work for a living wage. The real damage done by the war to the material condition of Europe is comparatively almost infinitesimal. All the troubles which afflict mankind are concerned with politics and money, the latter rightly but a medium of exchange and not a commodity. If the medium of exchange had been stabilised, arrangements made for industry to resume, and the nations relieved of the vast incubus of artificially created burdens and restraints, there is no reason why the ordinary affairs of life should not have been taken up in 1919 approximately where they were set aside in 1914 and humanity allowed to work out another cycle of its existence. Men of affairs in Great Britain and the United States agreed as to this diagnosis of the European situation. The British proposals to France in the matter of German reparations were based upon these ideas, and in sympathy with this position the suggestion came later from America that an international commission upon which the United States would be represented should view the whole situation and devise a plan along such lines as would be fair to all and yet give all humanity and its concerns at least a chance for recovery from the parlous state in which they were involved.

Nothing that has taken place in the history of the economic relations of the two great English-speaking nations has been more illuminating as to a community of thought than this agreement in principle, and this agreement was strengthened and

broadened in every way through the two great international events of the post-war period, the results of the Naval Disarmament Conference at Washington, and the settlement of the terms of the British debt to the United States. It does not seem possible that anything of greater importance or containing greater elements of possible discord can come up for discussion between the two countries, and if these can be disposed of so quickly and with so little discussion of a character dangerous to international relations, it is a hopeful augury for all future negotiations.

That there are many rivalries between British and American interests goes without saying, and the greatest of these is for the possession of oil-producing territory or rights within that territory. That conflicts over these questions are dangerous to good international relations has been recognised by the Governments of both countries, and such danger has been eliminated whenever possible. The oil interests in both countries are rich and powerful, not only financially but politically. There appears to be less danger from the American side of the question than from the British, for the American Government is notoriously slow to act diplomatically on behalf of the great American industrial interests. The reasons for this are found primarily in a certain antagonism in American public opinion to the operations of great industrials which approximate the character of monopolies. It is only a few years since the nation was stirred to its depths by a struggle on behalf of the people against the so-called "trusts," otherwise great industrial organisations holding almost complete control of the market in the line of products they sold. The disclosures made during that fight proved many of the contentions advanced by the anti-trust advocates, and in the settlements and readjustments that were forced upon these organisations by public opinion and the vigorous enforcement of anti-trust legislation the consumers are not yet entirely satisfied as to their benedict character or as to whether they did not get the best of the law in the matter of their enforced reorganisation. The prosecution of the "trusts" was unquestionably carried too far in many cases, and enterprises valuable to the country were unnecessarily injured, as is always the case where great reform movements are given full sway.

Naturally the whole question became largely one of politics, and no political leader or party can even yet afford to appear too friendly with what is known as "big business." Hence it is that when the great industrial organisations appeal to the United Government for aid in their quarrels in a foreign country, American diplomacy moves slowly and cautiously. It must first be assured most convincingly that some foreign Government is aiding discrimination against American interests abroad, and must then satisfy itself that the situation warrants such Government action as will not lay itself open to just criticism from the political party in opposition. This situation certainly results in one thing, and that is the genuineness of any protest made by the Government of the United States to any other Government on behalf of American business interests. It is a protest to be taken seriously. It is evident the British Government understands this situation fully, and is ready to meet it, for during the past few years the few times the United States Government has intervened on behalf of American interests which were apparently in conflict with British interests the results have been satisfactory to the diplomacies of both countries. The public of Great Britain and the United States look upon great combinations of capital from somewhat different points of view. The undesirable features of such combinations have not developed as quickly or as flagrantly in England as they did in the United States. Public opinion has not been aroused in Great Britain as it has in the United States, for reasons of the different conditions prevailing. The British appear more inclined to endure the disadvantages inflicted upon the individual for the sake of industry as a whole than do the people of the United States, and the British Government and Press are more subservient to "big business" than the Government or Press of America. This condition arises from the fact that the American Government is more exposed to the criticism of the mass of the people who are, in America, more widely instructed as to industrial and commercial reactions than they are in Great Britain, and politicians and newspaper owners in America can acquire power and influence by violent opposition to financial or commercial interests, whereas in Great Britain such opposition identifies them at once with the extreme "left wing," and puts them out of court so far as the middle and upper

classes of society are concerned. In America "big business" is often the football of the politicians, and its growth to the dimensions of the present day has been accomplished in spite of popular suspicion and hostility and consequent Government restraint.

The great industrial organisations of the United States are largely responsible for the building of American foreign trade in manufactured goods, and this has been finally recognised by the American public, for many of the restrictions which still apply to business within the United States have been relaxed upon the business of export. American observers have long watched with interest the tendency towards combination which has manifested itself so strongly in the United Kingdom during the past few years. Many things which are allowed or at least tolerated in Great Britain are forbidden by law in the United States. It has been predicted that in time the British people will become aroused to possible danger of the exploitation of the home market by monopolies, and that the future holds for the British a violent struggle against these same forces, which almost brought about great social disturbance in the United States, and which certainly did lead to something of a political revolution. When that time comes, the people of Great Britain may be able to profit by the experience of the American people, and avoid some of the errors made in the heat of a great contest.

In America the anti-trust movement was not originally political; it was economic, and as such broke down party lines to a great extent. In Great Britain such a move would probably originate with the Labour party, and be looked upon largely as a political weapon. This would deprive it of much of the driving force it had in America, and prolong the contest, or else compel a compromise on the part of all political parties, which in the end would all go, as an act of self-preservation, as far as they could in the same direction. This feature of the commercial life of the two countries has considerable bearing upon international relations, and in some directions gives British finance and industry an advantage at the present time. British industry is in a position to bring stronger and more direct pressure to bear upon the British Government in matters affecting British foreign trade than American industry

can counter by efforts in a like direction. This might be a source of danger to the relations of the two countries but for the fact that considerations other than purely commercial have great weight with the powers that govern the British Empire. This appears to be something towards a guarantee that no sordid controversy over purely material things will ever seriously check the progress now being made towards a real entente between the two nations.

The mere fact that during many years of peaceful trade the exchanges between the two countries increased to a point when they exceeded those between any other two countries, and that as order slowly appears out of the chaos created by the war these predominating relations are resumed, is all-sufficient evidence that the United States and the British Empire complement each other in the economic field of human activity. American relations with all English-speaking parts of the British Empire are most convincingly good, and growing better with each passing year. This is due largely to improving transportation facilities and to the adoption by some of the British overseas dominions of forms of government procedure in harmony with those in force in the United States. These American relations with the British overseas dominions have given rise to some feeling of jealousy in Great Britain, but as all these dominions remain entirely loyal to the Empire, and show their leanings towards trade within the Empire by giving preferential treatment to British products, this jealousy is not to be taken seriously by either nation. The whole economic situation resolves itself into a determined but friendly rivalry for a comparatively small percentage of the exchanges between the nations. The vast bulk of the trade is beneficial to both, and seems to promote rather than weaken friendship. As Mr Gladstone said nearly fifty years ago, "the vast contributions which from year to year through the operations of a colossal trade each makes to the comfort and wealth of the other" constitute an effective and practical guarantee of increasing knowledge and co-operation in all things.

## CHAPTER XVII

### THE BRITISH INVASION OF THE UNITED STATES

**T**HE records of the United States Government show that about 9,000,000 people emigrated from England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales direct to the United States in the one hundred years between 1820 and 1919. The records of the early years of that century are necessarily defective and are an understatement. Neither do these figures include the people of British nationality who came into the United States from the United Kingdom by way of Canada and other British possessions. It is known that over 2,000,000 immigrants have entered the United States from Canada alone, and that all but a very small percentage of these were British. It is not difficult to believe that 12,000,000 or 13,000,000 British citizens left their homes with the intention of making a permanent residence in the United States in the one hundred years which ended in 1920. A few of these returned to their native land, to remain there. Many of them revisited their old homes, but the vast majority of them took root in the New World and put forth their branches in a purely American environment.

The population of the United States in 1790 was about 4,000,000, and while no figures are available, it would probably be a fair statement if it was claimed that over half of this population was of British origin. The circumstances of the original settlement of the country, the fact that it was a British colony until 1776, and the preponderance of travel between the United States and the United Kingdom would probably warrant an even larger estimate as to the percentage of British in the whole population. In 1920 over twenty-five per cent. of the foreign-born whites in the United States were from British territory, and it is estimated by competent statisticians that of the present population of the United States more than fifty-five per cent. are of British blood. The immigration restriction law of 19th May 1921 limits the number of aliens admissible in a

year to three per cent. of the number of the particular nationality in each case resident in the United States, as shown by the census of 1910. Under this law the annual quota allowed to the British is about 78,000. This is the largest quota allowed to any nationality, and indicates that, according to the census of 1910, there were resident in the United States about 2,600,000 aliens still retaining a British nationality, which was necessarily a larger showing than that made by any other alien citizenship.

Since this law came into operation emigration from Great Britain, which had fallen off by reason of the war and several other causes since 1914, increased rapidly, until in 1922 the quota of British allowed to go to the United States was filled in the first ten months of the American fiscal year. The movement of 1923 up to the time this is written shows that competition is keen among those emigrating from Great Britain to get to the United States before the quota for each month is filled, and the pressure upon the gates is such as to indicate a possible annual movement of nearer 200,000 from Great Britain to the United States, except for the fact that the limit fixed by law is considerably less than half that number. This increased movement is due to lack of employment in Great Britain, a marked restlessness resulting from war strain, reports of high wages and unlimited employment in the United States, and it has come about in the face of increased restrictions upon travel both political and economical.

One of the most interesting features of this movement of British to the United States at the present time is the changing character of the emigration. In the one hundred years preceding 1920 the direct emigration from the United Kingdom to the United States included about 4,500,000 Irish, 3,500,000 English, 600,000 Scots, and 65,000 Welsh.

In the first half of the century referred to nine-tenths of the outward movement was from Ireland, England and Wales, for the Scotsmen stayed at home. The first real impulse to emigrate was apparently felt by the Scots between 1880 and 1890, and these impulses appear to have occurred with a certain regularity ever since that time up to the current year, when the movement of the population of Scotland to other countries has taken on the character of an exodus, only limited by financial restrictions and those imposed by the United States, for it is to America

that the Scots appear determined to go. One half of the Irish who have gone to the United States in the past one hundred years went prior to 1871, about one-third of the English, but only one-tenth of the Scots. Nine-tenths of the Scots who have emigrated to America have gone to that country in the past fifty years, and the larger part of these in the past twenty-five years. This great exodus of Scotsmen from their native land is a comparatively modern phenomenon and has excited considerable alarm in Great Britain. This would not have been the case had these people been emigrating to some of the British overseas dominions. There is a general belief among the people of Great Britain that emigration is not only allowable, but to be encouraged, if it is from one part of the British Empire to another. It is looked upon as more or less a solution of economic and social difficulties at home, and the building up of the dominions is regarded as an equivalent to a like increase of national strength in the Mother Country. That this is a policy debatable as to its real value and founded upon an overestimate as to the strength of the economic ties of Empire is possible.

These Scotsmen are nearly all going to the United States, and it is only the limitation placed upon the number who will be admitted, and the difficulty of financing the move that prevent an immediate transfer for a large part of the population of Scotland to the United States. Conditions of life in Scotland have always been hard, and they are harder than ever at the present time. Money is scarce and hard to get, unemployment is rife, and to make a living from the land is a difficult task. The people are hard-working—none more so—intelligent, democratic in their beliefs and customs, and they make as desirable a class of citizens as any country could ask of its immigration. The qualities and characteristics of the Scotsman for which he is famous the world over are largely the product of his native environment. His closeness in money matters is the enforced habit of thrift, due to absolute lack of money. His physical hardiness is the result of an outdoor life in a stern climate. His independent democracy of thought and social habit is the product of a racial and tribal pride nurtured through generations of hard-won and jealously preserved political freedom. He is British of his own free will, but withal a Scotsman first, last and all the time.



As a matter of public policy, while it is fortunate that the number of British immigrants allowed to enter the United States each year is larger than that allowed from any other nationality, it is unfortunate that there are any restrictions at all upon British immigration. These people speak the English language; they are born and brought up under conditions which qualify them to become American citizens on short notice; they need no instruction as to the meaning of political equality or liberty; they are not recruits to a foreign colony in the United States, nor are they added to the ranks of sweated labour when they seek employment. They go to the United States to better their condition, and not to escape political or social oppression. They are in no sense refugees seeking an asylum, but are freemen willing to work at anything a self-respecting man may do in the hopes of achieving an economic independence, almost impossible in their native land. They become naturally an anti-criminal, deeply religious and stable element in the social structure of any country in which they may happen to make their home.

The unscientific character of a numerical restriction upon immigration was never more clearly demonstrated than in the arbitrary limitation the present American law places upon the number of British people who may be allowed to enter the United States each year for the purpose of making new homes in that country. If a standard of all-round fitness for American citizenship was the only test, other than the usual physical and financial requirements, nearly all of the would-be immigrants from Northern and Western Europe would pass through the gates ahead of those from any other part of the world, and the British applicants for admission would be well in the vanguard of these. Every possible effort is being made by the British authorities to direct the outflow from Great Britain to the overseas dominions; but while sentimental reasons incline the British emigrant to keep under the shadow of the flag of his Mother Country, practical reasons take him to the United States if it is possible for him to get there.

While the British Press makes much of the hardships some British citizens have suffered through the workings of the American immigration law in principle and in operation, the British Government, those who encourage the Imperial spirit in

a practical way, and the Governments of the overseas British dominions are deeply grateful to the United States for coming to their aid. No effort made by the British authorities has succeeded in stopping British emigration to the United States, and it is only the numerical limitation placed by the United States Government upon those who are to enter to remain that has kept the exodus within bounds. Thousands of British emigrants have gone to Canada, South Africa and Australasia who wanted to go to the United States, and would have done so had they been allowed. Many of them who have gone to Canada as a second choice have gone with the idea that better opportunity may come to enter the United States from there, and that it certainly will come in course of time.

The Scotsmen who are emigrating all seem to prefer to go to the United States, and with that persistence characteristic of the race they wait from month to month in hopes of getting in under the legal quota. The greatest exodus of the Scots is from the Highlands, and if the present movement is maintained large areas of Scotland will be almost depopulated before long. The average density of population in Scotland is about one hundred and twenty-seven to the square mile as compared with about thirty-six in the United States. Of the less than 5,000,000 people in Scotland over 2,000,000 are to be found in seven cities, and it is the country districts which are furnishing the emigrants and thus becoming more and more sparsely settled. It has been estimated that in 1923 there were over 200,000 Highland Scots who wanted to go to the United States, and were ready to do so as soon as arrangements could be made. This state of affairs has brought forth a plan to take these people in a body to Canada and place them upon the lands of the western part of that country. The plan is declared to be entirely feasible, and it may be carried out. Every assistance possible will be given by the British Government, as otherwise the majority of these people will find their way to the United States.

While it can easily be understood why the British people prefer their emigrating thousands should remain within the British Empire, it is really no misfortune for either country that they are going to the United States. If it be inevitable that Great Britain should lose these people, it requires no

stretch of imagination to believe that they are serving well the future of British-American relations, and thus indirectly at least strengthening the British Empire by remaining within the lands of the English-speaking peoples. Great Britain receives no admixture of American blood through immigration, and in a way it is not needed to counteract other and more alien influences. It is, however, of the greatest importance to the future of British-American relations that every possible influence be brought to bear to emphasise the native-born English-speaking element in America, and in no way can this be accomplished so effectively and in such a short time as by increasing the British element in the population of the United States. No possible danger threatens the American nation from any invasion of erstwhile British citizens, and it is an invasion by an army the members of which are technically classed as aliens, which the American people can and do welcome without misgivings.

It was not the movement of population from Great Britain and Ireland which brought about the restrictive legislation so hastily adopted in self-defence by the United States after the war. In the one hundred years ending in 1920 over 35,000,000 immigrants had entered the United States. These were the official figures, and in the early years of that century it was probable that many came in who escaped official enumeration. In 1881 the annual inflow passed the half million mark, but it was not until 1902 that the inflowing tide rose to such alarming proportions as to give rise to doubt as to the wisdom of allowing it to continue in such volume. In 1905 it passed the million mark, and in six out of the ten years following it exceeded a million. In 1914 over 1,200,000 immigrants entered the United States. The war gave the American people a respite and a chance to consider the question as a whole, but nothing was done during that period. When, however, in 1919 the tide began to rise again, and it was realised that conditions in Europe would probably cause many millions of people to seek new homes in foreign lands, and the United States would be the asylum preferred, the matter of immigration restriction was again considered.

With the advent of the fiscal year 1921-1922 the numerical restriction went into effect. It was a hastily enacted measure,

designed to hold the situation within control. It was a temporary measure, operative only from year to year as renewed. It is certain that severe restrictions upon immigration will remain in force in the United States, but there may be some changes in the present law making it more scientific and intelligent in its application. The rapidly rising tide of immigrants did not find its origin in British territory. It came largely from Russia and from Central and South-Eastern Europe, and the quality of this immigration was such as to give little satisfaction to the nation giving shelter thereto. It was deemed necessary as a matter of international policy and for political reasons not to make this law discriminatory, hence all nations were treated alike. This policy will naturally prevail in the future should the restriction be purely numerical, but suggestions have been made for certain modifications which would react to the advantage of the British movement, and if this were possible the United States would most certainly gain thereby.

Since the war the exchange of visitors between the United States and Great Britain has increased with each passing year, but it has not yet reached pre-war dimensions. Immigration will never be allowed again into the United States on such a scale as was witnessed in 1914, but it is expected that while that country will lose in numbers by the curtailment, it will gain in the greater desirability of those who are allowed to enter. Both Great Britain and the United States, however, are desirous of increasing the number of people other than emigrants who visit one country from the other. In this direction Great Britain has the advantage of the United States, for many more Americans come to England as visitors than British go to the United States in like capacity. The disadvantages of modern travel as compared with the pre-war state are many. The expense of the journey is nearly double, the matter of passports and visas is a deterrent, and the general expenses incidental to a visit to either country are much greater than they were before 1914.

Those who travel for pleasure only do not care to incur the hardships and annoyances now an inevitable feature of crossing frontiers. Those who travel on business are not as numerous as in pre-war years, because there is not so much business being

done. It is unfortunate for British-American relations that these things are so, for the freer and easier the international communication the better the nations will get to know each other. The generation just now coming into control of the affairs of the world has as yet no opportunity of getting well acquainted with foreign peoples, and it is only through acquiring such an acquaintance that the needed international outlook can be secured and natural sympathies discovered. There is nothing to be feared and everything to be hoped for in an unrestricted association of British and American people. It can be imagined that closer acquaintance with some nations would arouse the hopeless antagonism of any native-born Britisher or American, and it would probably be a perfectly safe experiment to mingle all the nationalities and observe the reactions. The first would be a segregation into groups of individuals, each group comprising a single nationality. The second would be the formation of larger groups, each one including all the nations brought together by any natural and mutual ties or sympathies. It would be found that, in the first place, language was the tie that operated most strongly and in the shortest time, and in the second, that racial sympathy would play an important part in sorting out the original mixtures. The English-speaking people—in other words, the British and the Americans—would not be long in getting together, and no other group of two or more nations would be so strongly united as this by reason of the ties of language, racial likeness and common purposes put into effect by like methods.

A number of Americans go to the United Kingdom each year who are classed as emigrants because of the manner in which they travel. These are not really emigrants, however, in the strict sense of the word, for very few of them are on their way to Great Britain for the purpose of making a home in that country. There is practically no emigration from the United States to Great Britain, and for obvious reasons. In the emigrant class the invasion is all the other way, and, as before stated, this is all to the good in the matter of British-American relations, for it is in the United States the pro-British leaven is most needed. It is estimated that the movement of the 78,000 British to the United States each year means a monetary loss to Great Britain of about £4,000,000 sterling, excepting

for that portion of this money which is paid to British steamship companies for transportation across the Atlantic. Much more than this, however, comes back from the emigrants themselves as soon as they become wage-earners, for it is estimated that over \$100,000,000 are sent to Europe every year from the United States by those who have emigrated to that country within comparatively recent times.

The British, other than emigrants who go to the United States, are travelling for pleasure or on business. Few go merely as a matter of choice to make their homes in that country. There are no British colonies, known as such, in the American cities, and the British who live or who travel in the United States not of the working class make little impress upon American political, social or business life. Those who are there appear either to blend effectively into the life about them, or are lost in the whirl of an existence which has no time for clubs, societies or other features of social life which in Great Britain are conducive to the segregation of foreign nationalities thus transplanted into alien surroundings.

There are supposed to be about 10,000 Americans living in London. Practically all of these are business or professional men, with a few exceptions who may be classed as the idle rich. There are probably many more than 10,000 of British nationality in New York, but a majority of the British in New York would be wage-earners. Most of the Americans living in London possess some degree of social or business position, are more visible to the eye, and more insistent on their nationality than are the British in New York, who, because of the less conspicuous social or business position of many of them, are lost in the mass of hurrying humanity which goes to make up the crowd. The British invasion of the United States is via the emigrant deck, and ultimately reveals itself on the weekly pay-roll of the American employer. The American invasion of Great Britain is via the saloon deck, and it aims either at pleasure or information or at a share of the profits made out of a British pay-roll.

. Both these armies of invasion have their uses in bringing about closer relations between the British Empire and the United States, but there is no question but that the British workman who goes to the United States better his condition

and becomes an American citizen, as most of them do in time, is a more powerful missionary for the British-American entente than the sophisticated American tourist or business man who goes to Great Britain for the pleasure or profit which he expects to gain by his residence abroad, temporary or permanent as the case may be. The British workman who goes to the United States takes something with him to exchange for what he gets, which is of great value to the nation with which he has cast his lot—he takes skill and industry and, as a rule, a sense of thrift and a knowledge as to the value of this quality if he is to realise upon his ambitions. He has previously in his own country led a hard, spare life. His standards are more or less those of the Spartan, and while these are rapidly modified under the influence of an American environment they serve a valuable purpose in the new home, not only to himself but to the community of which he is now a part.

This is more the case with the English, the Welsh or the Scots immigrants than the Irish—a race apart from the others to be found in the British Isles. The Scotsman is, above all men of the English-speaking peoples, the most desirable immigrant to secure, and the fact that he prefers the United States to any of the British dominions in his choice of a new home is evidence that his intention of leaving his native land is not a mere impulse of flight from hard conditions at home. He is more serious in his mental attitude towards life, better read in a general way, more deeply sentimental in his attachments, and there is a greater gravity of purpose in his emigration than there is as a rule in that which takes his fellow-countrymen of English, Welsh or Irish birth to a foreign land. As a matter of public policy it would profit the United States in every way if it were possible to throw open the gates to all Scotsmen who might want to enter, but in the effect such action might have upon other international relations in all probabilities lies an unanswerable argument against such discrimination in favour of a single nationality.

A great deal has been said and written concerning the effect of the so-called American invasion of Great Britain upon life in that country. American women have married into the British aristocracy, and are credited by some with all the changes of questionable value which have taken place of late years in

British social life. Probably a much fairer statement of the case would be that these same American women have taken things as they found them, but have emphasised such tendencies as appealed to them personally through their natural vitality, high spirits and personal habits of independence and freedom to which they were accustomed to give free play in their native land, where tradition and convention do not play so great a part in the unwritten laws of conduct as in their new environment. It is also the case that many of these marriages are more or less business arrangements, hence lack those softening influences of the ordinary mating; and the implication is natural that those who are willing to make such marriages are lacking in a certain idealism which governs the lives of others. The real effect upon British society of the advent of these American matrons has been vastly overestimated, for the institutions of British society do not yield easily to outside influences. It is far more likely to be the case that the American woman who has been absorbed into British social life has become more Anglicised than her associates have become Americanised.

In a business way life in Great Britain shows evidence of some Americanisation in methods, but even this idea has been greatly exaggerated in the public mind, and many of the so-called American innovations are merely the results of a natural modern development which keeps pace with the world-wide improvements in methods, aided by new inventions and their use in the trade of the world. The British business man clings tenaciously to the system which he has found advisable and successful for so many years, and his affairs, being conducted upon an international rather than a national basis, as in the United States, are not quite those of any other country. Within Great Britain in the development of retail domestic trade many ideas are now in use which are of American origin, and it will be found that nearly all of these lie in the domain of publicity. In some cases these have been very successful among the British, but this has not been so where there has been a failure to grasp the principle or idea that lies behind the form, for inherent in every successful device for attracting attention of men or women there must be a soul of sorts. The mere form, while important as a method of expression, is nothing without the illuminating power of intelligence behind it. It is in this



direction that the British fail at times to grasp the psychology of so-called American methods. It will be found that there is a meaning behind what is often considered by the British to be a grotesque form, if that form has really accomplished anything of note.

An illustration of this is often given in British newspapers where an attempt has been made to copy the American style of advertising. So far as the actual wording goes it may be similar, but when used without understanding it becomes banal and, it may be said, is a waste of space and money. A few British merchants have sensed the real secret of success in this direction and have used it to their profit, but as a rule they have had the assistance of an American mind in the initiatory work. Some of the changes made in British life have come about through a desire to profit from the presence each year in Great Britain of several hundred thousand American visitors, and these changes in some instances have been found agreeable by the British themselves, and have been incorporated permanently into British life. An American without much experience of life in foreign countries who comes to Great Britain for the first time would not, from his point of view, see very much evidence of any Americanisation. The American who has been familiar with British life for a generation would, however, be able to point to much that has occurred in his experience which would indicate closer touch and even sympathy with American ideas as to how things should be done.

British influence upon American life is really far greater than that of American influence upon British life, but it does not lie so much in the obvious. In the arts, literature, the theatre, and in some forms of music British influence is supreme. In its effect upon those who are building the palatial homes and surroundings of the rich it is evident everywhere. In matters of clothes, sports and games British origin can easily be traced. In politics and matters of Government America finds little to adopt from British models. In the realm of labour America has its own ideas, which do not chime with those of British labour. American social activities have no permanent unchangeable foundations upon which they are based, as those of the British have, which find their lead and authority in a social

system fixed, and a part of the constitutional structure of the British Government.

British capital has played a tremendous and all-important part in the development of the North-American continent. It has built nearly all of the transeontinental railroads, put into operation mines of all descriptions, and has financed great industrial enterprises. It has even extended the farming area by furnishing money for loans upon the land and for carrying on the live-stock industry on a large scale. On the whole, British capital has been well paid for doing this; but it is also true that millions of pounds sterling lie buried in American ground which never returned a penny of interest to the lenders, to say nothing of the fact that they never saw a pound of the money after making the investment. Investment in American enterprise stands well, however, with British capital—probably as well as, or better than, that of any other foreign country—and the British capitalist has now achieved a discriminating power in these matters which he did not possess in the earlier years of financial transactions between the two countries.

The tide has turned to a certain degree since the war, and American capital has come to Great Britain and Ireland in considerable quantities in recent years. If the situation in Ireland develops into reasonable economic stability, it would not be surprising if it was largely American money that put the new Ireland on its feet and brought wealth and prosperity to a people who have all too long been absorbed in unprofitable adventure. This will be a form of American participation in Irish affairs which will have a more beneficent effect upon British-American relations than the form in which American participation has shown itself in the past through the efforts of the Irish element in the population of the United States.

There is one direction in which Great Britain exerts an especially strong influence upon American affairs, and that is through the commanding position of London in the financial world and its position as a price-maker in the international trade of the world. Notwithstanding the increased power which came to American finance as a result of the war and its aftermath, London is still the exchange rate-maker and the centre of gravity of the world's financial affairs. So far as America is concerned, Great Britain may have become a debtor

country, although the balance against her is not nearly as large as is popularly supposed. So far as the whole world is concerned, Great Britain is still a creditor country with a very large balance in her favour, and the single fact that the British people are paying their enormous debt to the United States under terms arranged by mutual agreement gives some idea as to the financial resources of the nation. By taxation alone the British Government is getting five times as much money each year as was obtained from the same source before the war, and is using large amounts of this income to clear away obligations incurred on behalf of the whole Empire, at the same time requiring no contribution from the Empire as a whole towards these payments. The burdens and responsibilities of being a Mother Country to an Empire upon which the sun never sets are carried by the less than 10,000,000 tax-payers resident in a single country out of an Imperial population of over 400,000,000 scattered through half-a-hundred more or less autonomous states.

As a price-maker in the international market Great Britain still holds a relatively high position, although owing to the decrease in the trade of the world the transactions recorded in the London market are not so numerous or so large as they were prior to 1914. It is still to London, however, that American exporters must send to gauge their power of competition not only in Great Britain but in all other foreign countries as well. The competitive power of the international foreign traders, brokers and bankers of London has as yet been reached by no other like organisations in any country, certainly not in America. Germany was well on the way to have become a formidable competitor in 1913 until a rush of blood to the head precipitated the Great War and dragged her people to their ruin. That the German-speaking people will come back into their own in time is inevitable, but it will be many years before they will be able to again take a leading position, as their machinery for international trade must be almost entirely reconstructed, and in the meantime the competitive power of other nations will be maintained and improved. A jealous watch will be kept on German progress, and it will be thwarted wherever possible by European rivals who, while realising the recuperative power of an industrious, intelligent and ambitious German nation,

will endeavour to postpone the date of their full recovery as long as possible.

Notwithstanding the present depression in the economic life of Great Britain and the burdens the British people are carrying, there are few signs of weakening in the fibre of the national and Imperial fabric. It is handwoven of sound material. Time has been no object in the making, and it is of a nature to stand the wear and tear of even greater misfortune than it has yet been called upon to endure. It is yet a question as to whether the institutions of the American Republic have acquired the resisting power possessed by those of Great Britain and achieved by that country through the centuries gradually but surely. With hardly more than a third of the population and wealth of the United States the voice of Great Britain in the affairs of the world speaks with greater certainty and authority. As the American nation is of the same race, and this race has a common purpose and ideal, a destiny is suggested for the United States to be realised upon in the years to come which is far beyond the ambitions or even the dreams of the present generation. The American nation devoid of Imperial ambitions as it is from the Old World point of view naturally develops slowly any foreign policy of a positive character. A negative policy is already fairly well defined, and, what is more, is understood and accepted by other nations.

Imperial ambition is what directs the foreign policy of most Governments—in fact it is such ambition which creates a positive line of thought and action in relation to other countries. Without such ambition there is no selfish motive to serve as a driving power in formulating a positive attitude towards international affairs, and there must be a certain element of selfishness in every movement made by individuals or nations to make them convincing to others, individually or in groups. The British Empire was created through a positive foreign policy. The point has now been reached, however, when this policy becomes more negative than positive. The Imperial ambition of the British people has largely exhausted itself, and now becomes more defensive than aggressive—a significant change—one which puts their people more in sympathy with American ideas than they were when an aggressive policy of expansion was more in evidence.

The American people can understand and sympathise with a people who are determined to hold what they have, and who will go to any length to do so, but they rather look askance upon a nation whose foreign policies reveal more or less the intention to get hold of something that belongs to someone else, if it can be done.

The people of Great Britain are now apparently content to go their way as they are, and as their overseas dominions furnish all the room needed for any surplus of population which may appear in any part of the Empire they no longer have any Imperial need to satisfy. With the world in normal state there is, however, no real over-population of Great Britain. It is only the conditions of the present time which have created the impression that the country is suffering from over-population and has a surplus which must find an outlet in emigration. To strengthen the Empire as a whole ranks only second in the mind of every Englishman to the desire to increase the strength, prosperity and prestige of Great Britain. If people are going to leave the Mother Country he wants them to remain within the Empire. In earlier days, when the authority of the Home Government over the dominions was greater than it is now, these people would have been allowed to emigrate to British territory overseas without any restrictions, but, as it happens, the people of Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand have ideas of their own on these subjects. They are somewhat discriminating as to the character of the surplus they get, and they do not want any at all unless conditions are favourable to the absorption of those who come into the ranks of the employed.

As has been the case with every newly opened territory, with the exception of that of the United States, the British dominions have not been reclaimed as rapidly as was hoped for or expected by those whose desires outran the economic law. In 1900 it was predicted that Canada, for instance, would have a population of 10,000,000 by 1910, but that point has not been reached even yet. The United States, with its activities conducted upon a gigantic scale, offers employment to practically all who may come, and for this and other reasons attracts the home-seeker from other lands more powerfully than do countries of limited population, development and opportunity. Almost any country offers opportunity for the use of capital,

but it is the country where a man can get work and accumulate capital that attracts the man who has none.

So it will be that the British invasion of the United States will continue. From time to time there will be a lull in the human tide which flows that way as periods of depression and consequent less employment make their appearance. Immediately following the recent war over 5,000,000 workers were unemployed in the United States. In consequence of this immigration dropped to the lowest point for fifty years, with the one exception of the year America was in the recent war. As soon as industry began to recover the immigrants again appeared in rapidly increasing numbers, until the American people, suddenly aroused to possible danger, thrust back the tide and partially closed the gates. The quota allowed to enter from the United Kingdom is now waiting on the doorstep with the coming of the first day of each month, and is welcomed as is the quota from no other land.

It is interesting to note that a large emigration from the United Kingdom does not necessarily indicate a period of hard times in that country, for the total number of emigrants in 1913, a year of great comparative prosperity, was twice that recorded of 1922-1923, when conditions were bad, and there was extensive unemployment. The United Kingdom has been a breeder and exporter of humanity for centuries.

The exchange of visitors, other than of the emigrant class, between the United States and Great Britain is rather a one-sided affair, for in 1920 over 200,000 Americans came to England, while less than 200,000 aliens of all nationalities visited the United States, and only about 50,000 of these were British. Not as many British visit the United States by a half, even allowing for the difference of population, as there are Americans who visit Great Britain. It was Sir Auckland Geddes who, while on a visit to London in 1922, publicly urged his fellow-countrymen to visit the United States. His advice was sound, and if followed would have a most beneficent effect upon the relations of the two peoples. The more formidable the British invasion of the United States the happier will be the result for both countries.

## CHAPTER XVIII

### SOME DIFFERENCES

**A**N important difference between the Government of the British Empire and that of the United States of North America is that while the British Empire is a loosely knit federation of states governed without the form of a written constitution or Imperial law, the United States is a closely knit federation of states governed in detail by a written constitution and laws emanating from the central or Imperial authority and absolutely fixed in their limitations and operating powers. In the eighteenth century the British Empire was a federation governed by the British Parliament and Crown under a flexible system of opportunism largely inspired by the needs of trade. Throughout the years which have followed there has been a constant effort on the part of certain schools of thought and political action to give this Government of the British federation a greater degree of fixity. This movement has found expression in modern times in the agitation for an Imperial Parliament in which all the states at home and overseas should be represented, and that local government should rest in the hands of state parliaments or legislatures.

With remarkable persistence, however, the British people have clung to the older form of government and agitation, if it may be called such, for a more definitely defined form of federal government with written powers and limitations has not made noticeable headway towards bringing about any popular demand for a change. The organisation of the so-called Imperial Council has been the only notable concession in form made to this idea, though in the yielding of increased power and independence to the overseas dominions the spirit of the times has been recognised. These concessions have been made through the opportunist method employed in governing the Empire, and would not have been possible had the relations of the states of the British Empire been embodied in a written constitution,

put into effect by written laws defining these relations in detail. In other words, the Government of the British Empire has been more or less successful, because it has been able to adapt itself to any situation which might arise from day to day, without the formality of Parliamentary action.

The American system of Government was formed also upon the idea of a federation of states, but with the difference that the principles of the federation should be written down, and the powers of the central government and the states thus united closely and definitely defined. The Government of the British Empire has had to make no written amendments to a written constitution to keep its methods adjusted to the development of the past one hundred and fifty years, but in that time the Government of the United States has been compelled by will of the people and the necessities of administration to make nineteen amendments to the written constitution, and more are suggested for the near future.

It followed as a necessity with a written constitution that all laws and other measures enacted by the Parliamentary body should be written out in elaborate detail, as the constitutionality of each law had to stand the test of a decision by the Supreme Court, and the powers conferred by such laws had to be set forth in a manner which gave no option of administration to those who exercised them. In this lies one of the most important and interesting differences in British and American Government methods, and this difference began when the United States came into being as an independent state. The same method of opportunism extends throughout the system of British government in detail as well as in Imperial affairs, and is only made possible by the general character of all legislation, and allowing great latitude to departments or officials charged with the administration of government. While the British Parliament may enact a few hundred measures in a single session, the Congress of the United States never fails to pass several thousand within the same period. All authority rests with the British Parliament, but it is generous, from the American point of view, in relegating this authority to the Crown or to administrators of the law. Another difference lies in the fact that practically all laws enacted by the Congress of the United States are strictly mandatory, while those enacted



by the British Parliament allow of considerable liberty in the matter and manner of their enforcement to those charged with the administration.

The British system of government is notable for its possible flexibility. The American system is rigidity itself. It is not the purpose here to enter into any discussion as to the merits or demerits of either system. The probabilities are that much could be said in favour of or against either, but the fact remains they are different, and that this difference often leads to misunderstandings on one or the other side of the Atlantic. If the fact of this difference is kept in mind in considering the course of either Government in affairs of mutual interest, it will lead to less criticism and better relations.

One of the most striking illustrations as to the difference in flexibility of the British and American systems is in the matter of the government of newly acquired territory. The British Empire can absorb a continent without Parliamentary action, and could quite easily govern it indefinitely without the enactment of new laws. The American military forces could, in time of war, occupy and govern foreign territory under purely military law; but before any status could be given to this territory, or it could become a possession of the United States, Congress would have to define its relations to the Mother Country, and before any civil government could be established in a newly acquired area laws would be necessary authorising its establishment and setting forth in detail the manner in which it would have to be conducted. This situation has been fully illustrated in the proceedings which have followed every acquisition of new territory which is recorded in the history of the United States. The British Empire absorbed the vast areas which fell to its lot after the war with Germany without causing a hitch in the operations of the British Government, and arrangements were made for their civil government so quietly that there are to-day many British people who hardly have cognisance of the existence of such organisations.

Here again we have a possibly controversial question as to which is the best method. The British way of doing it is undoubtedly the most convenient and most direct, but it might be claimed that it puts more responsibility upon the executive

Government, gives it more power, and thus makes it more autocratic than is compatible with a popular representative form of Government. When General Leonard Wood, now Governor-General of the Philippines, was Governor of Cuba under the American military occupation, he adopted to a certain extent the British plan of governing new territory. In other words, he took the opportunist method of keeping peace and otherwise making his government successful. It worked very well until it was discovered in the United States by those standing guard over the Constitution that certain things did not fit in very well with the American idea of government, and more or less trouble ensued. This does not imply that General Wood was wrong in his ideas as to how the immediate situation should have been handled, but it does illustrate the fact that an American administration of any part of American territory must be carried on in the full glare of publicity, and in accordance with the will of Congress, no matter how inconvenient this may be, or how it may militate against efficiency. Under the British system, and with the British Government in control, General Wood could have done almost as he pleased, and have stood or fallen by the result.

The British Government has in many ways a distinct advantage over the American Government in its power to conform administration to the needs of the moment, for the American Government is always compelled to proceed under its mandatory laws along a prescribed course, which may not in some cases make entirely for international harmony. This has been strikingly illustrated in the present day in matters appertaining to prohibition and immigration, for no matter how sincerely the American Government might desire to come to some arrangement with another country which would involve modification of the American law to mutual advantage, this cannot be done, as the laws are mandatory in detail, and Congress alone has the power to change some of the details of administration. The British Government, however, would be able to meet the situation with a policy of opportunism, and incur no danger of being called to account politically, or in the Law Courts for alleged dereliction of duty or of illegality of administration. It may be claimed this is an exaggeration as to the powers of the British Government officials in the discharge of their duties,

but it is not when the actual situation in the two countries is compared.

There is one point, however, which is perhaps not so favourable to the country with the most liberal ideas of official administration. If the United States officials are compelled to do something disagreeable they can disclaim any personal responsibility and put the blame on Congress. They can justly claim that they are not free agents, but merely cogs in the machinery of government, which must work with precision and accurate adjustment to other cogs that the machine as a whole, and as designed by the law-making body, may function according to intention. The administration of a government system which possesses a certain amount of elasticity necessarily has more responsibility and is entitled to praise or blame, as the case may be, for the manner in which it interprets and administers the law. Upon such an administration would often depend the nature of the relations between two nations as influenced in their international contacts.

There are always two ways of carrying orders into effect—the disagreeable way, that necessarily provokes enmities, and the suave and tactful way, which softens asperities possibly inevitable to a situation. This is a matter under the control of any administration however strict the law may be, but if a government executive has the legal power to adjust the application of a law, it is naturally criticised if it becomes apparently unnecessarily arbitrary or harsh in the manner of execution. Antagonism often arises between British and American people because of the different manner in which official duties are fulfilled by one or the other. This antagonism is generally entirely unwarranted, the offence being largely a lack of understanding on the part of the one who is offended. The rather casual, off-hand way in which American officials issue their instructions and carry out the orders they have received is taken too seriously by many British travellers, and the apparent personal familiarity of the American surprises, and at times affronts, the Britisher. On the other hand, the heavy seriousness, slowness and occasional pomposity of the British officials irritate the American, who fails to employ a sense of proportion, and is lacking in that admirable humorous philosophy which carries so many people through life with the minimum of friction.

These things are all matters of national temperament, environment and the circumstances of life. The Britisher measures foreign countries, manners and conditions by the standards prevailing in the United Kingdom, and the American applies a yardstick, the product of his own standardised methods. The results are that each finds much to criticise, and is generally confirmed as to his previous belief that things are better done in his own country. Fortunately for both nations there are a large number of individuals in each who are ready to accept without prejudice anything good that comes their way, even though it may not be home-grown, and to enjoy with full appreciation those things they find in foreign countries which appeal to them, realising that although their own homeland does not or even cannot supply them, they are to be enjoyed nevertheless.

While the Britisher is fully convinced that his own country and its institutions are the best that human ingenuity has yet been able to devise and put into being, he can conceive the possibility of a British citizen finding it necessary, advantageous, or even preferable for personal reasons to live in a foreign country. He cannot understand why any British citizen should become naturalised in another country, and has a poor opinion of him if he does. The mere matter of a foreign residence does not count against him, and he is not looked upon as any less British even though he may be absent from his home country for many years, or even his whole lifetime.

The average American takes a much narrower view of this matter however. Why live in a foreign country which is necessarily inferior to the United States, when it is possible to stay at home? This prejudice against a foreign residence prevails to a remarkable extent, and it is not confined to those of presumably narrow outlook, inadaptability or of small-town view. Travel is allowable, and even to be encouraged, though the keenest sensation of delight apparently experienced by many Americans during the journey is the realisation that they are on their way home, and yet some of them, a week after they have returned, and life has again fallen into its ordinary routine, have been known to regret they were not able to stay longer abroad. This idea, that because a man was born in a certain country he should make his home in it for the whole of his life,

extends throughout the American scheme of existence. Even the regulations made by the Government support this contention in matters of citizenship, passports, taxation, military service, and in every other way possible. It is a cult in a way, and is encouraged officially and unofficially by those in authority. The late President Roosevelt once referred to "that most undesirable class of citizens, the educated émigré."

It is not difficult to trace the origins of this cult. No man in any country excels the Britisher in his sentimental love of his "homeland." He visits it when he can, and, if living abroad, thinks and talks continually of that day when he can return for good. Many of them contrive to do so in the end; but there are also many who come home only to find they no longer fit into British life, and miss certain amenities peculiar to the foreign country in which they have been living. No one at home thinks the worse of them for that; and if they return to their foreign habitat neither the British Government nor their fellow-countrymen denounce them for it. One of the reasons for this is that the British think Imperially, and it is realised by the British Government and people that the Empire is wide in its boundaries, and that there is always the possibility of its becoming wider, and that every Britisher abroad, with his unchangeable Britishness, is a centre of influence which may be of value to Imperial power. Even if the British exile lives under the British flag in some remote corner of the Empire he is from "foreign parts" when he visits England, but he is looked up to or regarded with interest rather than criticised as a voluntary expatriate.

Naturally and quite rightly Americans do not think or talk Imperially, but the very fact that they do not gives their expressed views as to a foreign residence for an American citizen an entirely different turn from that of the Britisher. In a way they are equally justified in their point of view, for the American who leaves his own country for a residence abroad is the loss of a unit to a country striving for increase of native population and more intense development of home territory. These things must all be taken into account before either the Britisher or the American is criticised for his point of view. Public men, whatever their private views on personal inclinations may be, are compelled as a matter of public policy to recommend those

actions on the part of their fellow-citizens which will lead to the strengthening of their country.

Loyalty to race is completely understandable. It is an outgrowth of the older tribal instinct become much more than that as the human mind has developed and world-knowledge has increased. It is the blood tie of the family on a large scale. This appears to be stronger in the Britisher than in the American, excepting for that minority whose ancestry is purely British. The modern British are a mixed race—none more so—and in the earlier days, when the lines of demarcation were more clearly drawn, racial sympathies were probably confined to the tribe or family from which the individual came. As time progressed these lines were obliterated to all intents and purposes, although even now an occasional variant appears when physical and even mental characteristics disclose the mingled strains of generations ago. Should history repeat itself, the day will come when the American people will present a racial homogeneity equal to the British, and will possibly acquire that unchangeability of fundamentals in character and outlook now so marked of the people of the United Kingdom as to permit of generalisation. These underlying characteristics will not be the same, for climate, food and environment enter largely into the formation of temperament and even character. Wherein they will differ is probably indicated in the well-recognised differences which exist between the British and the native-born Americans of to-day.

Accident of birth has, however, achieved an unnatural significance through the development of nations into military and political powers. The science of power is well illustrated here, for human beings, almost from birth, are impressed with the importance of their loyalty to what is called their "native land." A boy born in Niagara Falls, in the state of New York in the United States, is taught from earliest childhood that under certain circumstances a boy born in Clifton, in the province of Ontario in Canada, just across the river, is his natural enemy, and to be fought to the death in a contest for supremacy between these two artificially delineated sections of the earth's surface. The Canadian boy is taught likewise; and here we have later on two men, one American and the other British, who, on behalf of their birthplaces, are serious rivals in

world affairs. These two may be of the same race—in fact even distantly related—and yet this situation remains. It was merely an accident of life that the parents of one should have lived in America and those of the other in Canada. If a generation before better financial results had been promised across the river to either or both of the founders of the families from which the two boys came, they might both be fighting as Americans or as British, but because of the place of their birth they must fight each other. Reduced to the plainest terms of common sense, and when the case of the individual is considered, the whole thing becomes nonsensical.

This feeling, however, has been instilled and encouraged in the individual for centuries, and in every nation, until it has become an accepted formula, the truth and importance of which is seldom questioned. When it is questioned the individual who raises the issue is accused of lack of patriotism. Multiply the individual by a million, or even a hundred millions, and the result is a great national impulse or belief held conventionally as only second to a religion. Its origins are not difficult to trace. In earlier days it was advisable the King or the feudal lord, or even a nation struggling for its existence, desirous of presenting a force outnumbering the enemy, should encourage the breeding of population to make soldiers, workers and breeders of both. In later days the industrial interests have, to a certain extent, taken the place of the overlords, and it is desired that workers and breeders of workers should be produced to the wealth and power of the nation as a whole.

Statesmen gravely urge the bringing into the world of large families, and a man or woman who voluntarily limits the output is held up to execration as selfish, unpatriotic, and even immoral. In view of the acknowledged over-population of some sections of the world, the inability of the most advanced states to care for the helpless humanity already in its hands, and the boasted liberty of the individual, it becomes a colossal impertinence for one man or a community to demand of the population that it should increase to the utmost limit possible, and without thought as to the provision to be made for those who are thus brought into the world. This idea that a man or woman is lacking in loyalty to his or her birthplace because

they prefer, even when not governed by necessity, to live in the homeland of other fellow human beings, harks back into this same demand of the patriarchal state that the population should not only increase but should remain at home to swell the ranks of a possible army, furnish an additional worker, increase the number of local taxpayers, and generally add to the strength of the nation.

There may be a deep love and loyalty in the heart of a man for the country of his birth, especially if his forbears have for generations back been of those who built up the nation of which he is a member; but there does not appear to be any sound reason why he should be compelled to make his home in that country if he prefers to live in another, excepting those reasons of public policy which are survivals, however they may be disguised, rather than conclusions reached by intelligent moderns living in the full mental freedom which is the meaning of a true civilisation. As stated, racial sympathies are understandable. They are deep rooted in human nature and touch upon the instincts as well as the affections of human beings. These so dictate that in the exercise of general gregariousness of the human family the chosen associates are those of the family from which sprang the individual. It is the call of the blood. In it lies the primary impulse which brings the British and American peoples together in times of stress or in times of rejoicing. It is also this instinct which has in the past, and will again in the future, draw the people of North America and those of North-Western and Northern Europe into closer communion than can ever be attained with the Latin nations or with the Orientals. Humanity naturally segregates itself into three great groups, the bond of union in each being racial sympathy.

In this Teutonic group of Americans, British, and the people of North-Western Europe, the British have achieved a pride of race as great or greater than that of any other division of the group. They have held this so long, and it has become so strong, they have outgrown the idea that a man must live on British soil to prove his loyalty to the nation of which he is a member, and, as shown, there are political reasons why the State does not necessarily combat or even make difficult his foreign residence. In this instance the tribal power is not exercised to place any



limitations upon his wanderings, as it happens to suit the purpose of the tribe as represented in its public policy that British influence should be broadcasted throughout the world in the belief that it may possibly serve a useful purpose.

In the United States the situation is very different. The American nation is comparatively youthful. Even less composite, or mongrel as the term goes, than the British nation was originally, a fixed type has not yet been produced from the amalgamation of races. This will not take as long, however, as it did in the British Isles, for even to-day fifty-five per cent. of the American people are of British extraction, and under the present system of immigration restriction this percentage will increase in the future, as the British are now allowed to send to America each year the largest quota allotted to any country, and they are taking advantage of this privilege to the last permissible unit. A fixed type of nationality is usually more a state of mind than a physical fact, for in most nations, no matter how long they have been established, there are, as a rule, several distinct physical types. While there are always many exceptions it is possible, however, for all of those varying physical types to rest in a common state of mind towards the usual affairs of life. When it is said that a man looks like an Englishman it is necessary to know whether the long-legged, loosely built, fair-coloured Norman British is meant, or the short and saturnine descendant of the original British aborigine, before this particular Englishman can be visualised. If, however, it is said that it could be told he was an Englishman by his talk and his ideas, the mental type becomes immediately comprehensible. The same with the American. If it was said he looked like an American it would not be his physical type that inspired the remark, but his general appearance, clothes, manner of conduct, style of conversation, and certain general characteristics of thought and action that would be meant, and there would be no misunderstanding as to what the appearance of the man might be.

The American has been brought up in the idea that his is the greatest country in the world in natural resources, and that it is his job to develop these to the greater wealth and glory of the nation. His home is all under one roof, and the fact that an American chooses of his own free will to reside in a

foreign country apparently gives the impression to his fellow-countrymen that he is a deserter from the cause to which all good Americans should devote their lives. There is no excuse of Imperial interest to send an American out into the world. It is conceivable that he should become a temporary exile for business reasons or for the purpose of serving his country, but to become a voluntary and permanent exile—for as such he is looked upon—denotes some mental kink, or implies some sinister reason for such strange behaviour. He is generally said to be either not a good American, or else he is effete and bankers after that decadent life of the worn-out races which, according to this point of view, inhabit all great countries other than the United States.

It is a curious contradiction in the life of the people of the United States that while there is no country in the world where individuality is more esteemed and, if properly directed by its possessor, more liberally rewarded in some walks of life, no individual freedom from neighbourly supervision or freedom of opinion as to the place in which a home can be made by an American is allowed. This idea is upheld by the actions of the Government, the utterances of all statesmen, politicians, and other leaders of American thought and action. It is taught at the mother's knee, in the schools, in the church, and public opinion exerts a constant pressure in this direction. An extreme case of this usually mild form of persecution was the speech of a prominent member of Congress, in which he expressed his lack of sympathy for those Americans who had lost their lives in a steamship disaster. The vessel was on its way to Europe, and the speaker asked why they had gone when they could have stayed in the United States, a country far superior in every way to any they may have intended to visit. This sounds extremely ignorant and raw, and it is; but, on the other hand, it was the crude expression of a sentiment which governs a great mass of American opinion upon the subject of a foreign residence for American citizens. It may be thought this matter has been stated more emphatically than is justified, but to those not familiar with the intense American spirit of the narrower kind the actual state of opinion on this matter among millions of Americans would be incredible.

That it makes for internal national development is true, in

the same way that a narrow provincialism is sometimes of immediate value to a neighbourhood. In time it will soften, and the spirit will change. When that day comes it will mean that the great rush of work attendant upon the domestic development of the United States is largely over, and that the nation is then confronted with the same problems which have long vexed the older-settled and more intensely developed countries of Europe. It will be long before there is a very great change from present ideas however, for when it is realised that one hundred million people now occupy a country which, if populated, and its natural resources utilised according to European standards, would accommodate and support nearer four hundred than one hundred million, some idea of the task set for the American nation to accomplish can be grasped, and some idea as to the possible future of the United States as a world-power in all phases of international life can be gained.

Personal life in America is much more exposed to the glare of publicity than personal life in Great Britain. It has been said that one of the most noticeable characteristics of the American people is an apparently insatiable curiosity about everything and everybody. This curiosity undoubtedly exists. In its larger phases it is a useful attribute, and it is expressed in a keen desire for information of all kinds upon all subjects. It stands for the widespread vogue of educational institutions of a self-help character, it accounts for the vast amount of space given by the Press to information about people, and it is the restless inquiring mind of the young American which is responsible for many discoveries of value to humanity in all directions. To investigate, to analyse, to see "what makes the wheels go round" is an almost irrepressible instinct, and once the desired knowledge has been gained the further consequence is an attempt to improve established methods. New ideas, new cults, new fashions, even new religions and new ways of accomplishing results find eager followings, inspired by what at the bottom is the curiosity of the inquiring mind.

The admirable and useful forms in which this curiosity displays itself are recognised forces in the progress and development of the nation, and the beneficial results are not confined to the American people, for the world has benefited time and

again from their activities. Unfortunately this characteristic of the nation does not always confine itself to beneficial channels, but overflows into the affairs of everyday life in such manner as to become a form of meanness and, at times, actual cruelty. In some of the larger cities, certainly—not more than half-a-dozen in all—life can be lived in that retirement desired by most mankind, and to be found in nearly every European community of any size. In fact it is possible even in the small places of Europe for individuals to maintain a privacy, a reserve or a freedom from the personal supervision of their fellow-men which is unattainable anywhere in America, except, as stated, in a few of the larger cities. The most expensive luxury in the United States is personal privacy, and under some circumstances it cannot be bought at any price.

The Press caters to this demand for information as to people, and twenty times the space is given in an American newspaper to personal news as will be found in a British newspaper of equal standing. A man could read the London newspapers all his life and yet learn nothing of the personal affairs or private life of the most prominent English statesmen, politicians, business men or social leaders, unless such people happened to enjoy that form of publicity and asked for it, as is occasionally done by the exceptional individual. Every once in a while some London newspaper attempts to carry out the American idea, and adopts a personal note in its news columns. Interviews are sought, stories as to the doings of this or that man are printed, and an effort is made to collect each day a column of personal notes. Every time this has been tried it has proved a failure. In the first place it is difficult to gather the information, and in the second it is deeply resented by those who are most concerned—the people who are written about. The personal column, which starts off with a fair showing of news items, generally soon dwindles down and resolves itself into the usual Court circular, the notices which are handed in, and a word of congratulation to those of prominence whose birthday coincides with the date of the publication.

If a well-known public man in England does receive any attention from the Press in a personal way, the favourable or unfavourable comment, whichever it may be, is generally an account of his public activities, some phase of his mental life,

a description of some of his possessions, or perhaps an account of his literary, artistic or sporting hobbies will be the nearest approach to personalities indulged in. To touch upon the intimate and really private affairs, to expose to public view the daily comings and goings, personal failings or virtues, to reveal the family life, or in fact to advertise to the world any part of the individual existence which is known as the private life would be considered indecent, and would be deeply resented, not only by the one whose privacy was thus violated, but by the public in general. There have been a number of cases in recent years where the English newspapers have indulged in this sort of thing, but as a rule it is concerning people who are not English, and who are generally Americans. It is also apparent that these same English newspapers have allowed the more expert and experienced American reporters to furnish them with the material, for what is published is either sent from the United States or is taken from the European editions of American newspapers. There is one exception to this usual attitude of the British Press, and that is when licence is apparently permissible in that it deals with the private life of man or woman who is unfortunate enough to get into the courts in some way or other, though not necessarily as the accused party. Even this excuse for publicity is not accepted by the British public without protest, and it is now proposed that it shall be made illegal to publish the details of divorce cases which, under the English system of trial, now obtain great publicity and bring out matters concerning everyone connected therewith which, to the layman, do not appear to have any bearing upon the question at issue. The eagerness with which all these reports are printed, the prominence given to them in the news headings, and the avidity with which they are read by the public suggest the possibility that it is only because of a tradition, originating in the power of the ruling classes in earlier days to prevent publicity concerning their private affairs, which has long kept the British Press from being as personal in its news gathering as the American Press is to-day.

In the United States there are apparently few reservations as to what should or can be printed concerning the presumably private affairs of the individual, whether involved in a case at law or not. There does not appear to be the same desire on the

part of the people themselves to escape publicity as there is in Great Britain. The British are not entirely averse to publicity—far from it—but it must be of a general kind, and must touch only upon the private affairs of the person seeking the limelight in a manner approved by the subject. There is a certain amount of personal publicity in the British Press, and it is of such a character that the experienced journalist can generally detect therein the hand of the press agent, either paid or voluntary. Politicians, a certain type of business man, aspirants for social fame, and some professional people are debarred from using the ordinary advertising columns of a paper, hence they exercise their ingenuity to secure the desired results in some other way and, it may be said, with a notable degree of success.

In Great Britain the politicians and the very rich escape the attention of the Press if they so desire. In the United States they are looked upon as fair game, and the newspapers assume, with considerable justification, that their readers are interested in the most minute personal details concerning the manner in which they live their lives. Politicians would probably disappear from public life if they did not get it. Like the successful promoter of a patent cure, all their names must be made “household words,” or they perish. The rich would probably like to dispense with the superabundant notice they get, but the lives of the very rich are a never-failing source of news for a Press given to that sort of thing. The one advantage to the public is the assurance that such must walk a fairly straight path to keep their reputation at par. They must exercise unusual skill to secure their iniquities from public view. In Europe there is greater opportunity for a man to carry through some scheme against public good, or to elevate himself to high position in spite of matters which, if known, would bar the way owing to the freedom of the Press from that inquisitiveness which is characteristic of the Press of the United States. Like all questions of this kind, there are plausible arguments in favour of both ways of doing. The British are apparently satisfied with their still more or less inviolate personal privacy, and the Americans feel that in a sense they are protected by the outspokenness of their newspapers. It is not for one nation to condemn the other because of the differences in their practice

of life ; and it may not give the British of the older generation much comfort to realise that if there is going to be any change in this matter, the tendency appears to be for the British Press to adopt the methods of the American Press rather than the reverse.

## CHAPTER XIX

### PAST AND PRESENT

**I**T is extremely interesting to let the imagination play with history, not as it has been written, but as it might have been written had the British Government so treated the American colony as to give no cause for agitation in favour of separation. Such a discussion is profitless in view of what actually happened, but in the light of the history of the events of the past one hundred and fifty years it is possible to construct a romance in which the British Empire of 1923 might include the whole of the North-American continent, for had British methods prevailed in America during all that time the Imperial power would undoubtedly have extended itself as far as the Isthmus of Panama at the very least. Whether the British Government would have been able to retain its hold over what is to-day the American Republic during all that time, no matter how kindly or wise its rule, is an open question, for as the overseas dominions begin to realise their own individual strength they become more and more independent in their relations to the Mother Country.

There is no doubt but that Canada and the United States would have been considered as more or less of a colonial unit, and there is equally no doubt but that the territory now known as the United States would not have reached anywhere near the material development recorded of the present time. Much of what has been done has been by reason of the independence or self-sufficiency—political, social and material—of the region involved. British methods would not have adapted themselves to many things which now appear to be inherent in the physical environment of the American, and this physical environment produces a mental and spiritual attitude equally foreign to that of any other people. For ever struggling against the limitations imposed by European methods and increasingly impatient of what in time would have been considered foreign



control the separation of the United States from the British Empire would probably have come in any case sooner or later. If it had come later it might have taken Canada with it, and thus the Empire would have lost more than it did by the affair of 1776.

A later separation might have come without a war, however, for while the absolute independence of Ireland could not be allowed for reasons of home defence and interest, it is inconceivable that the British Government would go to war to hold either Canada or Australia if to-day the people of those countries were practically unanimous in demanding their independence. The independence of the American colony was won partially by force and partially by circumstances which favoured its cause, for had the whole weight of the British Empire been thrown upon it with the consent and approval of all the people of England and by a harmonious Government, American independence would probably have been postponed to a much later date than it was.

The American war for independence was fought with bitterness and hatred on the American side, as any such war is generally fought; in fact without intensity of conviction and a burning sense of inflicted wrongs a war of that character cannot be successful. On the other side the war was fought more as a sense of duty, and by some of the troops employed as a matter of gainful occupation and adventure rather than as a matter of principle or patriotism. The circumstances of such a revolution as this and its almost bewildering success were calculated to embitter the thoughts of those who had won their political freedom against their erstwhile enemy, and this bitterness was to be transmitted to succeeding generations, its influence clearly apparent nearly a hundred and fifty years after the actual struggle had taken place. It was perpetuated and kept in active state in the literature of the new Republic, and the minds of the children of each succeeding generation were fed with prejudice from the text-books used in the schools.

So vigorous was this inoculation, and so persistent the poison it carried, that the young men and women who came from the schools and universities of the United States, even up to the time of the Great European War of 1914, gave evidence as to its power, and notwithstanding the participation of America in

that war as an ally of the British Empire its influence can still be traced without difficulty. This same influence was given a renewal of strength from time to time through events subsequent to the American revolution, and with the soil already favourable for the culture it did not need a great deal to induce a bumper crop of anti-British feeling. The voice of the young nation was quite naturally strident. The winning of independence and the founding of a new nation were the outstanding accomplishments at the beginning, and the people were bathed in a glory which was all the brighter and the more dazzling in that victory had been theirs against the greatest world power described in history.

That the British appeared more or less indifferent to American affairs and almost entirely absorbed in European events had also an exasperating effect upon Americans, who resented British attempts to belittle what had happened or what might happen in the New World. The young Republic had no patience with those who did not sympathise with all it had done, and those who had remained loyal to the British were driven from the country and took refuge in Canada. The consequences of this act, explainable, justifiable and perhaps necessary in many instances, are still apparent in the continued and profound political separation of Canada from the United States and in the intense loyalty of a certain section of the Canadian population to the titular head of the British Government. The so-called loyalists settled mostly in Ontario, and to this day it is the most British community of all Canada, and the strongest in anti-American sentiment. It is the vote of this section of the population which has at critical times in Canadian history defeated various attempts to bring about closer political relations with the United States.

It is also interesting to note that the same thing happened in Canada in these loyalist circles as happened in the United States, only with a reverse action and effect. The bitterness and hatred of the exiled loyalists towards the United States and its people were bequeathed to subsequent generations, and were kept alive in much the same way as was perpetuated the hatred of the British Government among the Americans. It is not attaching too much importance to this comparatively minor incident of the achievement of American independence to credit

its influence with being a powerful factor in the British-American antagonism of later days. In the United Kingdom it was more indifference than active antagonism which prevailed, but in Canada it was a real and active bitterness, with the same personal element in it as inspired the American dislike of the British. These British exiles, as they deemed themselves to be, were real casualties of the War of Independence, and they, their families and some of their descendants suffered bitterly for their loyalty to the Mother Country. They never forgave and never forgot, and nearly one hundred and fifty years later this antagonism is as active in some Ontario families as it was with their forbears.

One reason for this lies in the comparatively slow development of Canada, the more provincial character of the Canadian community, and its greater conservatism as compared with an American community of like size. Conditions have been more favourable to the preservation of traditions and the direct line of descent in the older settled parts of Ontario, where material progress has been slower than in the United States and life has been more reserved and placid. They have had more leisure and quiet in which to cherish old beliefs and prejudices, and have seen the United States, the country from which their families were originally exiled, grow into a surpassing power and wealth in which they have had little part.

In the past twenty years there has come about a great change in this direction, however, and the closer commingling of the younger generations has resulted in wiping out much of the former hostility to Americans. One-fourth as many Canadians as there are now in Canada now make their homes in the United States. American capital has gone into Canada on a large scale and assisted in developing the natural resources of the country. Many Americans have emigrated from the United States into Western Canada, where they have taken up land and built up prosperous farms with money brought with them. It is probably true that, aside from the natural jealousy of the United States which finds expression in industrial and commercial circles in Canada, the real anti-American spirit so active fifty years or less ago has entirely died out, or is at most confined to representatives of the older generations, who still cherish the

traditions that were handed down to them from their parents and grandparents.

The American war for independence was a long struggle, the termination of which was not recognised by the British Government until the formal treaty of peace was made in 1783. It was a war which lasted so long, and which was characterised by so much on either side calculated to arouse ill feeling, that it was inevitable it would take many years to do away with the antagonisms then generated. The war of 1812 between the United States and England came while the feeling between the Americans and the British had hardly become less vindictive than it was thirty years before. It was ended in 1814 by a treaty which settled none of the questions at issue, and left them all to remain for years as irritants in the international situation. The American military operations on land were conducted largely in Canada, and this gave an opportunity to the exiled loyalists and their children to make manifest their anti-American sentiments by active service in the British Army. This again intensified the antagonism of the two peoples, and gave more permanent life to that prejudice which was to last a hundred years or more, and to be handed down as a cherished family tradition.

The end of the war in 1814 was counted as a victory for the United States, and it was the proud boast of the American people therefore that twice within forty years had they defeated the British Empire on land and at sea. The Treaty of Ghent declared the war to be at an end, but gave no clue to what the outcome would be of the controversies which had brought the two countries into conflict. The fact that England was no longer at war with the United States passed almost without notice in England, where in fact little attention had been paid to the matter from the beginning. The situation on the Continent at that time held the attention of the British Government and the interest of every Englishman. Napoleon had returned from Elba, and another European war was about to begin which was to absorb any attention in Europe which otherwise might have been given to American affairs.

In 1815, however, American and British negotiators began the work of settling the questions in dispute between the United States and the British Governments. It was nearly a

hundred years later before all of these were disposed of, and while at times it has appeared that war between the two countries was inevitable, no war has come. Hence it was that the celebrations planned internationally in recognition of the one hundred years of British-American peace were to have occurred in 1914, and would have come about in all the fullness of the original programme but for the outbreak of the European war. The greatest possible tribute that could be paid to the change in the relations of the two countries that had taken place in a hundred years was the fact that three years after the centennial of the Treaty of Ghent the armies of America and England were fighting side by side in the same cause, and in a country foreign to them both.

In 1816 a treaty of trade and commerce was made between England and the United States, but here again little was done to provide against future controversies over questions which were even then recognised as issues dangerous to peace. In 1817 came the famous Rush-Bagot agreement for practical disarmament on the Great Lakes between Canada and the United States. This was the first naval disarmament treaty made between the British and Americans, and it foreshadowed in a small but significant way the naval armament treaty made between the two countries over a hundred years later.

In 1818 further progress, though slight, was made in another British-American treaty which dealt almost entirely with matters affecting Canada. Fishing rights were agreed upon, and the 49th degree of latitude was established as the boundary line between the two countries for the major portion of the contact. The demarcation of those portions of the boundary not covered by this provision were destined to be the cause of controversy for many years following. In the year preceding this treaty General Jackson nearly brought about a diplomatic break between England and the United States by the execution of two British subjects who had acted in league with the Seminole Indians, with whom the United States was at war in Florida, then a Spanish possession.

This matter was finally adjusted between the two Governments, but caused a bitter political controversy in the United States, which in the end resulted in Jackson becoming President of the United States. It is interesting to note here, in view of

present political conditions in the United States, that it was the influence of the settlers in the Mississippi Valley which made Jackson President. A strong anti-British feeling existed in this region, for the settlers there believed that the British had instigated many Indian outrages of which they had been the victims, and they vigorously supported Jackson in his political controversy. It is this same section of the United States which now makes and unmakes Presidents, and it is here that is found to-day the greatest degree of isolation from the problems of Europe. The feeling towards England in this section is now, however, more one of indifference than of antagonism—a change for the better, which is believed may be but the half-way house to a friendly attitude towards an entente of the English-speaking nations.

It was in the treaty of 1815 that England and the United States agreed to do away with any customs duties aimed at each other's trade which were in excess of those collected on the goods from other countries. This foreshadowed the coming of the favoured-nation clause, now a feature of practically every commercial treaty made by the British Empire and the United States. It was early in the nineteenth century that the more liberal and radical elements in England began to make their mark upon the English political and economic life. In the earliest days of the American Republic its founders had reacted to extreme contrasts to the conditions existing in England. In the latter country the government and the business of the nation were operated for the benefit of certain classes of people, and there was little individual liberty as to a choice of occupation or manner of living. In the United States all such restrictions were dispensed with in the system of government adopted and the conduct of the life of the nation in the attempt to live up to a democratic ideal conceived and advocated by those who founded the Republic.

It was the beginning of a vast experiment in a form of government then unknown to Europe in which the liberty of the individual was the guiding principle, and no class or special interest was given advantage over others. In England rapid progress was made towards a more democratic form of government and greater equality of opportunity for the individual during the first half of the nineteenth century. During

this same period the Government of the United States became more conservative in its character and found it desirable, as a matter of public policy, to foster special interests.

At no time, however, was any inclination shown to create a favoured class in the social system. Such special classes as have built themselves up in the life of the nation, and which are now recognisable as such, are an economic product of industrial origin and character. These in turn have attempted to perpetuate themselves in a social way, and have done so to a certain degree. There is nothing really permanent in these social constructions however. The membership changes from time to time. Some drop out and others come in. Whole families disappear from the roster in a single generation, and others appear without warning from out of previous obscurity.

In British life the social system is a fixture which finds its framework in the Royal family and the line of descent from the overlords of older days. These constitute a governing class whose power not so many years ago was absolute, and who still wield an authority out of all proportion to that exercised by the ordinary citizen. They are a distinct and special class whose privileges have a legal status and are maintained by tradition and habits almost stronger with the mass of the people than the restraining power of any law they are called upon to obey.

In the first half of the nineteenth century English social and political reformers, classed as radicals, found their ideals in the social and political organisation of the United States, and the existence of this English-speaking Republic across the sea undoubtedly had a great influence upon political events in England. It gave encouragement to those who favoured the changes in the British system and served as a warning to those who were inclined to perpetuate and even extend the privileges of class and special interests at the expense of the mass of the people. The birth and progress of the American Republic speeded up the reforms advocated by some in the social and political systems of England.

There have always been those among the British who favoured the monarchical form of government, with political power resting almost entirely with a limited governing class. This element exists in the British life of to-day, and the

individuals of prominence in this element are readily distinguished through their social and political habits of thought and action. As time has progressed and the more democratic influences became powerful they have been obliged to compromise with what they manifestly believe to be an evil. It is this element which has favoured the monarchial institutions on the European continent, and has used all its influence and power to retard the progress of republican ideas. Among these people there has never been any love for republican France, and they have been quick to note any failings which might show themselves originating in republicanism.

They have deplored and opposed as best they could all revolutionary movements, and they have helped to maintain in exiled grandeur the lines of succession to thrones which have disappeared. Some of this dislike of republics and sympathy for deposed monarchs has originated in the fear that their turn would come in time, and perhaps quickly if the rising tide of democracy the world over was not somehow held in check. The rise and progress of the United States they have observed with keen and critical interest, tinged by disappointment and jealousy.

In the earlier part of the nineteenth century anti-republican sentiment was widespread among the governing class in England, and openly expressed. It was held that no republican form of government could succeed for any length of time under conditions as they were to be found in the New World. It was sincerely believed that the American Republic had but a short life to run, and that in the end the people would revert to that form from which they had broken loose. As the United States persisted in the form chosen for its organisation, and year after year it weathered the storms at home and in its international relations, it gradually became as an accepted and more or less permanent political state of existence for a people. In the meantime the same ideas in modified form increased their power in the political life of England. It became less advisable to be an open advocate of the old order. The more conservative element in English life became smaller through conviction and circumstance.

This body of opinion, as concerns America, remained considerable, however, until the American Civil War. These extreme



English conservatives could not believe that the Republic would survive the severe test of its vitality, and it was this element which largely favoured a recognition of the Southern Confederacy as an independent state. When the war was over and it was realised that not only had the Republic come through the ordeal with safety, but was stronger than ever, the English reactionary element accepted their disappointment with more or less resignation and turned their attention exclusively to European affairs. This element is now in hopeless minority in English life, but that it still exists is shown in many ways from time to time, and quite a number of men prominent in British political life to-day are still thoroughly convinced as to the desirability of a monarchical form of government and as to the entire undesirability of a republican régime.

It was during the war of 1914-1918 and the subsequent years of negotiation, sundry revolutions, falling thrones and the general rearrangement of the political affairs of Europe that their influence was again made manifest. It did not succeed in directing the course of events to any perceptible degree, but through its agents it worked along reactionary lines, not only on the Continent but in the affairs of Great Britain. Much of the anti-revolutionary and strike-breaking work done by the British Government was manifestly inspired from this source, for in some of the steps taken against immediate possibilities, and especially some of those concerned with possible future social developments, principles and means were engaged which could not have borne the test of complete publicity, nor would they have been possible of execution in a republic such as that of the United States in time of peace.

It is unquestionably true that during the one hundred years prior to 1901, the year in which Theodore Roosevelt was inaugurated President of the United States, England and America had been drawing together in the matter of principles employed in government and their practical application. England was approaching the United States by the path of increasingly democratic methods. The United States was drawing towards the English ideas by the road of increasing conservatism, special privileges for special interests, and a Government taking on the nature of an industrial autocracy. With the advent of President Roosevelt and his subsequent leadership

of those who believed the Republic was drifting away from its ideals there came a halt in the American retrogression, for such it must be termed.

There still remained, however, even in 1901, a wide gap between the methods of the two Governments, and under the influence of the war of 1914 and a post-war hesitancy to give back to the people the freedom from Government interference which had been subordinated to the needs of war, British progress towards the American theory of government was checked. In the United States the movement for a return to first principles has made considerable headway, thanks to the initiative given by the late Theodore Roosevelt. He made articulate the uneasiness that pervaded the spirit of the nation. The war brought to America, as it did to England, an opportunity for reactionary forces to regain their sway, and it was through this power that the late President Harding came into office in Washington, as did the Conservative party in Westminster.

There is not much progress now being made by either nation towards a similarity of principle as employed in their respective Governments. The British now await the moving power of a new impulse towards more democratic methods. The American people, temporarily checked by their own act performed under the hypnotic influence of war and its reactions, in their return to first principles are again awaiting another stirring of the national political conscience and new leadership to take up the journey from the last halt.

It was in 1823 that President Monroe, in his December message to Congress, announced that policy of no-American interference in Europe and no-European interference in the Western Hemisphere, which, extended and elaborated as to its purpose and intent, has since become a cardinal doctrine of American foreign policy. That the British Government wanted the United States to make some such declaration to the end that the erstwhile Spanish overseas dominions might retain the independence they had acquired during the Spanish revolution is, of course, a matter of history. That the declaration should have been made so general in its application did not at all suit the British purpose however, and the English statesmen of that time saw clearly that the future would bring its times

when this American attitude would interfere with British plans. The British wanted the former Spanish dependencies on the North and South American continents to remain independent because of the British trade that had been built up in that part of the world since Spanish restrictions had ceased to operate.

If the Monroe Doctrine had been directed against Spain alone the British would have been well satisfied and their object accomplished, but when they found themselves under the ban as well, the situation was not as anticipated. This was not so evident to the public however, and the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine was popularly held to be the outcome of diplomatic co-operation between the English-speaking nations. This good feeling did not last for long, however, and the two countries were soon engaged in a controversy over certain rights in Behring Sea. The British Government did not admit the principle of the Monroe Doctrine when it was proclaimed, or for many years after. It was not until the Venezuela incident of 1895 that it was brought home to all foreign Governments, including the British, that the American position was important, inclusive, comprehensive, and would receive the unanimous support of the American nation if put to the test. With this realisation came an acknowledgment of its potency, and a more or less cheerful acceptance of the principle involved.

The question of American ships trading in British colonial ports was the subject of long negotiation and acrimonious discussion. Such trading had been allowed for some years only with the British ports in the East Indies, and it was not until 1830 that American ships were allowed to traffic in the ports of the West Indies. This episode in itself calls attention to the different status the British colonies have won from the Mother Country in the past one hundred years, for it is not difficult to imagine the situation which would arise if at the present time the British Government attempted to dictate as to the trading rights of any foreign country in the ports of an overseas dominion.

The Tory Government of England came to an end in 1830 and the Whigs came into power. It was under the previous Government that so many controversies arose with the American Government, and it was believed in the United

States that the political change taking place in England would bring about better relations between the two countries. This belief appears to have been justified, for a long period of calm ensued in which there was hardly more interchange of opinion between London and Washington than was required in the ordinary course of diplomacy. One reason for this was the absorption of both nations in their own affairs. The ten years following 1830 brought great changes into the political and economic life of England. Radical tendencies prevailed, and while American opinion did not uphold the Whig programme, it was sympathetic with many of the changes brought about. In that decade the impressment of men for sea service was abandoned, thus doing away with some of the reasons for British interference with American ships, and slavery was abolished by the British in the West Indies.

Under the rule of the Tories America had a bad Press in England, and through what was published the English people conceived the Americans to be hardly fit for association with civilised people. When the Whigs came into power with their greater sympathy with liberal political ideas the character of the Press changed, and much of the harm done by previous unfriendly publicity was overcome. It was Richard Cobden in 1835 who did more than any other publicist to give the United States and the American people some sort of standing with English readers, and his persistent urging that the British could to advantage cultivate a knowledge of America and its people and do all they could to further good relations with the United States had wide influence. He was the original propagandist for a British-American entente on practical rather than sentimental lines.

In the middle of the last century more British visited the United States than Americans visited England. There was practically no Press for British current affairs in the United States, and such information as Americans acquired was from schoolbooks treating of past events or from British immigrants into the United States. Few of these immigrants were friendly to the British Government or to the English governing class. Nearly everything that was said or done in America, therefore, was more likely to emphasise or at least confirm American opinion as regards the character of the English Government

and its intentions, and this was not at all favourable, for public sentiment had softened little since the days when there was war between the two countries.

In 1846 the Corn Laws were repealed in England, and it was about that time, under democratic administrations, that the United States returned to a free-trade basis in the fiscal affairs of the nation. Protection became a national issue once more with the birth of the Republican party in 1857 as it is known to-day, and under pressure for revenue it was introduced on a considerable scale immediately following the Civil War. It is a matter of history that practically all import duties have been adopted following wars for this very reason of national financial need. In the earlier history of the Republic these duties were reduced or done away with altogether as the Treasury recovered. In the more recent history such duties have been imposed or increased for purposes of revenue, but avowedly also for the purpose of protecting American industry.

In consequence of this dual motive having become generally recognised and generally approved, these duties have remained even when the need of revenue was not so pressing. The campaigns which resulted in the election of President Cleveland in 1884 and in 1892 respectively were the last political contests fought out in the United States in which free trade was advocated by any political party of importance. There is in 1923 practically no free-trade party, and the differences of the two great political organisations on the subject are represented by arguments, not as to whether there should be a tariff or not, but as to the degree of protection which should be given to any particular industry. The imposition of high import duties by the United States has always been resented by other countries, the degree of this resentment being determined by the effect these duties had upon the foreign trade of each particular country.

In the case of England the American fiscal policy has always been a source of irritation. As Great Britain was a free-trade country, until the results of the war in 1914 justified in the minds of the taxpayers the imposition of certain duties, American goods came in free of charge while British goods entering the United States paid heavy toll. Even with the duties imposed by Great Britain as a matter of public policy

or as a revenue necessity, the same condition remains, and one of the chief arguments of the Protection advocates in England is that the imposition of import duties would give the British something with which to bargain for a reduction of the American import charges.

For several years after the war of 1914, in view of the urgent need for an increase in British foreign trade, it was the hope of the British manufacturers that some reduction would be made in American import duties when the tariff was again revised. The American law of 1922 not only put an end to these hopes, but brought great disappointment with it, for the rates of import duty were increased rather than decreased. This has not increased the friendliness of the British industrialists towards the United States, but in spite of this handicap on British export to the United States the American market is the most profitable outlet for British manufacturers to be found in any foreign country.

Coincident with the coming of Queen Victoria to the British throne in 1837 British-American relations entered upon a new chapter in which the strain put upon them threatened now and again to result in an open break. An insurrection in Canada found support on the American side of the line, and while the United States Government did everything in its power to prevent a break of neutrality, it was found difficult to keep American interests out of the affair. This enraged the loyal Canadians and drew the British Government into acrimonious dispute with the United States Government. The settlement of the Oregon territory by American immigration brought the long unsettled question as to boundaries to an acute stage. On the eastern shores of the continent another boundary dispute arose between Maine and New Brunswick. This reached such a point that at one time the State militia of Maine was face to face with British regular troops, and but for the prompt action of both the American and the British Governments the result might have been such as to have required later on a postponement of the celebration of a hundred years of peace for at least twenty years beyond the date of 1914, in which it actually occurred. At this time also the slave trade became another source of trouble between the two countries. The Webster-Ashburton treaty was the beginning of a settlement of some

of the vexing questions which threatened British-American relations in 1842, but it was to require many more years of negotiations, many more treaties and many more narrow escapes from serious conflicts before the relations between the British and American peoples reached a state when there was no further danger of war.

## CHAPTER XX

### DISCOVERING AMERICA

**B**RITISH opposition to the annexation of Texas by the United States hastened that event, for while it had been proposed originally to bring it about by treaty, the American people became so aroused at the intervention of the British in Texas affairs it was accomplished by legislative action, with the consent of the people of Texas, in 1845. The matter of the Oregon boundary was one of the most serious matters that came up for settlement in the "hundred years of peace" to vex the relations of the two peoples, and at one time there would have undoubtedly been war, but for certain restraints experienced by England through her relations with other Powers.

The great "trek" of Americans to the Far West had begun by this time, and it seems as though the spirit of the nation was aware of what was going to happen in the hundred years to follow, for the trails were blazed to the uttermost confines of the continent when it would have been easier and more profitable to push the frontier of settlement out gradually from the eastern states and thus conquer the wilderness from an easily reached base of operations. The movement to Oregon began before the discovery of gold in California, hence there was none of this distant lure that came later to restrain the settlement of the fertile valleys traversed by the emigrant trains on their way to a reputed but unknown paradise two thousand miles from where the break was made into the wilderness. The discovery of gold in California, when it became known, diverted the great bulk of this stream of west-bound emigrants from the Oregon trail, and resulted in those earlier days in a larger settlement being made in California than was to be found farther to the north.

Through development in both the United Kingdom and the United States between 1840 and 1850 war between the



two countries became highly improbable, notwithstanding the serious nature of the controversies between the two peoples. The reasons that prevailed sixty years ago are potent in 1923 in very slightly altered form. Americans were entirely absorbed in the economic growth of the United States, and the British could not have cut themselves off from the supplies of raw material, principally cotton, which came from the United States, without disaster to themselves.

It was in this decade that England abandoned Protection and became a free-trade country, and it was also in these years that the Irish question became one of important interest to Americans. The great famine in Ireland sent thousands of Irish people to the United States in 1847, being the year in which this movement became of notable proportions. America sent money and provisions to the relief of Ireland in large quantities, but it was as a land of refuge that the United States made its strongest appeal to the Irish people. These immigrants brought their political troubles with them, and from that time until the British Government gave a qualified freedom to Ireland they played an important part in American politics and in British-American relations.

The rush of gold-seekers to the Pacific coast brought to the attention of the United States and the British Government the possible importance of the Isthmus of Panama and the Nicaraguan route as transcontinental highways. The interests of the two countries conflicted materially in this region of Central America, and owing to the actions of one Government or another affairs got into a serious tangle. President Taylor was not aggressive, and Clayton, his Secretary of State, was in favour of a peaceful settlement. Many of the irritating features of the situation were withheld from the knowledge of the public, and even from Congress, until in 1850 the so-called Clayton-Bulwer treaty was made and ratified. This treaty was made in haste to adjust differences which seemed likely to end in a rupture between the two Governments, but had those who ratified it in 1850 been able to look forward fifty years it would never have been made, for later on it became the source of much trouble to the two Governments, and seriously complicated the arrangements for building an Isthmian canal. In fact it made necessary certain agreements under which the

canal was finally built, which may yet lead to diplomatic controversies.

Indeed it was not until ten years later, in 1860, that an interpretation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was arrived at which was satisfactory to the United States. That matters were difficult for those who tried to maintain good relations between the United States and England in the ten years prior to 1860 is evident when it is considered that the Democratic party, the strength of which rested largely in the slave-holding states of the South and the Irish vote in the North, was in power. The South was intensely anti-British for fear of British influence in favour of the abolition of slavery, and the Irish regarded themselves as exiles from their native land by virtue of British misrule.

This ten years was also productive of a number of agreements between the two Governments which not only did away with matters of serious controversy which had been a cause for irritation for many years, but which brought the two nations generally into a state of better relations. The British finally and formally abandoned the right of search. A reciprocity treaty was made with Canada in 1854 which largely put an end to the controversy over fishing rights and gave a great impetus to Canadian-American trade, and it then seemed as though the future was to be more or less clear sailing for British-American diplomacy.

A great change had come to the status of the United States among the countries of the world however, and American opinion and intention were seriously and thoughtfully regarded by the Governments of all the Powers. When the Treaty of Ghent was signed in 1814 the population of the United Kingdom was 19,000,000, and that of the United States 8,000,000. At the beginning of the American Civil War in 1860 the population of the United Kingdom was 29,000,000, and the population of the United States 31,000,000. Great Britain was the greatest world-power on land and sea, politically and economically, but in some directions the United States was fast becoming a rival, and the British were absolutely dependent upon America for a supply of raw cotton.

The two nations were much closer in their political thought and action than they had ever been before, hence there was a

better understanding between them and greater toleration of each other. Then came the American Civil War, and in the passions aroused by this conflict between two sections of the same nation the results of the previous painstaking diplomacy became ineffective. The older aristocracy in England quite generally favoured the Confederacy, and the middle and lower classes gave most of their sympathy to the North. The English aristocracy had never believed that the American Republic would stand for long, and they did not want it to stand. When the Civil War came it was generally believed among this class in England that the United States as constituted in 1860 had come to the beginning of its end.

Queen Victoria issued a proclamation of neutrality which was to all intents and purposes a recognition of the Confederacy as a power engaged in war. This action caused deep resentment in the North, not only at that time but for many years after, and to this action can be traced some of the traditional anti-British sentiment which still exists in the United States, and which is directed not so much against the British nation as a whole as against the British Government and the representatives of the governing class. The capture of Mason and Slidell, the two Confederate ministers, on their way to Europe by the commander of an American warship, these ministers being taken from a British vessel, aroused a storm of anti-American sentiment in Britain. Britain prepared for war and demanded redress. Under the needs of the moment these men were released to the British and allowed to proceed on their missions. The effect of this was to increase the anti-British sentiment in the northern part of America to a point hardly reached before. What had gone before in diplomatic exchange between the two countries in the effort to bring about cordial relations was rendered practically useless.

By the time the American Civil War had come to an end the people of both the North and the South had accumulated a list of grievances against the British, which made the latter more hated than ever before in the history of the United States, excepting during periods of actual warfare between the two peoples. So universal was this feeling that the armies of the victorious North and the defeated South would have fought together against England if war had come about. In this

anti-British feeling Canada was involved, and the reciprocity treaty with that country was abrogated and never renewed upon any lines of importance. This feeling made possible the Fenian raids upon Canada in 1866, and although the position of the United States Government was technically correct, there was no enthusiasm shown in the enforcement of laws against the Irish for violations of neutrality.

In this post-war period again is seen the influence of American institutions upon English political life, for with the triumph of the North over the South more weight was given to the arguments of the English liberals. Some historians assert that the English Election Reform Bill was made possible by the rise to power of the American Republic, through the encouragement this gave to those who were advocating a more democratic form of government in England. It was not until 1868 that the two Governments were able to reach a point in diplomatic negotiation where the making of a treaty could be considered. Outstanding disputes were numerous and important. The American claims for damages inflicted through alleged English connivance during the Civil War were enormous, and the English position was apparently irreconcilable. The difficulty was solved by the appointment of a Joint High Commission which met in Washington in February 1871, and concluded a treaty three months later.

The administration of the American Government was by this time more pacific, and the British Government, in view of a desire to settle the American controversy, owing to the threatening situation in Europe, and a real desire to come to more friendly terms with the United States, made many concessions. A general agreement in principle was concluded and an Arbitration Commission provided for in this treaty met in Geneva, Switzerland, in December 1871. The United States, Great Britain, Italy, Brazil and Switzerland were represented on the Commission. The results of the arbitration were accepted in both countries with some criticism, but other matters had by that time engrossed public attention, and the matter was thus disposed of.

The matter of the boundary between the United States and British North America was also left to arbitration. Many other matters arising out of the Civil War and the Fenian raids

into Canada were disposed of, and the vexed question of American fishing rights on the Northern Atlantic coast reached another stage of settlement. The result of all these agreements was a restoration of fairly good relations between the two Governments officially, though national sentiment in both countries had to pass through many more fluctuations before anything like stability was reached. The fact, however, that the Prime Minister of the then recently created Dominion of Canada, Sir John MacDonald, had served on the Commission which laid the foundations of a new British-American understanding, was an influence for good, not only at that time but in the future relations of the United States and Canada.

The reasons which brought the Canadian provinces into a Dominion federation were fundamentally those of self-defence against the United States in case of possible trouble, but on the other hand the influence of the United States in the form of the Government and the principles employed was almost supreme in the determination of the basic law under which Canada should be governed. The adoption by Canada of a system of tariff protection, the reopening of the fisheries disputes on the eastern coast, and the defeat of the Irish Home Rule Bill in England again brought British-American relations into a troubled state in the years between 1880 and 1890. The British were believed by many Americans to be supporting the Democratic party with its free-trade policy, and this was apparently confirmed by an incident which led to the British Minister receiving his passports from the United States Government and being sent home. President Harrison was elected in 1888 and James G. Blaine became Secretary of State. The McKinley Tariff Bill was an outcome of this administration, and Mr Blaine, with his Irish-American friends, helped considerably to retard any progress towards better relations between Great Britain and the United States.

It was in the years of this decade that America acquired a share for the first time in an oversea possession in the interest secured in the Samoan Islands, and that was but an incident of the growing sense of power that was coming to the American nation. The years from 1890 to 1900 witnessed a vast development of American resources, a drawing together of widely scattered communities by the building of railroads and canals,

and the great increase in the shipping interests on the Great Lakes. As a concomitant of this interior development there came a greater desire for a vigorous foreign policy, one deemed suitable for a country of the size, wealth, population and power of the United States.

It is generally believed that what is now called the "Venezuela incident" was a reply on the part of President Cleveland's administration to this public feeling, for in 1895 the British Government received a shock, due to certain phrases in a note from Richard Olney, President Cleveland's Secretary of State, delivered to Lord Salisbury, then British Prime Minister, by Mr Bayard the American Ambassador. The British Government was at that time faced with innumerable questions which had arisen in Europe and the Near East, and was paying little attention to American affairs. The attitude taken by the United States over the Venezuelan boundary question, a matter then in dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela, brought the British Government to attention once more as to what was going on in Washington.

President Cleveland had, on assuming office, declined to continue a policy inaugurated by his predecessor, President Harrison, for the annexation of Hawaii, and this had offended a large element among the Americans, who at that time were showing a spirit of more or less aggressive exploitation of national activities. Whether the Venezuelan move was made by the Democratic leaders for domestic political reasons or not, the President believed that the long dispute between Great Britain and a South American country was a danger to international relations, and should be settled, and that it was a good time, for many reasons, to reiterate and interpret once more that principle of American foreign policy known as the Monroe Doctrine.

When the attitude of the American Government was made known, certain eventualities were at once suggested. The British Government took a number of inconspicuous steps towards preparation for war. Naval supplies were rushed to British naval ports, and the Atlantic Fleet was warned to be ready to receive further orders. This phase of the matter went no further however. The British Government having refused to accept the American position, the President laid the matter

before Congress and suggested that the United States should determine the boundary line between Venezuela and British Guiana and support that decision. No such crises in British-American relations had occurred since the American Civil War, and old antagonisms flamed at once into new life.

While it is true that this episode brought about a dangerous state of affairs, and brought all influences opposed to a British-American friendship into action, it had its value, for it also brought to light the great progress that had been made in British-American friendship among the two peoples, and it led to the greatest demonstration on record up to that time in favour of the arbitration of all questions which arose to vex international relations. In England in the latter part of 1895 and the beginning of 1896 public attention was concentrated upon the political situation in South Africa, and the final settlement of the Venezuelan matter came about without further friction between the two countries, and passed into the records only as something of great historical interest.

This it was for many reasons, for it was the first official announcement made by the United States Government as to the degree of its interest in South American affairs, and it resulted in British recognition of the American position. It was also of peculiar interest in the contention advanced by President Cleveland to the effect that any permanent political union between a European state and one in the Western Hemisphere was not in the natural order, and was inexpedient from an international point of view. As applied to the future this, of course, committed the United States Government to a policy, unless reversed later, of preventing the acquirement of any American territory by a European Power, and also suggested the possibility that in time all American states would find it expedient to break off any political ties which bound them to Governments outside of the Western Hemisphere. The unreasonableness of the government of an American state by a European Power has been demonstrated in recent years by the Spanish retreat and the growing political and economic independence of those states in North America still retaining their connection with the countries of Europe.

If the British Government had not adapted the relations of Great Britain and the overseas dominions to the strain of

conditions, and had the people of the United States shown a more imperialistic spirit, there is no doubt but that British possessions in North and South America would have fallen away to insignificance as a result of natural laws of selection and least resistance. It was in 1897 that Great Britain and the United States made their first general Arbitration treaty, but American suspicion of the British brought about its defeat. An element against it also was the feeling among those in favour of the free coinage of silver that the influence of England had helped to defeat Mr Bryan in the campaign of 1896, when he stood for election on that issue. This first treaty was defeated by only a small number of votes, and was to find justification in the institution of The Hague Conference and in the Arbitration treaty made between Great Britain and the United States in 1911.

The war between the United States and Spain in 1898 was undertaken by the American people very generally in a spirit of joyous adventure. That this war could have been avoided is believed by many, and Mr McKinley, then President of the United States, was one of those who rested in this belief. After the most careful consideration he wrote a message to Congress which he fondly believed was a peace message. Probably no man in the United States was more shocked and disturbed the day following when he found that in the handling of his message by the Press it had been converted into a message of war. Even then he still hoped to prevent war; but when the United States battleship *Maine* blew up in the harbour of Havana, and it was believed by the American people that this came about through Spanish agency, war became inevitable.

It was during this brief but enlightening conflict that British-American relations became not only better but distinctly good. The British Government gave evidence of its approval. The British Army and Navy sided openly with the Americans and gave practical assistance in many ways. It can be said in this period that British-American friendship took such form and shape as to become a real factor in international politics, and was in time to become the most important of all international influences to the people of both nations.

The war itself brought about a great change in America. The complete breakdown of the machinery of the military



department of the Government led to drastic reforms and complete reorganisation. The importance of the navy proper and an auxiliary merchant marine was notably demonstrated. The acquisition of the Philippines and other Spanish territory brought forward the American-Japanese situation and drew the Government into the intricacies and necessities of colonial management. In 1897 the whole attention of the American people was absorbed by domestic affairs. In 1898 the same people were forced by circumstances to turn their eyes outward in a new consciousness of foreign contacts. The results of the Spanish war did not, however, convert the American nation to an imperialistic point of view—in fact almost the reverse, for the taking over of the Philippines was accepted with doubt and serious distrust as to where this event would lead in the end.

It was realised that a new epoch in the history of the United States had begun in which the part of a world-power with scattered interests would have to be played instead of that of a country of compact territory resting in the greater security of geographical complete isolation. This feeling was so strong that immediate steps were taken towards giving the Philippines their independence. The annexation of Hawaii had been accomplished without much opposition among the people of the United States, for such a move was regarded more as a protective gesture than one of expansion. The islands in the Far East gave rise to another problem, however—in fact many of them—and this increased responsibility for what was deemed to be an interest foreign to American ideas in all their bearings was not, and is not to-day, popular with a majority of the American people.

Events moved slowly, however, in this connection, and what seemed at the beginning to be a more or less simple matter has become one of the most complicated and urgent problems in the administration of the American Government. There was little or no real opposition to the acquisitions of territory made in the West Indies. These islands lay close to the door, and the building of the Panama Canal had extended practical and material American interest far beyond its original state in a southward direction. The purchase of the Virgin Islands from Denmark in 1917 was but a further move in the scheme of

defence for the Panama Canal, and was not held to have any political significance.

There is one feature of this West Indian situation which is worthy of note and that is the American attitude towards Cuba. The release of Cuba from Spanish dominion was due, aside from any sentimental feeling for the cause of Cuban independence, to what was termed by Secretary Elihu Root its "nuisance value." In other words, it was putting an end to a foreign quarrel being conducted upon the American doorstep to the annoyance of those within and to the danger of international relations. Cuba was not retained by the United States however after being taken from Spain. The Cubans were given a qualified independence somewhat wider than that given to Ireland by Great Britain, but considerably restricted nevertheless. It was Mr Richard Olney, President Cleveland's Secretary of State, who said after the Spanish war that, notwithstanding the form of Government given to Cuba, or anything that might be said to the contrary, the United States owned Cuba, and would always own it for the reason that the United States was necessarily the sole guardian of Cuban interests, and must control these to suit the purposes of American policy. No foreign Power could be allowed to interfere with Cuba, and the people of that country could not be allowed to do anything to the damage or danger of American political or economic interests. In return for this necessary American control Cuba is given preferential treatment by the United States, and American capital thus guaranteed security has developed the country far beyond its normal rate of progress.

Here again is found the justification of home defence, for this American departure from older policies for Cuba is as much a part of the coast-line of the United States as is the State of Florida. Another manifestation of this intention to safeguard the North American continent from possible foreign attack is the suggestion made by some Americans in good faith that Great Britain should satisfy her war debt to the United States by relinquishing her title to the British West Indies in favour of the United States. No such proposition has been put forth by the United States officially or even very seriously from unofficial sources, but the suggestion aroused considerable feeling among the British and loudly expressed opposition.

A new phase of this question has appeared since prohibition was adopted by America, for these British West Indies are utilised as a base of operations for liquor smuggling into the United States, and have prospered amazingly thereby. There is no doubt but that this newly arisen situation has given further impetus to the American project for eventual dominion over all the islands of the West Indies, but the matter will be long in reaching a stage when it will be seriously considered by either Government.

The effect of this employment of the British West Indies as a base of operations for those who were conniving at a violation of American law has not been happy in the irritation it has caused in British-American relations. It does not appear to be fully realised in Great Britain that the prohibition of liquor is a very serious attempt to carry into effect a belief which is held by a majority of the American people, and that this attempt will be persisted in indefinitely. The American people are in deadly earnest in their intention, and the indications are that if they succeed in holding prohibition in force until a new generation born under its influence comes into the effective life of the nation, it will prevail for all time, and it may be said that this movement is spreading throughout the world, notwithstanding the efforts of the publicity department of the trade to make this appear unlikely. British employers have been much interested in the American experiment, and they have reached the conclusion, based upon personal and detailed investigation, that industrial efficiency is increased from fifteen to twenty per cent. under prohibition. Opponents of prohibition have appealed to the working men not to allow their efficiency to be thus increased, as the employers make more money. They say nothing of the general increase of efficiency in all human activities which must necessarily take place at the same time. This so-called argument is on a par with many others used to keep prohibition of liquor from becoming more extensive. The American people are well satisfied as to the results of prohibition, but they are not at all satisfied with the manner in which the law is enforced, or rather the manner in which it is not enforced in some localities. The greatest hindrance to strict enforcement of the law is the connivance of otherwise reputable citizens in the illegal importation and the blockade-running

enterprises devised and carried out by foreigners. As Great Britain is the greatest exporter of liquor, and stands to profit more through a breakdown of the American law, the British are naturally blamed by Americans for a major part of the trouble they are having in cutting down the available supply. That there are possibilities for trouble between the two countries is recognised by both Governments—not the kind of trouble that leads to any break in relations, but the kind that interferes with the growth of amity between the two peoples. The American Government has attempted to devise some plan for controlling British activities in this smuggling trade, but so far has been able to do no more than maintain as strict a watch as possible on American territory and in American waters. It is notorious that the British Government is deeply concerned over these British adventures in contravention of American law, but up to 1923 no way had been found to check them legally other than to agree to an extension of the long-established three-mile limit to twelve miles—a notable concession.

With the impulse given to a British-American entente through the incidents of the Spanish-American war in 1898 the making of agreements between the two Governments proceeded apace for the ten years following, each one of these agreements disposing of some important questions which had long been in dispute. In 1901 the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was superseded by another in which the British waived their Isthmian rights, and the United States was given a free hand in the building, ownership and control of a canal. In 1903 the Alaskan boundary dispute was disposed of, not entirely to the satisfaction of Canada, but in such a way that it had to be accepted. This was the closing chapter in the determination of the boundary line between American and British territory on the North American continent. This boundary line is about four thousand miles in length, and proceeds under such varying physical conditions as to mark its completion as a great accomplishment. Again the matter of the east coast fisheries came up for adjudication and was again disposed of. The Behring Sea sealing dispute was settled in 1911 by an agreement between the four great Powers interested to prohibit pelagic sealing for fifteen years.

Quite naturally, both countries having a Protection policy, the commercial relations between Canada and the United

States are a subject of lively interest to the people of both countries. Reciprocity was tried about 1854 and abandoned a few years later. From that time on during the intervals of good relations between the two countries numerous attempts were made to bring into effect some plan for reciprocity, each side making notable concessions to the trade of the other. The last formal attempt to make a reciprocity treaty was in 1910, and while agreed to by the United States, failed of acceptance by Canada, this being a reversal of the usual conditions attaching to previous negotiations. There is an interesting feature of the tariff negotiations with Canada during the administration of President McKinley. It is not a matter of public official record and it is not widely known that President McKinley proposed that there should be practically free trade between the United States and Canada, and that the Canadians, notwithstanding their anxiety to come to some advantageous arrangement with the United States, could not accept this offer, sensational in character as it was, considering the fiscal policy of the country from which it came. Two reasons held the Canadians back, one being the influence of Canadian manufacturing industry, the other, the existence of a preference on British goods and a fear that Great Britain would not approve of a treaty so radically favourable to American-Canadian business.

In 1923 there is very little talk of commercial reciprocity between the United States and Canada. Each country is intent upon its own policy which is national in character. The exchanges between the two countries outrank those of either country with any third party. There is no vexed question or bad feeling between the two peoples. The British Government now gives Canada practical control over her relations to the United States, a concession in itself which makes for better British-American relations.

## CHAPTER XXI

### IN MORE RECENT DAYS

**I**N any search for outstanding landmarks along the path of British-American relations from the beginning which would indicate the end of one epoch and the commencement of another, historians may differ as to the relative importance of events. To the lay reader, however, it seems most natural to divide the subject into five parts: one treating of affairs prior to 1776; the second, those prior to 1823; the third, of those just before the beginning of the American Civil War in 1860; the fourth, between that period and 1914; and the fifth, from that year to the present time. Brief reference has been made to some of those events prior to 1914 which, in one way or another, appear to bear some relation to the state of affairs between the two peoples in 1923.

Naturally every event, great or small, has played its part, but there have been episodes the importance of which is more clearly indicated than that of others, and it is the most significant of these which must be regarded as turning-points one way or the other, and the most significant are those which have had the most lasting effect. It has not always been the events which have attracted the most attention or impressed themselves upon the mind as making notable dates that have become historical which have had the most lasting influence. There have been occasions when public opinion on either side of the Atlantic has flared into anger which have later proved to be but passing emotional disturbances of no permanent influence.

On the other hand there have been powerful influences steadily at work for years to which too little attention has been paid because of a lack of specific occurrences upon which public attention could be fixed. Some of the influences have been for years slowly but surely drawing the English-speaking peoples together, and others have been at work, not so effectively, however, to keep them apart. When the Great European War

of 1914 became a reality to a profoundly shocked and indignant world, British-American relations were what was then called unusually good. Preparations for the celebration of a hundred years of peace between the two countries were complete, both the British and American peoples were congratulating themselves upon the accomplished fact of a century of freedom from armed conflict with each other, and they believed it augured well for the future.

A glance backward, however, from 1923 to the spring of 1914, and a comparison of the state of British-American affairs then and to-day bring a realisation that the completion of one hundred years of peace did not necessarily mean all that was implied, and that the mutual congratulations of 1914 were founded as much upon the hopes and dreams of those to whom a British-American entente was the most desired of all possible international events as it was upon what had been actually accomplished towards that consummation or such guarantee as appeared to exist. The attitude of the two Governments one to the other was excellent. It was entirely friendly, and any controversy which could result in serious diplomatic strain or suggest a possible break in diplomatic relations seemed unthinkable. Back of all this, however, there was a spirit of watchfulness and a caution displayed in all exchanges. It could hardly be called suspicion or jealousy, though there was an element of both in the mutual attitude. There was the question of future comparative naval power, the rivalry of foreign fields for control of the oil supply ; competition in the trade of the world was keen ; the Anglo-Japanese alliance received varied interpretations, and the question as to the position of the British Government in any serious controversy which might arise between the United States and Japan was gravely debated, both publicly and privately. The Irish question stood as a barrier between the two nations, which, though in reality flimsy enough in character, was sufficiently tangible to prevent a sympathetic understanding between two considerable sections of the people in both countries. In addition to this, many old antipathies to the British survived in the United States, and the British, more especially the English, still looked upon Americans and American affairs with a certain air of lofty toleration that was peculiarly exasperating to American susceptibilities.

There was in fact in 1914 no guarantee that some occasion would not arise on which either the Americans or the British or both would be so aroused in anger as to bring about a very serious state of affairs between the two countries. There were several directions from which such disturbances could possibly arise and, but for the emasculated Arbitration treaty which existed between the two countries, there was no real bar to a serious difference of opinion and consequent international disturbance. In times of such disturbances treaties or agreements of any kind become merely as anchors dragging the bottom, for nearly all wars have come about through a belief among the people, generally cultivated by skilful publicity, that the honour or the safety of the nation is involved, and that the issues are outside the operation of any previous arrangement that may have been made.

The progress that was made towards a state of British-American amity between 1914 and 1923 is one of the most remarkable phenomena in all history. At the end of nine years not a single one of the questions that were at issue in 1914 remained to vex the two peoples. Even more than this, for during those nine years new questions of importance arose as well, and then were disposed of without trouble. It is a remarkable epoch in the history of both nations in this respect alone, to say nothing of the experience of war which fell to the lot of both nations within that period, a war in which they fought side by side for the first time in their respective histories. That this war and its reactions were responsible for the progress made towards a complete British-American understanding is true, but that the war did not create the underlying conditions which made this progress possible is also true. The war acted as a solvent of the mists which had obscured the international vision and laid bare the actual indissoluble bonds which existed between the two nations. That these bonds existed many had long believed, and practically all acknowledged the possibility of their discovery and the ultimate effect of the revelation. There were influences at work to keep them hidden or to prevent their realisation. There were those who saw them and knew their power, but from their own point of view or interest feared to have them become operative.

Many Continental writers have dealt at length and with



conviction of the inevitability of a union of the English-speaking nations, and have urged other nations with mutual ties to beware the strength and purpose of such a combination. The diplomacy of Germany was for years directed towards making an alliance with the United States and, in furtherance of this project, towards fomenting trouble between Great Britain and the United States. The Latin countries of the Old World watched the probable trend of events in the belief that they should do what they believed the English-speaking people would do in time—that is to say, bring about an entente based upon racial and linguistic sympathies. It is a rather curious commentary upon British-American relations that so many people of other nationalities have long realised the inevitability of an English-speaking union. Astute political writers, philosophers and essayists of German, French, Italian—in fact of almost all other nationalities—have forecasted this union even at times when British-American relations appeared to be at their worst. The bystander has had a clearer vision of the trend of events and their logical outcome than those who were most deeply concerned with the matter.

In August 1914 only a few realised to the full the possibilities of the war. It is doubtful whether anyone then had a clear vision of the extent to which all the world would become involved. It is certain that no one realised the agonies that would follow the officially declared peace. When the real seriousness of the catastrophe that had come to Europe had beaten in upon the mind it was not then difficult to imagine the world in such a state that the United States would become involved with or without the consent of the American people. To those Americans who lived in Europe during the first years of the war it became more and more a matter of conviction that their country was to become an active participant in the affair, and that the sooner this happened the better for all engaged in the struggle. It proved to be a weary and anxious time of waiting, however, before this came about, but there were vast and powerful influences engaged to defer it. That they did not triumph was due to two great impulses: one originated in the continued violation in Europe of all the principles held in reverence by Americans in their theories as to the relations of man to man and nation to nation, and the

other came from a realisation that another English-speaking nation was fighting to the death in defence of these same principles of which America held no monopoly.

The history of the relations of the British and American Governments in the years from 1914 to 1917 has been written, and a record has been made of practically all of the important events of that period. They are still fresh in the minds of everyone alive in 1923. There were no really serious controversies between the two Governments during that time, and there were many things in which both Governments found cause for congratulation. Probably ninety per cent. of all the disputes which did arise were due to faulty British administration in the earlier stages of the war. At first the British Government held to the so-called Declaration of London, which set forth the rights and privileges of neutrals. This position was soon abandoned however, and it ceased to be a guide for American exporters. The British authorities arranged to supervise the loading of cargoes in the United States, and then the British Admiralty refused to accept the reports of its own officials. American vessels were brought into English ports and kept there many weeks or even months before a decision was reached. This happened before it was realised how detrimental this was to become to the Allied cause when the shortage of shipping became apparent.

Many minor agreements were made which failed to work satisfactorily and were abandoned. The notorious controversy which was caused by the stoppage of American goods in transit to other countries via England, while English goods were allowed to proceed, was due to the activities of certain British shippers, who found it possible to do many things of which the higher British authorities remained in ignorance. The British export figures for 1915 tell an interesting story of British trading activities at that time, and it is interesting to note the profitable business done with Turkey by certain industries a year after war had been declared upon that country. In fact these statistics conveyed a tale of such interest that it became difficult, if not impossible, to get them later on. The responsible officials of the British Government had their hands full, and ~~many~~ <sup>few</sup> things were done of which they did not approve when made aware of what was going on.

When the blockade of Germany was put into effect the American Consular Corps suggested to Lord Robert Cecil, then Minister of the Blockade, that a system of naval certificates should be designed to ensure freedom for American shipping of legitimate character. Such a system was put into effect, and there was very little trouble afterwards. The institution by the Allies of a traders' "black list" was a matter that caused the United States Government some trouble, as it was not always clear that discrimination was justified or did not have some ulterior motive behind it. The entire trouble at the beginning was the lack of systematic method in the treatment of foreign commerce and a faulty inadministration of such rules as were put into effect. By the time, however, the war had been in progress for two years the system was perfected, and the administration ran more smoothly with responsible and experienced men in charge. That the troubles which arose between the American and British Governments over these matters were due to a lack in this direction is proved by the practical disappearance of these troubles when remedies were applied.

Another source of minor trouble was the difficulty experienced by the British in the control of the movement of Americans in and out of the United Kingdom. During the first three years of the war about two thousand American citizens passed through Liverpool each month, and to discriminate between the good and the bad, the dangerous and the harmless, the legitimate traveller and the adventurer was beyond the powers of the British officials. They worked hard and conscientiously, were largely successful in guarding the interests of the Allies, and made not a few mistakes. That injustice was done in some instances is not remarkable, for in the eye of the American law a naturalised citizen has the same standing as a native-born. It was a revelation to the British officials whose duty was to inspect the passengers from and to America when they came in contact with the polyglot procession which filed up or down the gang plank under the protection of the American flag.

It was an enormous relief to the British Government when the United States came into the war from this view-point at once, for the American passengers then came only at the rate of

about four hundred a month instead of two thousand, and American officials co-operated with the British to see that the visitation was rendered harmless. Enemy agents thronged the world, but there were not many native-born Americans among them.

Another comparatively minor but more or less important cause for ill-feeling among the English people against the Americans during the war was the use of enlisted American negro labour units in some of the English towns. They were not kept under close control, and the class of negroes from which a majority of them came would have suggested greater care to any one familiar with this type of humanity. The English officials were patient and understanding however, and in co-operation with the higher American authorities finally reduced the danger to the minimum.

From August 1914 to April 1917, or during that period of the war in which the United States took no part as a belligerent, was a trying time for all Americans who were in contact with the Allies, especially with the British. In the first year or so there was not much feeling shown—in fact there was a considerable element in British life which did not expect America to come in as a belligerent, and did not want her to. As time went on, however, and the war settled down into a test of endurance, this feeling disappeared, and a strong desire that America should come to the help of the Allies took its place. As the situation grew worse, surprise and disappointment that American aid was not actively forthcoming became marked, and the feeling among the British people was profound and bitter.

The relations of the two Governments remained excellent. The responsible men of the British Government understood the American situation fairly well. The Allied cause was receiving valuable help from America in money and supplies of all kinds and through the enlistment of Americans in all forms of war service, active and supplementary. Nevertheless the time came when it seemed that the United States must come into the war on the side of the Allies, or risk stultification in regard to principles upon which the Republic had been founded and the nation had employed throughout its life to the extent to which such things are possible to average human beings. To be

attached to the American diplomatic mission in Great Britain at that time or to be in that country in any official character as an American representative was no sinecure.

The American Ambassador in England at that time was Mr Walter H. Page, a man of keen sensibilities and intellectual attainments. His official attitude was that of neutrality, but as the war progressed, its purposes and methods became well defined, and the necessity of American intervention to bring about a decisive termination was made painfully apparent, his official neutrality was lost in his rapidly growing conviction that America was lagging in responsibility, call of duty, and destiny. His concern was far more with the spiritual needs of his own nation and the proper use of its power than it was with the conventional duties of the office he held. His anxieties and the enormous strain upon his vitality originating in the extraordinary duties of that time aggravated already existing physical weakness to such a degree as to bring his life of usefulness to a premature end. He did not live to see the end of the war, but he did live to see American troops crossing England on their way to France, and from that time on he had no doubt as to the outcome. After his death his letters were published to the world, and owing to his personal intimacy with President Wilson and the frankness with which he wrote to his friends during the time he was American Ambassador they constitute an amazing human document in which lie valuable clues as to those days in which America was particularly concerned.

It was during those days between 1914 and 1917 that the state of British-American friendship among the mass of the British people reached a low ebb. Men of intelligence who had conceived a respect and even admiration for the American nation in view of its peaceful accomplishments revised their opinion, and felt they had overestimated the spiritual strength of these people. Those who had still maintained a critical attitude towards Americans and their affairs, or even an active dislike, felt they were fully justified. It was a time when men's innermost feelings came to the surface even in Great Britain, where it was a tradition and a habit to keep the emotions out of sight. The effect of the war had been to strip human nature of its artificialities, and quick response was given to all things which appealed to the emotions. Grief, sacrifice

and hardship were borne with stoic fortitude and outward calm, but reason and emotion were given freer ground for exercise, and there was less reticence in making known the reactions of the moment.

That American prestige suffered with the British during this time was manifest, and even later when America had played a part in the war and thus redeemed herself in action the ill-effects of that time when the Allies waited in desperate need and with ill-concealed impatience for the United States to abandon its non-understandable neutrality were still apparent.

Again, however, has time largely healed the breach and proved once more that underneath the course of history as it is written from day to day flows a steady current upon which both nations are being carried towards a port of neutral safety. The entry of the United States into the war sufficed to satisfy the emotional discontent between the two peoples, and the events subsequent to the Armistice have gone far to satisfy those who have based their antagonism upon knowledge and reason. The quite general feeling among the British immediately after the war that the United States was out to become the dominant power in the affairs of the world has given way to evidence as conclusive as it could be made that the American people have no thought of rivalry with the British Empire, excepting in the arts of peace.

Satisfied as to American naval aspirations, their confidence restored in the British financial position, and assured of American refusal to become in any sense an arbiter of international affairs or the destinies of other nations, the British have been relieved of their chief anxieties so far as the United States is concerned. So much so is this the case that it is now the desire of the British Government and people that America should even expand her activities in the foreign field, abandon her isolation as a policy towards other nations, and take a considerable part in influencing the trend of international events. The last word spoken by the American Government upon this subject in 1923 was a reiteration of the principle of the Monroe Doctrine, especially as it concerned the limitation of American activities in the field of foreign politics. The United States Government expressed its willingness to enter the confused economic situation in advisory capacity at the unanimous

request of all the nations affected. A refusal to participate in a factional dispute was emphasised, and once more was the world informed that under no conditions would America play any part in any political controversy which had arisen or might arise in Europe. It was also suggested that should some plan be devised and unanimously agreed to, America would be more than willing to consider in what way American wealth and influence could be employed to bring about some stability to the economic situation in Europe. A qualified acceptance of the American position was made by the Allies in October 1923, in the hope that it would lead finally to a solution of European difficulties with the aid of the United States.

A great drawback to a good understanding between the British and American people just prior to the entry of America into the war was the limitations necessarily put upon the reading matter furnished to the people of Great Britain by the newspapers and periodicals. The censorship, compulsory and voluntary, was severe. The nation was fed mentally with what was believed to be the most stimulating pabulum. That the method pursued was the best that could be devised is open to question, for the British people have more confidence in their leaders and in themselves when they know the truth. There was of course the enemy to be considered as well, and information that could have been safely and advantageously given to the nation could not always be spread broadcast, in the fear it might be of value in less friendly quarters.

Little real knowledge as to the progress of events in the United States was available for the mass of the British reading public. So true was this that while many were surprised that the United States did not come into the war long before that event actually took place, some were surprised that when the United States did come in it was not on the side of the enemy. That this should have been so is almost inconceivable to an American unless he was in close and even intimate touch with British life at that time. The real lack of knowledge as to conditions in America and the trend of affairs in that country as the fateful day of April 1917 drew near was due not only to restricted news from the United States, caused by limited cable facilities, mail censorship, the smallness of papers owing to shortage of material and labour, and the absorbing importance

of news from the battlefields and the high seas, but to the free play given to anti-American writers, who found their opening in such weekly publications as reached large numbers of the people among the working and agricultural classes.

It is perhaps only human to consider with some satisfaction the fact that in 1923 one of the most dangerous and malevolent pens which had been devoted to this anti-American publicity work is now idle owing to an exposure of the criminal activities of the man who drove it in those days when every influence possible was needed to hasten the day when the American soldiers would come to the relief of the suffering and enduring Allies. It would have been entirely consistent with the policy which controlled the publication of news had the British Government at that time put the soft pedal on these emanations. It is not as though these were confined to the publication of news or facts. They were propaganda, pure and simple, and often based on misstatements or a grotesque distortion of the truth which came to a reading public eager for anything that would give it some idea as to how things were going.

These anti-American diatribes were eagerly sought in the United States by those who were trying to prevent America coming to the aid of the Allies, and they were given to the American public as a true indication as to British opinion of the American Government and the people it represented. The harm done by this work was incalculable, for the reason that while it did not necessarily and directly influence the American Government or the more widely and truly informed element in the population the poison found its way into the minds of hundreds of thousands of people who accepted what they read at its face value. That it gave vast encouragement to the enemy was acknowledged by them; and a prominent member of the German Diplomatic Service on duty in America remarked then that Germany had no need to stir up trouble between Great Britain and the United States, as the British were doing this for them more effectively than the Germans could hope to do it themselves.

It may be considered that too much importance is given to this matter, but if the contention be admitted that no real entente can come about between two countries unless that entente exists in the minds of the two peoples, its importance



can hardly be overrated. In times of peace such influences as these can be combated, overcome, or neutralised, for there is full opportunity for contra-publicity, and there are no large number of people in the population interested in making them effective. In times of war, however, and particularly in such a time as when one country is hesitating as to giving succour to another, it may be that such international indiscretion may tip the scales on the side of continued neutrality, or even create antagonism sufficiently strong to bring about unfriendly action.

The whole question of censorship is involved in such a situation. As originally instituted it applied only to military or naval movements or information of any kind of value to the armed forces of the enemy. To-day, however, psychology plays a tremendous part, not only in international relations, but in a military situation. This is shown in the increased importance attached to the human phenomena by the military authorities of all the modernised countries. A hundred years ago a general who put a large number of his most able staff officers to work upon the psychologic features of a nation with whom war was a possibility would have been looked upon as of questionable sanity. To-day some of the best brains in every military establishment are given entirely to this work.

This being the case, it must follow that a military censorship is to be conducted upon much wider lines than in days gone by if it is to be made really effective, even from a military point of view. During the war the British Government had absolute and detailed control of everything that was presented for the public to read. The most powerful publisher in Great Britain at that time ventured to dispute this authority, and claimed freedom of action for one of his papers, the greatest of them all. He was quietly and tersely informed that if he did not observe the wishes of the authorities in twenty-four hours he would have no paper in which to defy them if he persisted in his opposition. Needless to say he became amenable at once. If the people of a country are to be deprived of their freedom of speech and liberty of action by their own Government in time of war, it should be done thoroughly and along lines so scientifically laid down as to meet completely the needs of the situation.

The rise to importance of the psychological research branch of the military establishment is due to the greater democracy of nations to-day as compared with that of one hundred years ago. The people of all the world are now taking a larger part in their own Government than ever before. The extension of the franchise, the spread of education and a consequent spread of democratic belief are but features of a social evolution. The power thus achieved by the masses of the people can be used to make or end wars ; it can bring about international alliances or ententes. That it can be tricked or misled was demonstrated in many ways and in many countries in the ten years preceding 1923, but that this power can be directed along desirable or desired lines has been made equally apparent.

## CHAPTER XXII

### THE DANGERS OF WAR AND PEACE

**T**HE most significant years of the post-war period in British-American relations may be said to have been between 11th November 1918, the date of the Armistice, and 25th January 1923, the day the last of the American troops left Europe for the United States. It was during these years of actual contact of American national interests with European affairs in times of peace that differences of opinion, doubts as to the real friendship of one country for another, international jealousies, rivalries of all kinds and old-time prejudices then revived became especially dangerous. Every nation in Europe was sore to the touch. The war had been won, and there was leisure to survey and attempt to estimate the wreckage, but few had the courage to really look matters in the face.

During the war adverse influences were held more or less in check by a common danger and a common purpose. The signing of the Armistice let loose a vast wave of emotional relief which was mutual among the peoples of all the Allies. It could hardly be called joy, for it was so tempered by the great personal loss which had come to nearly everyone; but for the moment there was no thought, only the feeling that the world had at last come to an end of the ghastly nightmare which had brooded over the affairs of men for more than four intolerable years. The ordinary processes of thought soon prevailed again, however, and there came an anticlimax of depression as a result of the briefest kind of a review of the actual position in which the average man found himself as a result of the war.

This international situation remained practically as it was immediately following the Armistice until the Peace Conference met in Paris in January 1919. The visit of President Wilson to London on his way to the Conference was the occasion of a notable demonstration of British friendship for the United

States and the high hopes then entertained of immediate American co-operation in international affairs. By the time the Peace Treaty was signed in Paris—28th June 1919—there had been some revival of international suspicions between the British and American peoples, and later, when it was realised that the Congress of the United States would refuse to ratify the document signed by President Wilson, there is little doubt but that the relations between the two nations were far from being of the best. The reaction from the war period was severe, notably on the part of the British.

A great many people in the United Kingdom felt that in a way they had been deceived in Paris, and in their elaborate effort to meet what they supposed to be the wishes of the American people, as expressed by President Wilson, they had been made to look foolish in the eyes of the world—through a misunderstanding it is true, but that did not take the edge off the deep annoyance felt. The strain under which they had been to harmonise with the ideas of President Wilson reacted even to anger with the nation which had put upon them something they felt to be more or less of a humiliation. By March 1920, when the last hope of an American ratification of the Versailles Treaty was given up, British-American relations were probably more actively antagonistic than for many years. In this instance most of the antagonism was on the British side, for reasons stated.

Through the defection of America the Allies were now left with a Treaty which they had all accepted, and by which they were bound to do many things they would not have agreed to do but for American influence. The League of Nations and the definition of small nationalities were the main features in the Treaty which had been included through American persistence. It is extremely doubtful whether there was any experienced statesman in Europe in 1919 who believed whole-heartedly in the wisdom of creating a larger number of small and independent states on the Continent than already existed. The multiplication of frontiers, of international rivalries and of international ambitions of all descriptions did not promise to be a policy which would make for peace in the future. The war had not changed the situation in Europe to such a degree as to destroy the force of all the old arguments in favour of a few large

federations rather than innumerable independencies. Also when the Treaty was made it was generally believed that as the United States was an important signatory to the document, and that this was peculiarly an American contention, that American money and other aid would be forthcoming to put the small new countries on their feet and thus give them immediate stability.

Probably the greatest surprise experienced by the general public in Great Britain in connection with the Treaty was the rejection by the United States of Mr Wilson's plan for a League of Nations. The British Government, with its usual perception of international values, immediately took steps to retrieve whatever could be saved out of the situation by securing control of the organisation, so that if anything of importance did come out of it there would be no functioning contrary to British interests. This in its turn had the effect in the United States of intensifying the opposition to American participation in the League, and was triumphantly referred to as a justification for American repudiation of the scheme. As a well-informed English writer recently said with more frankness than is usual: "We may shut our eyes to it if we please, but it is grossly and palpably evident to everyone else that the League is a British firm, however magnificent and universal the name under which it trades."

All such restraint upon the usual mental processes as prevailed during the war having been removed by the disappearance of immediate danger, both British and American peoples gave full play to pre-war prejudices and international suspicion, and these were intensified during the immediate post-war period by an almost inevitable reaction and such events as have been touched upon. The British had seemingly more excuse for irritation with Americans than the Americans had with the British; but just at this time the Irish question was at the height of its discussion, and while it put the United States Government in a very difficult and embarrassing situation it made it easier for all anti-British elements in America to fan any flame of resentment which might appear.

Fortunately for the relations between the two countries the United States had in London during this period, as American Ambassador, Mr John W. Davis, who had succeeded the late

Mr Walter H. Page shortly after the Armistice. Mr Page had conserved the good relations of Great Britain and the United States through the trying period from 1913 to 1918 with distinguished ability. Mr Davis came upon the scene in time to nurse American interests during the Peace Conference, and later through the even more difficult time of the Irish trouble, then in an acute stage. Mr Davis brought a fine legal mind, a dispassionate judgment and a strict sense of neutrality to the task, and all this was needed to minimise such friction between the two nations as could not be avoided under the circumstances. The British Government and the nation as a whole were hard put to it to find a way out of what was apparently a desperate and hopeless struggle, which had in it all the tragic elements of a civil war. Those who were carrying on this war on the Irish side found inspiration and material assistance in the United States. Had it not been for this American support the struggle would not have lasted as long as it did; and it may be said it is doubtful whether but for this support there would to-day be any Irish Free State such as was finally agreed to by the British Government.

The fact that the American Government was absolutely correct in its neutrality and did everything in its power to prevent any infringement of international law by Americans or by aliens using the United States as a base, and the fact that the Irish revolution was supported only by an extremely small minority of the American people, satisfied the British Government to a reasonable degree, but failed to convince many people in England that America as a whole was not in some way to blame for the trouble in Ireland. Mr Davis came to his post with many of the beliefs of traditional diplomacy. He was not a publicist, nor a man who urged his own personality to the fore. He regarded the interests of the United States as his supreme consideration and gave of the best to the interests of his client. It is doubtful whether anyone outside of official circles realised the difficulties of such a diplomatic mission under these circumstances, or the number of pitfalls, often cleverly hidden, which presented themselves for unwary or inexperienced feet; but it can be said with confidence that the United States came through this critical period with credit to its Government and that British-American relations in the

end suffered no real hurt from a situation pregnant with possibilities for evil.

There is little doubt but that during this post-war period British antagonism towards America was more acute than possibly it had ever been in history, for in some way or another existing conditions affected everybody, while in previous crises any disturbances caused by passing events or the possibilities of the future were the concern of only a limited number of people. The whole British nation had become aroused to the influence of foreign contacts on the personal affairs of the individual. The nation as a whole had become more widely educated, therefore more widely read and better informed as to what was going on and as to the influences for or against its own prosperity and happiness. In earlier days the governing class or perhaps those engaged in some one industry might have become deeply concerned as to what another nation was doing or threatened to do, but that the whole British nation as represented by each and every individual could possess more or less knowledge as to what was happening and acquire a vivid interest in the possible effect upon their own lives was highly improbable.

The war and its reactions had torn away this covering of ignorance, indifference and lack of personal responsibility among the masses, and left the mind of the nation exposed and sensitive to what would formerly have been described as outside influences. A million men were missing from the daily life of those with whom they had formerly associated. This loss was distributed throughout the land in such a way that each family and every community had contributed to its quota, and it was a nation in mourning. In a material way all of the machinery of life was disorganised almost as effectively as if the country had been actually invaded. The mass of the population was underfed and its resisting power lessened. British supremacy on the seas was threatened through the loss of many ships. The nation was, for the first time in modern history, heavily in debt to a foreign country. The British monetary unit was no longer the real measure of financial values. The war had only been brought to a more or less successful conclusion through the aid furnished by another country. The spirit of the nation was troubled and humbled.

in that sturdy belief in British supremacy which had so long prevailed.

This resulted in a state of mind in which resentment was quickly felt, and at times over matters which ordinarily would have caused comparatively little perturbation. A number of causes contributed to feed this resentment in connection with the United States, and upon that country and its people were concentrated the ill tempers of the British people. Superficially there seemed to be good cause for British complaint, and it is only superficially that most people observe and think. They saw a rich and prosperous nation which to all intents and purposes had suffered but slightly and yet which had acquired great glory by giving the decisive blow at a time when those who had borne the heat and burden of the day for long and weary years were fainting with exhaustion. They had given a notable reception to the man they regarded as the spokesman of that nation when he came to help them make the peace. They had listened attentively and deferentially when he spoke, and their representative had yielded to his wishes in affairs with which the British Empire was in reality far more deeply concerned than were the United States; and as they gradually awoke to the fact that this man was not a spokesman, that he did not come with a mandate from his people, and that all their efforts to do him honour and meet his views were futile, so far as the American people were concerned, there was a reaction to extreme bitterness and even anger in the mind of the British people.

The mere fact that practically every cause in which this anger and bitterness originated could be reasoned away was of little avail, for emotions had greater play in the exposed state of the people's nerves at that time than under ordinary circumstances. There were men in the British Government and outside of it who really understood the situation and whose feelings were in consequence more those of disappointment and of sorrow than they were of blame for the American people, for they realised the limitations of American executive government, and also the fact that each nation must act or refuse to act according to its own beliefs and theories of national life, regardless of the wishes or needs of any nation, no matter how sympathetic a majority of the people might be towards that nation.



This feeling of resentment towards America was aggravated by the fact that to the United States was owed a vast debt incurred for carrying on the war. It was in that country where dollars had become the measure of value for the pound. It was the mercantile marine of that country which threatened British supremacy, and it was American export which gave promise of crowding British goods out of the foreign trade of the world. Taken at its face value it was a serious indictment against any country, and few took the trouble, had the knowledge or even the inclination to indulge in any analysis or argument in an effort to ascertain the real merit of these charges. To the general public these things were as they seemed, and this brought about a state of mind concerning American affairs without precedent in the relations of the two peoples. American support of the Irish Republicans added to the flame, and when a resolution made its appearance in Congress calling upon the United States Government to intervene in Irish affairs, English indignation was outspoken. The state of mind arrived at by the general public was one of active hostility instead of the marked indifference which had been characteristic of previous controversies with America.

To Americans living in England at the time, and thrown into close association with the British, the atmosphere was reminiscent of the days when the *Lusitania* was sunk by the German submarines and it became evident that even this was not going to bring the United States into the war. The British are a wonderful people in many ways however. Even foreigners who dislike them often express their admiration or wonder at the qualities shown under circumstances which would probably produce entirely different reactions with another tribal community. As time went on they seemed to grow a new skin over their nerve-racked natures, or, in other words, they recovered their equilibrium with amazing quickness, considering everything they had suffered and continued to endure. The same causes existed in 1923, with the exception of the Irish embarrassment, as were in effect in 1919 and 1920, and in fact some of the contrasts between British and American conditions were even more discouraging, not to say exasperating, from the British point of view. British trade was in the doldrums, American trade was booming; unemployment was,

extensive and rapidly increasing in Great Britain, while in the United States there was work for all; the situation on the European continent grew rapidly worse so far as British interests were concerned, and America drew further and further away from the idea of helpful intervention; the skilled workmen of Great Britain were leaving the country and finding employment for their skill in American industry; the British Government looked towards Washington for signs of a co-operative spirit, while the American Government gave no sign of recognition other than a manifest policy of watchful waiting or even, as it seemed to the extreme British view-point, fiddled while Rome was burning.

With all this, and notwithstanding these phenomena, which might easily be believed to have the power to create antagonisms, the mutual relations of the two peoples in 1923 were unquestionably better than they had ever been in history, even during the time America was in the war, for that was an emotional rather than a reasoning period. The explanation of this is found in that very fact, for reason and greater understanding have taken the place of emotion as the controlling factor in the relations of the two nations. The British, having had time to regain their wonted equilibrium, have also acquired a new perspective as to existing conditions in their own Empire and in their vision as to things American as compared with that which prevailed just after the war, or even in fact at any previous time. They have regained their grip on life—individual, national and Imperial. They once more see themselves as they are, a strong, courageous and determined people, with many serious problems at hand, but with wealth, resources and resisting power to draw upon until solutions are found for those which interfere with progress. They have lost that feeling of futility which was noticeable in the confusion which followed the end of the Great War and brought with it a feeling of irritation. During the war many spiritual buoys, marking the channel in which ran the tide of life, came adrift from their moorings, and it has taken time to find them and put them once more in useful position.

Many factors have been at work to bring about a better understanding of the American people and the guiding principles under which they conducted their affairs. They now

accept the explanation as to why President Wilson could not "deliver the goods," though they are still rueful when they recall their own discomfiture. They do not quite understand as yet why peace-loving America does not accept the League of Nations, but as the opposition of the League grows among the British, as it certainly has done, especially since Mussolini threw his flashlight upon the weakness of its mechanism, there is not so much insistence upon the participation of the United States. The calling of the Conference to consider the matter of naval disarmament and the results of that Conference brought to the British mind a feeling of equal partnership with America in the command of the seas which disposed of all suspicions that the naval objective of the United States was to exceed the British in sea power. A faction of the "die hard" element among the British grumble exceedingly at what it terms the presumption of the Republic, in putting itself on a par with the British Empire in this respect, but these mutterings are but the echoes of an age-old tradition of tenacious life which dies slowly.

The business-like adjustment of the British Government debt to the United States largely removed another running sore in the relations between the two countries. This sore is not entirely healed as yet, for there is still talk of "the pound of flesh" which America is thought by some to have exacted. Those who criticised the British Government for making the settlement, however, on the ground that the British were thus deprived of a trading weapon in the settlement of German reparations and the inter-allied debts reckoned without the agreement of the United States to any such arrangement. Because letters were written by the then British Prime Minister to President Wilson, suggesting some interlocking settlement in which the American position was to be used as a bludgeon, does not mean necessarily that it could have been accomplished. In view of subsequent happenings, which have disclosed the real sentiment of the American people on this subject, and the repeated declarations of the American Government to the effect that the debts of the Allies to the United States must each be considered separately on their merits and as matters not concerned with German reparations, it would seem that the letter of the British Prime Minister to President Wilson on this

subject was no more or less than a *ballon d'essai*. In this light it does not appear that Mr Baldwin gave away any such advantage as some people seemed to think he had. It also seems reasonable to suppose that the British Cabinet informed itself fully as to all the possibilities of gaining some greater advantage for the British Treasury before they ratified the agreement made in Washington. It is also interesting to note that according to a statement made by Mr Bruce, the Prime Minister of Australia, the United States gave Great Britain better terms than Great Britain gave Australia in the post-war financial settlement.

During this post-war period many other matters came up for settlement in which there were openings for dissension, and it is to the credit of the representatives of both Governments that these were not allowed to reach a serious stage of controversy. One of the gravest episodes was a conflict over control of new oilfields in process of discovery and development and of older fields over which the Allies had secured temporary control through mandates or by virtue of treaties being made with erstwhile enemy countries in which the United States took no part. The importance of a great oil supply had only just been fully realised. For naval and mercantile marine use and for the manufacture of petrol and paraffin the oil supply of the world had suddenly assumed an importance equal to or greater than that of coal. Neither Great Britain nor the United States had any reason for anxiety as to coal for several hundred years to come, but the people of both countries foresaw the great value in the near future of a reserve of oil-producing territory. Oilfields are far from being inexhaustible; but there was another feature of this question which was even more important than that of the home supply. Any country with a large navy and a large mercantile marine needed oil depots along all the great trade routes.

In this respect the British already had the advantage, because of the wide distribution of the Imperial territory. The United States was compelled to bunker all American ships in foreign ports, while British ships could generally make a port in British territory, no matter in what part of the world they happened to be. The oil interests of the United States found they were being crowded out in favour of British interests.

The same facilities for prospecting were not available for Americans as for others. Bunkering arrangements for American ships were made difficult in many ways. There was no overt act, but, rightly or wrongly, Americans got the impression that certain mandates and opportunities derived from the terms of the Peace Treaty were being used for anything but to maintain the open door for commercial exploitation.

The United States Government, always slow to act in such matters, finally became convinced that diplomatic intervention was justified on behalf of American interests, and the matter was brought to a head by a serious protest from Washington to the British Government. The situation was in a way peculiar at that time, for not only was the British Government concerned as to an oil supply for British ships, but it was an actual shareholder in British oil companies. The British Government in reply to the American Government protested its innocence of any desire to take undue advantage, or in fact that any undue advantage had been taken, but promptly made an agreement with the American Government which did away with such features of the situation as were most objectionable to Americans, both from a governmental and a private point of view.

Fortunately for both countries nearly all of the international controversies which arose during this trying period were matters which could be handled by the executive branches of the two Governments and did not have to be referred to any Parliamentary body. Had this been necessary, the results would not have been so fortunate, for while diplomacy could ignore popular prejudice, politics and emotionalism, these would have been given opportunity for destructive influence in the course of a Parliamentary debate over some measure affecting international interests. It was the business and need of the British Government at that time to maintain the best relations possible with the American Government, and, fortunately for all concerned, it was also the will of the American Government that this should be made as easy as possible.

In 1921 Mr Davis, the American Ambassador in London, was succeeded by Mr George Harvey, and it was during the incumbency of the latter that all of the important controversies

remaining between the two Governments were finally and satisfactorily disposed of. The supreme quality of common sense, guided by a belief in the necessity for British-American co-operation, was, fortunately for all concerned, the dominant principle of Mr Harvey's most effective diplomacy.

Americans with previous experience of British life who lived in England during the years from 1914 to 1923, and who were in close and sympathetic touch with the life and thought of the mass of the people, could not fail, if they were at all observant, to become intensely interested in the psychology of the nation during that time. The reactions to conditions and events were marked and became even violent at times, as the strain of the war and its consequences increased from day to day. In 1914 and well into 1915 the pretence of "business as usual" was maintained, but it was finally abandoned for what it was—a sham and a delusion. The barometer marking the state of British-American relations rose and fell, indicating fair weather and storms. The lowest point was just before the United States came into the war, and the highest when the American troops made a khaki trail across England on their way to France. The year preceding that day in April 1917 when the United States declared war on Germany was a heart-breaking time for Americans, who were serving the Allied cause in the belief not only that it was just, but that by so doing they were serving the best interests of their own country. They were waiting for their own country to take its place alongside the forces fighting for civilisation, and as the days dragged along and nothing happened, they could but redouble their efforts with a bitterness of spirit only to be understood by those who went through the experience.

Those same Americans might have had a full understanding of the forces which were at work to keep the United States out of the war, and so refrained from blaming the nation as a whole, but their real opinion of their own Government in that time could only be felt or given expression to when Americans were closeted together. Each and every day of Allied suffering was a reproach which had a power far beyond that of words to cause grief and humiliation. It was this period of the war which broke the spirit and body of the American Ambassador, Mr Walter H. Page, and from the effects of that experience

he never recovered. In a lesser degree every other American who was in England at that time made his offering upon this sacrificial altar, and to such as these even the final entry of America into the war came too late to repay the cost of America's pre-war days.

Argument and explanation had no part in the life of those years. Deeds and emotions governed the situation, and men had no time or use for nicely balanced or subtle reasoning. The war had to be won, and there was only one way in which it could be won conclusively, and that was for America to actively join forces with the Allies. This belief was justified when America did finally come in, but the blow was so long held back it might easily have come too late. The British people themselves were bewildered with what was happening to them. They realised their objective, and that was the only clear light that shone through the fog of those dark days from 1914 to 1918, wherein they were denied all knowledge of what was really happening, and were asked to give all they had and to hold on to the end, be it bitter or sweet.

Never in the darkest hour did the mass of the people lose their confidence in ultimate victory. Some of their leaders, more fully informed as to current events, faltered in spirit from time to time, but not so with those who were led. The mass spirit of the British people during all that time never lost the faith that was to carry them through. They did not want to know why America did not come in; they wanted to know when America was coming in; and all an American could do in those days of agonised waiting was to predict, with all the signs of confidence possible, that it would not be long.

Americans who knew their own country understood the nature of the forces at work among their own people and the strength of the deterrent influences. They could, in their own minds, find reasons for all that had been done and for the things that had not been done. They realised the inertia that had to be overcome not only in the nation but at Washington. They knew when America did finally come into the war that something tremendous had happened in the history of the United States—an event no man would have dared predict at any time during the past fifty years, if he wished to retain,

any standing as a prophet. Few among even the best-informed people of Great Britain will ever realise the strength of the spiritual call necessary to dislodge the American people from their position of isolated security and cause them to plunge into the boiling cauldron of a great European war with the faith of the Crusaders in a holy mission.

When the war was over and danger no longer threatened there came another period during which the opinion among the British people concerning America was far from complimentary. In this period, however, no American felt that any stigma attached to the actions or inactions of his own people. He may have deplored the spectacle of an American President coming to Europe under what appeared to have been later on something like false pretences, and being unable to secure confirmation of his most solemnly attested agreements. He did not, however, blame his own nation for this, because he understood the whys and wherefores of this most amazing situation. He could reply to jibe or taunt with light heart and unabashed. He also felt confident that in course of time there would come to pass, the world over, a better understanding of the American point of view than then obtained.

He was justified in this belief later on, as has already been noted, for what has happened in the United States in connection with European affairs in the four years 1919-1922 has enlightened Europe more concerning American ideas and methods in the conduct of the national life than the events of any previous period. The real reason why Europe has absorbed this enlightenment is that European interest in America has recently been more fully aroused than at any other time in history, and when interest is aroused knowledge enters quickly. As a direct result, one of those benefits which often come out of misunderstandings, there is for the future less chance that trouble may arise in times of controversy through a lack of mutual comprehension as to motives and processes of thought.

The effect of the events and conditions peculiar to the ten years preceding 1923 upon all the nations has been to increase the general knowledge of each other's peculiarities, purposes and methods. Nations do not seem to be as remote from each other as at least they appeared to be before 1914. There has



been a quickening of interest, closer international contacts in the intangible ways that count for more than material exchanges. Each other's feelings, emotional reactions and general attitude towards life have become more a matter of common knowledge. It matters not whether these contacts have been friendly or unfriendly; they have been instructive nevertheless, and while they may appear to mean a hopeless divergence, this may not be so. Two individuals who have established a real friendship generally do so through an increased knowledge of each other's fads or foibles. Danger signals are placed over weak spots, and they are avoided in the desire of both to find a mutual path along which the current can flow with safety. It is possible that the international frictions of the war and subsequent periods may have generated the power which in time will bring about an international entente such as men have long sought and so far failed to find. It seems also possible that it is the period of the five years immediately following the war that will furnish the real basis for this entente. The period of actual war was a time when men shut their eyes to everything except the object in immediate view, but in the period that followed clarity of vision became gradually restored, until it reached a point when many things were exposed to the eye that could not have been seen before the storm cleared the atmosphere of international relations.

This applies with greater force to the traffickings between the British and American peoples than to any other international exchanges. They thought they knew something about each other in 1913, but what they knew then was inconsiderable and unimportant as compared with what they know now. This knowledge has not all been pleasant in its acquisition. Grave faults and fundamental differences have been disclosed on either side. Neither people is in a position to justly or safely assume the attitude of the Pharisee, but there have been other discoveries which make the friendship of each worth while to the other. Out of the war came an emotional entente. Out of the turbulent peace which followed the Armistice has come the makings of an entente founded upon clear vision, better understanding of each other, and the solid and time-resisting strength of reason. To be reasonable with

each other is all that is necessary to keep the British and American peoples in close and sympathetic touch for all future time, for the other forces at work in this direction function more or less automatically ; freely if under favourable circumstances, but to a certain degree all the time.

## CHAPTER XXIII

### THE MAN BEHIND THE GUN

**T**HERE are powerful influences at work for and against the closer co-operation of the British Empire and the United States. Some of these are active in principle and operation, others affect the people of the two nations subconsciously, but nevertheless exert a strong pull one way or the other. The active influences at work are more or less easily recognised, possess measurable dimensions and are subject to general discussion. When they are of such character they admit of argument and their soundness or falsity is susceptible of proof to a reasonable mind. Others are more or less intangible, more difficult of definition and harder to dispose of, as they are founded in psychology rather than upon facts. In many ways the subconscious elements in the situation are the strongest and less easily overcome, be they favourable or unfavourable to British-American relations.

Within a small margin one way or the other the favourable and unfavourable influences now balance each other in such a way as to result in the maintenance of a *status quo* in which slow progress, if any, is being made towards a real and effective entente such as is necessary to bring about that international co-operation of the English-speaking peoples of which the world is greatly in need. The superficial relations of the British Empire and the United States are excellent, but this in itself is, in a way, a hindrance to progress, for the situation is allowed to drift, held in a more or less neutral or inactive state by the general feeling that things are going quite well, and that as there is no apparent reason for anxiety it is unnecessary, and perhaps unwise, to initiate any new or more active principle into the relations between the two countries. Looking at the matter from this point of view, it is not unreasonable to believe that perhaps another great world crisis will be necessary to upset the equilibrium now so casually maintained, and bring

the whole matter once more down to a naked question of life or death for the English-speaking peoples.

The circumstances of the late war and their reactions destroyed the preponderance of latent antagonism which was characteristic of British-American relations prior to 1917, and brought about the present state of comparative balance between good and evil. Another jolt in the right direction might possibly accomplish more than another century of technical peace. The shock which would bring about the result suggested need not necessarily be the appearance of a common danger. Co-operation in some strenuous task might prove equally effective, and it is even possible that a sharp quarrel would lift the veil and expose the verities to the two peoples in such a way as to drive them together for self-protection or to prevent the recurrence of unnatural conflict of motive or intention. It is notorious that some of the most active and powerful personal friendships have been formed as a result of violent disagreements. Nations, being but collections of individuals, might possibly react in similar manner. There are other and more preferable paths to friendship, but to those who may be impatient with the slow march of events and the apparently unnecessary delay in realising the inevitable, almost any means would seem to justify the end.

As matters now stand, more or less in equilibrium, the international balance of relations oscillates first one way and then the other, never going far enough to produce really large results for good or evil and yet preventing the establishment of stability, without which nothing can be done worthy of the destinies of the two peoples. The recent war brought the scales down on the side of more intimate friendship and real co-operation, not only wiping out an apparently adverse balance, but showing a considerable gain in the other direction. The extremely dangerous post-war period of immediate reaction again tipped them the other way, even beyond the point of neutrality. Subsequent events again brought them back far enough to wipe out the preponderance of unfavourable influence, but not sufficiently to do more than to establish the present equilibrium, which varies slightly from month to month as current events may influence a more or less neutral and impressionable public in one country or the other.

The tangible and measurable influences which keep the two peoples apparently indifferent to the possibilities of closer co-operation find their origin in contrasts in form of government, historically established attitudes one to the other, differences in aims and material interests, the necessarily forward policy of Empire, and the reservations of a more or less compact, self-contained and internationally aloof Republic. Self-sufficiency characterises the view-point of both peoples, but the origin of this is different in the two nations. The British mind rests content in the traditional supremacy of the Empire in world politics and affairs. The world war and what has happened since has shaken this belief to some extent, but it still holds with the majority, and it is this obstinacy of belief which has been one of the strong factors in bringing the British back into a power and influence closely approximating that possessed before the severe and at least temporarily demoralising test of 1914 and subsequent years was experienced. So long as this prevails, any tentative approach towards such an understanding with the American people as will some day be possible will be delayed. An assumption of superiority, whether falsely or warrantably conceived, will be an insuperable obstacle to a working partnership between the two peoples, no matter on which side of the Atlantic it may be found. It will have to be an equal partnership based upon a mutual recognition of equality in strength and merit and not upon any feeling of toleration or patronage.

American self-sufficiency does not rest upon any belief in the dominance of the nation in international affairs, as is the case with the British, but finds its inspiration in great wealth and material resources so placed as to be geographically isolated from the European centre of political disturbance. This feeling of self-sufficiency was rudely shaken by the war of 1914, and in 1917 it became so subordinated to the growing importance of the rest of the world to the United States as to lead to a notable departure from all previous intentions. Since 1918, however, this feeling of national self-sufficiency has regained considerable sway, and while it is not as strong as it was in the years just before the war, its attractiveness as a policy leading along the line of least resistance has drawn considerable popular support. The favourable feature of this

recrudescence, however, is the fact that it has not been brought about as a result of British policy or actions, but rather through the apparently hopeless tangle of affairs in the continent of Europe, entirely outside the territory or sphere of influence of the British Empire.

The mental attitude of indifference to other nations which prevails among the British people is difficult to combat. The British Government itself is not at all indifferent to other nations in the practice of its diplomacy. But even with such a Government, so very much less representative in character than that of the United States, the mental attitude of the mass of the people has more or less influence and results in a foundational indifference or independence, or self-sufficiency, whatever it may be called which influences all international dealings. This mental attitude of the British people originated in lack of knowledge and responsibility. It was fostered by the form of government which has prevailed, whether that of a dictatorship or a constitutional monarchy. It has been emphasised with intent and purpose by many British Governments, and even to this day, while the Government acknowledges a responsibility to the people for net results, interference with or dictation to the executive power in the conduct of foreign affairs is discouraged, if not even resented. In present times the efforts of the Press to have an influence upon foreign policies are practically ignored, though a partial explanation of this is found in the fact that the leading newspapers of Great Britain do not, as a rule, reflect the opinions of their readers so much as they do the opinions of their proprietors—hence no one of them carries much weight as “an organ of public opinion,” which is the American definition of a newspaper. There are instances on record when the clamour of the London Press has influenced the British Government, especially in its treatment of some official, but quite generally the Government proceeds its own way regardless of newspaper criticism, and the British people are in the habit of taking their Government far more seriously than they do their newspapers—hence the Government having been elected is confident of the support of those who placed it in power.

Changes in the personnel and political complexion of the British Government are usually brought about through political

cabals rather than by popular opinion, and this includes such re-grouping of politicians on questions of foreign policy as may destroy the combination in power at the moment. Extreme old age, voluntary retirement or death appear to be about the only forces at work to eliminate from public life those who once obtain a foothold therein, and the changes which take place from time to time are caused by the "outs" succeeding in getting the best of the "ins." New blood occasionally comes into the select circle which governs, but its infiltration is slow, and it soon becomes identified with this or that existing faction. The vital functions of the British Government are vested in men who are thoroughly imbued with a belief in the dominant power of the British Empire in world affairs and no realisation of any present or future need for an admission of equality with any other nation or any dependence upon international partnerships for future salvation. This state of mind promises to remain until time has wrought its miracles, and either by the slow process of evolution the present governing generation or two has passed away, or by the quicker process of a rising tide of more democratic and radical political belief sweeping them from power. There is no threat as to the real security of British-American relations in the present character of British Government: neither is there much promise of radical departures from the conventional British attitude.

No such conventions, traditions or habits of thought bind the American Government to any one policy, however that Government may be constituted. The personalities of each succeeding American administration at Washington are of comparatively small account in the general scheme of things. There is no group of men who have more or less a monopoly of public life. They appear, sometimes with startling suddenness, and disappear overnight. In fact, so much is this a feature of American political life that old-established party machines attempt to escape notice by presenting novelties to the voters in the shape of new men whose character and beliefs are still open to discovery, and for whom everything can be claimed, for nothing can be disproved by way of the records. The most permanent feature of American political life in the past fifty years has been the party machinery or organisation of the

Republicans. Its foundations were laid after the Civil War, and the machine itself was designed, constructed and long maintained by some of the shrewdest and ablest men in the country. The secret of its strength has been, however, that it was and is a business rather than a political organisation. The only principles to which it has closely adhered through long years of success, by only an occasional failure, have been those affecting the economic life of the nation.

To retain its power it has had to yield at times to public sentiment. When that sentiment has swung too far to the left for the Republican organisation to follow, it has gone down to defeat; but from the day of its defeat it has started to build anew, with full confidence that the eclipse was to be but temporary. The invincibility of this Republican organisation was never questioned until the late Theodore Roosevelt, made Vice-President by an unwilling party machine, and who became President by virtue of the hand of an assassin, opposed his vigorous personality and powers of political leadership to its plans. It has never recovered from the devastating effects of that struggle with a single man who made articulate the protests and dissatisfactions of millions of voters who were at least non-partisan in their political beliefs. This Republican organisation, although forced into exile as a result of the revolt against its dictum, again bided its time, and rose back on a reactionary wave into a semblance of its old power when it nominated and elected the late Warren G. Harding President of the United States. Again, however, fate intervened, and the immediate political future is once more in doubt and much of the new constructive political work accomplished is rendered useless.

Before the death of Mr Harding, however, it was made apparent that old conditions under which the Republican party had ruled with autocratic power could not be restored. The Congressional election of 1922 took from the party its newly acquired and unquestioned majority in the national legislative body. The so-called "floating" vote, freed from its party shackles by the actions of Mr Roosevelt, refused to respond to the whip. It had achieved an independence which it refused to give up under any conditions. This decline in the power of the Republican party machine has not been due to any developing strength or skill of the Democratic opposition. If this had



been so there would be small hope in the immediate future for any new departure in American foreign policy, for if the Republicans are regarded as conservative in this direction, the old-time Democrats are even more so.

The Democratic party went to its ruin under the leadership of William Jennings Bryan, who carried the banner for those who had advocated the unlimited coinage of silver money at a ratio of sixteen of silver to one of gold. This was considered such a dangerous political and economic heresy that the party lost its ablest leaders and became more of a mob than an organisation. The real cause of its subsequent weakness, however, was the coming into power in the party machine of men of inferior quality, not only in the national organisation, but all the way down the line to the local committees in the smallest counties of all the states. It was only the force of circumstances which brought them to the surface. Once in power, however, they were quite generally able to stay there and the party has suffered under this blight from that day to this.

It has become fairly apparent in recent years, therefore, that the real political power in the United States now rests with the independent voters who constitute a great third party; tied to no formulas, pledged to no banner of man or machine, desirous of the best for their country, honest in their voting impulses and ready to throw their political weight in the direction which promises the best results for the nation, without regard to the political label worn by the men offering themselves as candidates. There have been many so-called third parties in the political history of the United States. All of them have been organised along lines suggested by the older and larger political bodies. They have generally failed of their purpose, and have one by one disappeared into the void. They were based upon honest conviction and a larger percentage of their followers were sincere in their political beliefs than were those who aligned themselves with the older parties, but their organisations were open to much of the same criticism as fell to the lot of those who opposed them. The great and more or less unorganised "third party" which is now making itself felt in the political life of the United States is not a party in the strict sense of the word, but is a force which is now the

deciding factor in every election. It is undefined, cannot be controlled, is under the lash of no political whip, and if any attempt was made to find it its elusiveness would soon become apparent. It is more powerful than any third party which has ever been organised, for it is not content with splitting its vote from off the strength of other parties. Its intention is to win, and victory is accomplished by adding its strength to the political organisation which makes the strongest appeal.

The influence of the independent vote is therefore not confined to its action at the polls, for the regular organisations must take it into account and govern themselves accordingly. Every declaration of principle and every candidate put forth is adopted with an eye to the effect this principle or this candidate will have upon the independent voter. It is now recognised by every practical politician that a large section of this vote must be secured to allow of success for any particular party at the polls. The direct influence of this unorganised third party upon the foreign policy of the United States Government is considerable and under some circumstances might even become decisive. It becomes of great interest, therefore, to note its geographical whereabouts and to attempt to understand under what influences it lives and exercises its franchise.

It may be said, speaking generally, that this independent vote leans more to the Left than to the Right. Nearly all of the liberal and some even of the radical elements are included within it. Practically all of those who would protest against things as they are hold themselves to be politically independent. There is no Labour party in the United States such as wields the power possessed by the Labour party of Great Britain. There is a Socialist party which in the aggregate casts a considerable vote but which fails to elect its candidates. The liberal elements in American political life are not sufficiently socialistic in their tendencies as to result in independent political activity. There is also another reason why the American voter is not given to joining a party which is manifestly hopelessly in the minority: he does not want to waste his vote and he sees little to be accomplished by voting for a man or a party marked for defeat before the vote is taken. If his sympathies are with the liberal or even with the

more radical political school, he hopes by his influence upon an established political organisation to bring it more into line with his own way of thinking, and in time perhaps to exert sufficient control to accomplish within an acknowledged political power such results as he could never expect to bring about by registering a minority and ineffective vote at every election.

It is an opportunist point of view, in line, however, with the policies of modern statesmanship the world over, hence probably more practical and effective in the end than taken by the voter who expresses his convictions regardless as to the utility of his method of expression. The purist in politics will condemn this apparent political dishonesty, but such a discussion becomes academic in the face of facts and actual conditions, and it is with these only that international relations can afford at the moment to concern themselves. Thus it is that within a great party organisation in the United States are to be found to-day men of most divergent and apparently irreconcilable views. Elected as Republicans or Democrats as the case may be, their political creeds do not harmonise to any marked degree with those set forth officially by the leaders of the party organisation. These views are known as "insurgents" and they derive their political powers from the independent voters of the country. No party can do now without them and secure control of national affairs. They are catered to therefore in platform and practice. It is not so many years ago when they would have been vigorously "read out of the party" for their insurgency, but the hard-and-fast party lines and the unequivocal political declaration are now largely phenomena of the past, owing to the growing independence of those who cast the votes.

The so-called doubtful states politically are nearly all in the Middle West or the western part of the United States. The vote of these states swings from Democratic to Republican or vice versa according to the mood of the majority and it is these states which elect or defeat the national candidates. It must be, therefore, that here is where the larger part of the independent or floating vote is to be found, and as it undoubtedly controls the political destinies of the country, with it rests the real responsibilities for the foreign policy of the United States. It

may be objected that these remarks concern the ABC of American politics and should be taken for granted without explanation. This is admitted up to a certain point, but as the subject under discussion is one of international influences it is not safe to assume that all concerned are familiar with conditions as they are. The theory of British government is familiar ground to every American who possesses average schooling. The practice of British government is understood by very few Americans, and owing to the fact that it is the result of a gradual development and is largely controlled by unwritten customs, traditions and social conditions, it must be experienced more or less first hand to gain even a general idea as to its workings.

The theory of American government is understood by nearly all intelligent Englishmen, and if so inclined they can learn more about the practice from the written word than the American student of British politics can learn of British politics from the same source. Even in the United States, however, where the political function is defined in detail from the casting of the vote to the fulfilment of the objective, there are matters to be understood which do not come within the range of the law and can only be fully grasped through practical experience and the process of deduction. There have been talented British authors of distinction who have been able to so intelligently discuss the American system of government and the political methods and reactions as to allow of their work being accepted by American students as authoritative. The best of these have made notable errors, however, as was to be expected, and it is no more possible for an American visitor to Great Britain to fully sense the British political system in all its operations than it is for a British visitor to the United States to do the same by the political system which prevails in Great Britain.

The difficulty lies in the human equation. The angle of view constitutes the major difference between nationalities, for nationality is in reality a state of mind rather than an accident of birth. The psychology of a people determines the local interpretation of a law, and no law has ever been written for the guidance of mankind which did not produce a variety of results when applied to groups living under dissimilar conditions.

Thirty years ago the party system was at the height of its power in the United States. Children were born Democrats or Republicans. To be one or the other was practically a necessity for any citizen. In some localities it was a social crime to be a Democrat and in others a Republican was regarded as of a low caste. Occasionally a third party appeared, gave evidence of life and passed out within a short time. In 1896, however, came the break in this inflexible political situation. Men then realised that there was more responsibility attached to the casting of a vote than mere party allegiance, and they found the courage necessary to break with tradition and established custom. Once this had been done it became easier to do it the next time, and the younger generations as they came into the right of franchise found themselves free to choose according to their reason rather than according to the influences under which they lived.

From that time on the unorganised third party comprising the independent voters grew apace, and as a consequence of this increase in the independent vote the results of all elections became more uncertain. This uncertainty was expressed in the varying fortunes of the two great parties, and they have since alternated in power with considerable regularity. The situation has now developed even beyond this, for within the great parties themselves has come about a degree of individual independence unknown in earlier days. Not only have the voters broken away from the tradition of through thick and thin support of the party with which they have been identified, but the elected representatives have dared defy the long exercised tyranny of those who controlled the party machine. This state of affairs is reflected in various ways in the course of Government procedure. Party measures can no longer be put through Congress under whip and spur. The understanding and voluntary support of members must be secured before they can be launched and they can only be enacted into law by the consent of the majority.

In the days of strict party control it was the nod of approval or disapproval from the political mandarins that was looked for, but now they are largely ignored and members who seek inspiration for their acts turn their faces towards the great mass of the people and await the sign which will govern their

course of action. To-day the source of political power in the United States lies with the independent vote. The politician knows he can depend upon the support of the steadfast party man. This support constitutes the nucleus of his political strength, but to this nucleus which is itself a minority he must add a sufficient quantity of the independent vote to make a majority before he is politically safe. It is to the independent vote, therefore, that all parties and candidates now make appeal and the influence of this marked change in political conditions upon the policies of the older political organisations is remarkable.

Nearly all of the more important newspapers of the United States are the organs of this independent element in the popular vote. Less than ever is the American Press the mouthpiece of party or any individual politician. If the present situation continues and develops as it promises to do, party organisation will become less and less important to a political crisis and the man and the measure will take its place completely in its erstwhile command of the conduct of an election. There is also another comparatively recent change in American politics. In former years the man himself was the all-important factor in an election. Before the population was as large, and before the states more remote from the eastern seaboard acquired their greater political importance, the Presidential candidate was able to make himself personally known to a very large number of the voters. His personal character, his beliefs and his reactions became widely known and were fully discussed as matters of the greatest importance to the people who were asked to vote for him. The influence of the personality of the candidate will always be an important consideration, but now, more than ever before, it is what he stands for that influences the vote.

The population is so great and the questions at issue so much more complex than they were that no candidate, however energetic he might be or how great his versatility and power of endurance, could canvass the country in the same intimate style as prevailed even a quarter of a century ago. To-day he will stand or fall on his general reputation for honesty and independence of control and by what he professes to believe and what he says he will try to do. About 30,000,000 votes will be cast in

the Presidential election of 1924 and in all that vast electorate the great majority are far more concerned with measure than with men. This is especially true of the independent vote, the vote that holds the balance of power. The so-called "doubtful" states from the point of view of the party politician are to-day the strongholds of the independent vote. In the earlier days of American political history a doubtful state was very often one where there was a fairly even balance between those who could be depended upon to vote with one or the other of the two great parties and a small floating element which was sometimes purchasable. In the days preceding an election these states were intensely cultivated by the party managers and large amounts of money were expended in the attempt to influence the comparatively few who held the balance of power. The doubtful state of importance to-day is unpurchasable as it is doubtful only because of the real independence of a large number of the voters from any party control.

It naturally follows that the independent vote is the most intelligent element in the electorate and also the most influential and aggressive. It is the thinking machine or political conscience of the nation. The birth and development of this element and the importance of this whole matter to American foreign relations has been thus traced and emphasised because, until the independent American voters in sufficient number make up their minds that American interests will be best served by an advance farther afield in the domain of world politics and influence, the present *status quo* of aloofness and apparent indifference other than a casual interest will be maintained. It is therefore to the people of the states of the Middle West that those interested must turn in any effort to estimate the future influences of the United States in international affairs and to discover if possible in what form this change or increase, if there is to be any, may manifest itself.

The vast majority of the independent voters of the United States live on farms, in small towns, are attending or are connected with numerous schools and universities; they edit newspapers, and it will be found they generally possess the most active minds to be found in their own communities. They are not of the long-haired type of humanity nor are they necessarily "high-brows." In short, they are average Americans

perhaps a little above the general level of intelligence, and are essentially human and practical in their ideas of life and citizenship. It is from the environment such as theirs that have come the beginnings of nearly all the better national impulses. The great forward movements the nation has experienced in the realm of ideas have been born in the smaller towns or communities of America, and from such places have also come the men who have best served their country in public capacity. The greatest Presidents and public executives of American history have come from the more or less open spaces and not from the crowded cities. Hence the independent voter in his customary habitat is to be seriously reckoned with and it is through him that any great change which may take place in the American orientation will take place.

Upon this independent voter largely depends the future course of the United States not only in domestic politics but in foreign affairs. He held America aloof from the war at the beginning and put America into it less than three years later. It was the independent voter who rejected the work of President Wilson in Paris, who brought the American soldiers home from the Rhine and who suggested American representation upon an international commission to discuss the matter of German reparations. It is the independent voter who has withheld the Government of the United States from any participation in the European quarrels or political events of the years following the Armistice. By the same token it will be that same independent voter who will be the authority for any move that may be made in the future whereby the United States enters the international arena with more significant gesture than yet indulged in.

It may be said that this is a minority rule. It is in a way, for the independent vote holds the balance of power between the two great and definable Democratic and Republican elements, but, on the other hand, it can do nothing without the aid of one or the other. It is not a party organisation, therefore cannot be bought through favouritism or patronage. It wields no power as a concrete force by itself so can make no bargain. It can offer no support for questionable political plans for a *pro quid quo*. It may be mistaken in a particular impulse at the moment, but it is intellectually and politically



honest, one reason for this being that by being independent it forfeits all hope of reward from a party, hence is not mercenary. The real future of British-American relations of any positive character rests with this more or less elusive element in the American electorate. While it may seem at first glance, in view of the events of very recent years, that this is not a hopeful prospect for the closer co-operation of the British Empire and the United States, further consideration will show that this political independence of a large section of the American voting public is the one avenue through which the desired end may be reached, if such an achievement is possible at all.

Just where American opinion stands in 1923 is not difficult to decide superficially, but it is to the opinions of the intelligent and earnest minority the investigator must turn to gauge the strength and character of the undercurrents and to determine their drifts, for in these lie any promise there may be for the future. The humanitarianism and sympathy with suffering shown by the American people is notorious. No appeal made for the unfortunate in foreign lands has ever been in vain. The sympathy takes a practical form and hundreds of millions of American money have flowed into Europe for which no return has been asked other than its use for the purpose stated. To say that this is as it ought to be because America is rich is to do an injustice, for this relief money has not been contributed by aggregated wealth alone. The bulk of it has been given by those who had earned it by some form of labour and in many cases the donation has meant a certain amount of deprivation to the giver. To say that American capital has refused to come to the aid of European industry is equally unjust, for the amount of American money now invested in European enterprises approximates \$1,000,000,000. This is the investment of private individuals and does not take into account any Government loans or transactions. This investment has been made largely since 1918 and is evidence not only of the increasing internationalism of the American financial outlook but of an American belief that Europe is sound at heart and will in time regain her economic equilibrium.

On the other hand, the opinion of American bankers in 1923

was, that if it was proposed to float a popular loan in the United States for the payment of German reparations without some marked change taking place in the attitude of the European countries one to the other it would be a failure. The reason for this is not one of security or interest to be paid upon the money, for such a loan involves the matter of a principle in which the American people have declared their faith. Whether the American point of view as to European conditions is practical or even possible of realisation under any circumstances may be a debatable question, but so far as America is concerned the attitude of the people is sufficiently well grounded in practice to encourage the belief that they are right in their conception as to the lines along which international relations should run.

The American people are not thrifty, none less so, and this is shown in the fact that only seven out of each one hundred adults in the United States maintain a bank account and that eighty-six per cent. of all American men make a failure of life from a financial standpoint. Neither are they close or mean in money matters ; this will probably be admitted by the most prejudiced.

To arrive, therefore, at the reasons why American money has not come to the rescue of the international situation in Europe it is necessary to revert to matters of beliefs and principles which have more or less clearly defined themselves in the American mind as being well worth while. Recalling the facts that the independent vote in the United States determines the outcome of elections and therefore the foreign policies of the Government, and that this independent vote is to be found largely in the Middle Western section of the Republic, it is there Europe must seek any reply that is to be made to appeals for help or for participation in a settlement of the vast affair of international debts and German reparations. The mental attitude of the man of the Middle West who has declared anew his political independence is that of a bystander to a situation for which he does not hold himself in any way responsible and with the outcome of which he is not intimately concerned. He confesses to a considerable interest in the proceedings and admits that indirectly they have a bearing upon his future welfare, but that this interest, political and material, is not

so vital or immediate as to force him to hasty action. He is willing to let the water run through the mill for a time that he may consider the nature of the grist.

His conception of the Europe of to-day is not that of a vast area in ruin. He has reliable sources of information and from them he learns that in a physical way the Europe of to-day is far better off than it was in 1913. He knows there are more people, more wealth and more industrial plant available for use in carrying on material activities than ever before in history. He has reached the conclusion, therefore, that the fault must lie with those who are directing the destinies of the European nations and in the hatreds, antagonisms and jealousies generated or intensified by the war. He sees a score of nations armed to the teeth watching each other for overt act and taxing themselves almost beyond the power of endurance to maintain those institutions which it was believed the outcome of the war would reduce to negligible proportions. He has a passion for peace, is a pacifist of the extreme variety, and in the simplicity of his soul he believed that when the German military menace was destroyed his dream of an international brotherhood might come true.

The actual outcome has made him cynical as to the real intentions and ambitions of the European Governments and has induced a caution in his foreign contacts which amounts almost to a complete withdrawal until such time as events may forecast themselves more clearly. He is deeply grieved for the masses of the European peoples. He does not hold them to blame and regards them as the victims of circumstances. He would help them if he could do so without contributing to the strength of force which he now believes has taken the place of reason in the conduct of the international affairs of the European continent. This same withdrawal from the general European situation has, however, brought him more into sympathy with the British people, for he sees that in their own way they are trying to bring about some solution which will be just to all and thus not give undue advantage to the powerful few. He may be critical as to the British methods, actions and ascribed motives, but even if somewhat antagonistic to British influence, he realises that out of all the nations represented in Europe the British are working along

lines with which he is more sympathetic than those of any other country. This in some cases is more or less of a revelation and a surprise, for with many Americans in the past the British Empire has stood for international aggression and an arrogant use of power. In this manner, therefore, has the cause of British-American relations made good progress in the remote, well-entrenched and almost inaccessible citadel of the independent voter of the American Middle West.

## CHAPTER XXIV

### WHAT MAY AND MAY NOT BE DONE

**A**NY attempt to forecast the future relations of the British and American nations must be approached with caution. Optimism or pessimism must not be indulged in, for the free exercise of either warps the judgment and obscures facts and actual conditions. They may act as a mist upon a landscape where it is desired to see things clearly in detail and in correct perspective. It is a measure of precaution to begin with a process of elimination, for so long as impossibilities are dreamed of, advancement along practical and possible lines is hindered. It is the part of wisdom to dismiss from the mind any possibility of a permanent offensive and defensive military alliance between the United States and Great Britain. To the British mind there are no objections and no obstacles to such an alliance. The British people are accustomed to the making of these arrangements with other nations. They are impelled thereto by tradition, habit of thought, and the needs of Empire. The geographical position of their countries, their widely scattered interests and their proximity to constant danger of international disputes have induced them to adopt quite naturally, as one of the basic principles of their foreign policy, the making of useful allies through binding agreements, dictated by mutual needs, dangers and advantages.

In the past some of these agreements have been made more or less secretly, or, in other words, by the Government itself without the knowledge or consent of the nation as a whole. It is possible that the nation may have been aware in a general way that some agreement existed, but the details of these arrangements and the commitments involved therein have been kept from public knowledge so far as possible. The excuse for this has been that such knowledge must be kept from the possible enemy to be effective, also to prevent needless

antagonism, and to check so far as possible the making of like arrangements between potential antagonists. The history of such secret diplomacy does not show, however, that these objects have been obtained—in fact quite the contrary; for when one nation has made a more or less secret treaty with another for purposes of military offensive or defensive action, it has generally resulted in other nations following the example thus set, and in that way two groups of powers have been formed opposed to each other, and forced to make preparation for possible war. The object of each group has been to secure a preponderance of strength, and the time comes inevitably under this system when this strength is put to the test.

So-called secret diplomacy seldom lives up to its name, for while the details of a secret treaty are kept from the peoples in whose name it is made, the existence of such a treaty and its terms generally become known without much delay to those against whom it is directed. The political Intelligence service of the countries engaged in this work of secret diplomacy is generally good, and numerous convictions of informers who have been discovered dealing in State secrets reveal the weakness in all such arrangements, the secrecy of which must necessarily depend upon the loyalty and discretion of a comparatively large group of individuals, many of them in minor positions, thus subject to the temptations of cupidity in their need.

Before 1914 the nations of Continental Europe were woven together by understandings of various kinds in such a way as to form two groups opposed to each other in every phase of international activity. The British nation, in accordance with custom and necessity, was involved in this situation in the wish to maintain what was called a balance of power. The efforts made to maintain this balance of power defeated its purposes, and the structure, so carefully and skilfully erected, fell with a crash in 1914, because its foundations were laid in the weakness rather than the strength of human nature. Ambition, jealousy, economic pressure through artificial repression of natural expansion, and the weight of preparations made to support the group strength brought about the crash. Such a structure may again be raised in Europe, and if it is, the result will be the same as in the case of the greatest balance of power arrangement the world has ever seen, the one that led to destruction in

1914 and shook the world in its fall. The British people are even now apparently not convinced as to the obsolete quality of this form of world government, but this faith in its efficacy is undoubtedly weakened. There is no doubt but that if the British Government saw fit to again arrange a group of European Powers friendly to British interests, the British people would at least acquiesce in the arrangement. There are strong indications, however, that the British Government has either now lost faith in this plan for the conduct of European affairs, or else has come to the conclusion that the antagonisms arising out of the post-war reactions have made such a plan impossible of fulfilment, and is gradually turning towards a foreign policy adopted from the beginning by the United States, and not at all unknown in the history of British diplomacy—that is, “splendid isolation.”

The American people will have no suspicion of secret diplomacy in their foreign policy. This is not only because of its utter impossibility under the American form of Government, but because they do not believe in it. Rightly or wrongly they hold it responsible for many of the troubles of the Old World, and these they intend to avoid if possible. Any treaty or even any arrangement of importance made by the United States Government with another Government will of necessity be made publicly with every detail subject to discussion by the people, in the Press and in open session of Congress, and before it is concluded it will have to be voted upon by the people as represented in the law-making body. This condition under which all foreign agreements are made by the United States Government has been stated time and again to the people of other countries, and foreign Governments have expressed their comprehension of this condition, but its full significance does not even yet appear to be grasped in Europe.

Every once in a while a story appears in the European Press to the effect that the United States Government has already in existence or has in the making some form of secret treaty with a foreign country. European statesmen of mark have been known to state their knowledge as to the existence of some such agreement, and even men who have been the diplomatic representatives in Washington of foreign countries have intimated the possible existence of such agreements. It is

not desired to labour the point, but it seems almost impossible to convince a European, accustomed as he is to this form of international exchange of pledges, that this phase of diplomacy is unknown and will always remain unknown to American practice so long as the Government of the United States is conducted under the laws and system as they now exist and have existed since the Government was formed.

Eliminating therefore the possibility of a secret agreement with the United States as beyond the question, there remains a choice from among three courses of action possible under the American constitution and law. One of these is an out-and-out military alliance, such as is known as an offensive and defensive treaty. Another is a state of aloofness, each country having no binding understandings or agreements with the other, and maintaining a more or less critical attitude which might easily become one of friendly co-operation or open antagonism. The third is the close entente, practically unwritten in its larger phases, but perhaps reinforced by minor agreements and arrangements whereby the public services of the two countries co-operate to the advantage of both.

As stated, it is impossible to conceive, under present conditions in the United States, the possible success of any move towards a written alliance between the British Empire and the United States which would commit both peoples to combined effort under all circumstances and in all international crises in which the interests of either were threatened. As also stated, such an idea is not foreign to the British mind, and a close alliance with America of the kind indicated would probably be welcomed. Not, however, because of fear or weakness on the part of the British Empire, as some Americans profess to believe. It would be welcomed by the British in the belief that it was to the mutual advantage of the two countries, that it was but a natural union of the English-speaking peoples, and that it was more or less a guarantee as to the continued peace of the world and the ability of the more enlightened and principal nations to impress their views upon the whole world in the allowable assumption that the world would benefit thereby. There is every possible argument in favour of such an international agreement between the British Empire and the United States. The British are absolutely right from the point of view of their



attitude towards the idea, and there are few sound reasons against it from the American point of view. For reasons inherent in the American situation alone, however, it must be dismissed as impossible at the moment at least, and probably equally impossible for some time in the future, unless events of vast importance and foundational character bring about a complete change in the present American attitude towards foreign countries, international interests and controversies. To argue in favour of it at this time with the American belief and attitude as they are would be a waste of time and energy. It is the practical view and suggestions the world needs just now, and this does not mean necessarily in regard to the purely material affairs. The so-called higher aspirations of mankind are in need of practical help and guidance just as much as, if not more than, material concerns, notwithstanding the present confusion of the latter. One of the reasons why idealism and altruism do not make greater headway in the affairs of mankind is the fact, unfortunate though it may be, that as a rule the more disinterested and altruistic plans for the betterment of mankind and the improvement of international relations are advanced by those who lack the power of practical application of these plans to the proceedings of everyday life. When the time comes that the same common sense, shrewdness and practical ability are given to the furtherment of idealism, as known to the best element in all advanced nations, as is applied to the extension of a great industry, or even the perfection of the means for carrying on war, then will it make real progress. Even in the present day, when it seems that all nations are more or less weary of international bickering and strife, the efforts of those who would put an end to them through the application of a well-known and recognised code in common and successful use among individuals can get no farther than the stage of exhortation. The preacher talks and the congregation agrees with what he says, but they leave his suggestions behind when they go out of the church door to meet and wrestle with what are termed the practical affairs of an everyday world. This being so—and it cannot be said the situation is overdrawn—it is advisable to devote more time and effect to what might possibly be done than to urge consideration of what everyone knows cannot be done.

The second course open to consideration is one familiar to all at the present time, for it now exists. We now have between the British Empire and the United States what is called a desirable state of affairs. It is a state of mutual aloofness, with no binding mutual agreements of note, barring an emasculated arbitration treaty of sorts. Each country maintains towards the other a more or less critical attitude, resulting to-day in friendly co-operation, and perhaps to-morrow in a state of affairs suggesting at the least a possible break in diplomatic relations. Noted orators grow fervent over the friendship of the two nations and the indissolubility of the ties that bind them to each other. International societies give dinners for the forwarding of this friendship and congratulations are cabled from London to New York or vice versa on all auspicious occasions. Shrewd, able and eloquent Americans ride into public favour in Great Britain by their protestations of friendship and claim to speak for their own nations in such matters. Shrewd, able and eloquent Englishmen find their way to the United States and please their American audiences with their descriptions of the fervent friendship they assure their hearers exists in Great Britain for the American people. These missionaries of goodwill are more or less correct in their interpretation of the gospel of British-American internationalism, but what they say does not change the situation as it really exists, and if they overstate the case, as they do occasionally, the disappointment is all the greater on one or the other side of the Atlantic when there is an eruption of international ill will.

In this present situation between the British Empire and the United States there is too much left to chance. There should be something tangible in the relations of the two nations which can be taken hold of and used as a life-line when storm threatens. There are many negative reasons why a break between the United States and the British Empire will not come easily, and which render it inconceivable that the two peoples should ever engage in actual warfare against each other. These are almost stronger than the positive reasons based upon kinship, language, friendship and a mutually enjoyed idealism. Neither nation wants war with any other nation. No Government of either country would dare for political reasons to make a real cause for war, and every selfish interest of

both British and Americans forbids a disturbance of peaceful relations. Any and all of these negative influences, substantial as they may appear, can be swept aside as if they did not exist in the surge of a great national wave of emotion, and that is the danger to which a mere friendship is always open. There should be something in the nature of articles of partnership, which would help to hold the international relationship steady in sudden squalls until the men at the wheel could bring the ship of State up into the wind and thus ease the strain. This brings up for consideration the possibility of the third suggestion made: a close entente, practically unwritten in its larger phases, but strengthened and safeguarded by minor agreements and arrangements, whereby the public functions of the two nations as represented in their Governments can operate co-operatively to mutual benefit.

This takes the whole matter back again to the state of mind existing in the two nations, for any arrangements made by Governments other than a binding treaty imposing mutual obligations of serious character are a flimsy barrier against international misunderstandings in which the anger of the nations is aroused one against the other. The gist of the whole matter is the elimination of suspicion as to motives, and a more or less complete understanding of each other's purposes and ambitions from a national point of view. The most difficult of accomplishment is the doing away with suspicion of each other. From even a most conservative and matter-of-fact point of view it can be said that great progress has been made in this direction in the past few years on both sides of the Atlantic. It is becoming more widely recognised by the British that the people of the United States have no Imperial ambitions which interfere in any way with those of other nations, that they have no desire to interfere in the political situation in Europe, that they are not desirous of mandates, protectorates, spheres of influence or other form of participation in the control of foreign territory. In fact, so clearly has this determined isolation of the United States been defined, that criticism has veered to the opposite pole, and the United States is now blamed by many British for not taking a more active interest in the affairs of other countries.

This is unquestionably a step forward for the British-American

entente, and it has resulted from the American attitude since the war. Before the war there were constantly expressed fears or insinuations that the United States had world-wide designs for the increase of American power and influence in international affairs and on foreign territory. When, however, America came into the war with a declaration to the effect that no foreign territory was sought as compensation, and after the war mandates offered were refused, participation in the settlement of European questions was rejected, the American army was removed from Europe, and even membership in the League of Nations did not appeal, it dawned upon the people of Europe that perhaps after all the American nation was sincere in its declarations, and that the national policy was in reality as it was declared to be. With all the criticism now current because of this same American aloofness, this same aloofness has had a tremendous value in disarming the critics of 1913 who ascribed Imperialistic ambitions to the United States Government of which it was guiltless. In this way it may have served a greater purpose for the future than any aid America might have given to taking a more active and tangible part in present foreign controversies.

## CHAPTER XXV

### THE POINT OF VIEW

THE American people, in view of events subsequent to the Armistice and the present state of European politics, feel that they have been completely justified in their abstention. They cannot see that had America entered into the European situation three or four years ago with every laudable intention of helping to put the world on its feet, any more progress would now be recorded than has been made. Not only do they believe this to be true, but they realise that had America taken an active part in all recent controversies the United States would by this time be helplessly entangled in the maze from which the Governments of Europe are now trying to extricate themselves, and thus be deprived of that independence of thought and action which may yet prove useful in international affairs.

In answer to those who now berate America for non-participation in the European situation, and who are demanding American intervention to save the situation, the American people have asked to be shown the way that they might consider the matter concretely and from a practical point of view. It can be said without fear of contradiction that as yet no one in Europe, and in fact no one in the United States, has yet been able to present a plan for American intervention in European affairs that had any real practical value, or that would be accepted by a majority of the peoples of Europe. To forgive debts and lend money is apparently the final answer in the minds of all, and the desired American participation in the troubles of Europe revolves itself into some form of money contribution and "no questions asked," if it be sifted down to its real motive.

This the American people have made up their minds not to do, for obvious and natural reasons. They are asking many questions, some of them of rather embarrassing nature, and

they are going to have satisfactory answers to their questions before there can be any change in the present policy of watchful waiting so far as European affairs are concerned. The American people will never agree to contribute money or even lend money on good security if it is going to aid in continuing the present state of international relations in Europe, to be used to finance military armament or the domineering attitude of the stronger Governments on the continent of Europe towards their weaker brethren. This must not be mistaken for any manifestation of a "holier than they" spirit, for it is not. It is a practical and tangible contribution towards the spirit which must prevail among the nations before any good can come out of what was accomplished when the strength of Prussian militarism was destroyed. That militarism itself was not laid low by the Great War is evident, and that it is obnoxious to the ideals for which the American people are struggling is also evident, no matter what the particular brand may be. Prussianism by any other name smells no sweeter than that which called five hundred million people to war and turned the world into an armed camp for four tragic years.

The British peoples are beginning to understand this phase of the American national spirit, and convinced as they are, and with every reason, that it conceals no plan for the aggrandisement of American territory, interests or world influence, and being largely in sympathy with these American antagonisms themselves, this understanding, arrived at through a negative course, is of greatest value to British-American relations from the British point of view. The American conception as to the present British point of view is more difficult to dispose of in its more unfavourable features. The course of British policy since the war, however, is working towards a much better understanding and a softening of unfavourable pre-war conceptions which were not entirely without foundation. The settlement of the Irish question; the great concessions of power made to the British overseas dominions; the settlement of the British debt to the United States; the British attitude towards German reparations; the military occupation of the Ruhr, and the course pursued by the Italian Government in its controversy with Greece have helped many Americans to an understanding of the spirit that moves the British people in their contact with

international affairs at the present time which is decidedly favourable to British-American relations.

Beginning with its manner of dealing with the American colonist two hundred years ago, nurtured in the grievances of 1776 and 1814, 1861, and other less important periods, the American people have been brought up generation after generation to regard the British Empire as the oppressor, the land-grabber, the would-be dictator of the world's affairs all in the selfish interest of the people of Great Britain. It has been drilled into the American mind that the United States has been the only country in the world which has successfully withstood British dominance, and that this has been accomplished through the superior qualities of the people of the United States rather than by any circumstances which might have favoured the nation from time to time.

It has been often said that American history books as written for the schools and colleges should be rewritten if young America is to secure a correct perspective of the events of the past two hundred years. It does not appear, however, to have been entirely the fault of the books that the now middle-aged generation acquired its prejudice against the British. A flamboyant spirit of nationalism, which would probably be termed patriotism by many, is certainly shown in nearly all the literature treating of British-American relations during the past century; but when the middle-aged generation of to-day—the generation which now governs the United States nationally and locally—was young and passing through its formation years, the influence of the Irish question was far out of proportion to its real significance. Politicians of both the great political parties found therein a staple and conventional topic, safe, from every local point of view, and the indifference to American opinion shown at that time by the British Government and people but fanned the fury of the anti-British flames. President Cleveland, in his famous Venezuelan message, was trading politically upon this anti-British feeling, and probably no one was more surprised at this official revelation as to American public opinion than the average British politician of that period. It had one good effect, however, in that it awakened British interests in American affairs and policy, and resulted in the relations of the British Empire to the United States being taken with a

seriousness hitherto lacking in British procedure, public and private.

It was about this time that it was decided to raise the rank of the British diplomatic mission to Washington from that of a legation to an embassy. The negotiations between the British Government and that of the United States in regard to the building of an Isthmian canal followed shortly, and the British Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service generally began to attach considerable importance to the post at Washington. Lord Pauncefoot, who was the last British Minister to the United States, became an Ambassador, and secured his title because of these important matters, and reaped a reward he would never have been given the chance of securing if at the time of his original appointment Washington had been looked upon as a post of the first class in the diplomatic world. Little attention had been paid by the British to the matter of American public opinion. Whatever it might be it was considered negligible as it might affect the world-wide interests of the British. Had there been a different attitude in this matter less than forty years ago, and had some part of the attention now given to this feature of international relations been expended then upon putting the real British position before the American public in an intelligent manner, it would probably have had a marked effect upon the events of the first twenty years of the twentieth century. It might even have brought America into the war quicker than actually happened, for there is no doubt but that the anti-British feeling, whether active or subconscious, and an inherited suspicion as to British motives and intentions in international affairs, acted as a check upon American enthusiasm for the Allies in the first two years of the European conflict.

Twenty-five years ago the British attitude towards America was more one of indifference than active dislike or suspicion. If any thought was given to the matter, the United States was looked upon as a country of raw material, including in this category a large part of the population. This is of course a generalisation such as is necessary in discussing all national and international affairs. There are always numerous exceptions to any generalisation about nations or even less numerous groups, but if the generalisation be well founded it will stand as applying to the majority. It was considered that in time the



United States might possibly become a rival of the United Kingdom in certain directions, but the matter was not regarded with undue seriousness. Any real knowledge as to what the American people were working for, the guiding principles of their foreign policy, or any appreciation of the growth in wealth, population and power the United States was to make in the coming quarter of a century, was confined to a few British minds which had either specialised upon the matter, or which were possessed of wider vision than the majority of their fellow-countrymen.

The war and subsequent events brought home to the British people the genuineness of the non-Imperialistic ambitions of the American nation which had oftentimes been previously expressed but were accepted by the outside world as an idealistic pose under cover of which almost anything could happen. A better understanding as to the wealth, power and population of America was brought about by what America did in the few months of active participation in the European struggle, and in the current figures of her national and international exchanges. In brief, the war led to the discovery of America by the British people as a whole, and induced such a frame of mind as was needed to bring the two nations together. Also it may be said these new perceptions modified the customary British attitude of patronage towards all things American. These things are important, but what the war did for the British in the United States is even more important to the immediate future of the relations between the two nations. In the first place it was evident that the British did not begin the war, that they went into it reluctantly and from a sense of duty as well as in self-protection. Their bravery, stubborn endurance and cheerfulness in the midst of all that was disheartening evoked the sympathy and admiration of all Americans. Then came the reactions of the war previously referred to, such as the settlement of the Irish question, and the attitude of the British Government towards all of the serious controversies on the Continent. All of these things helped amazingly to obliterate previously acquired prejudices, or to dispel conceptions as to the British Government and people which did not at all fit into the proper scheme of things as they were formulated in the minds of the American people.

There is no question but that the war and its subsequent reactions advanced the cause of British-American goodwill more than the hundred years of peace, the centenary of which was marked in 1914 by the beginning of the great struggle at arms in Europe. There is also no question but that it would have taken many years more for the present state of affairs between the two countries to have been arrived at had there been no such war. In fact it is doubtful whether these flashes of illumination would have come to either nation concerning each other's character and intentions and the mutuality of nearly all their interests had not the strain and horror of the stupendous conflict destroyed for the moment all artificialities and stripped men's souls to the quick. It has been this passing glimpse into reality which has put British-American relations upon sounder foundations than they have ever been before. No matter what may happen in the future, no matter how men may strive to again conceal, even from themselves, their real beliefs, the memory of what was seen and done when the English-speaking peoples stood together at a time when their whole future was at stake can never be forgotten. Much that happened before 1914 now counts as nothing, and the two nations have entered together upon a new epoch in their relations, from the beginning of which is dated the birth of their real friendship.

In view of this it becomes not only a duty but a necessity that none of this ground so hardly won and dearly paid for should be lost. The position now attained should be consolidated, that fresh advances can be made from an assured base of operations. It is agreed by those who know both peoples intimately that a real alliance sealed by a comprehensively written treaty is an impossibility at the moment. That it may come in the future is possible, as all things logical are within the range of coming events. The fact that it is sentiment rather than practical wisdom which prevents it allows of a possible change in the attitude of the nation now in opposition, but it is with things as they are that humanity is now concerned. The habit of mankind is to let things drift until some shock disturbs the current or diverts it into a more turbulent channel. Affairs are drifting to a certain extent. A great deal of practical value has been accomplished. An arbitration treaty exists which remains in force unless denounced by either party thereto, and two

years' notice is required of such proposed termination. The weakness of all such agreements is that nations do not consider them binding in affairs in which the honour or national integrity is concerned.

This has been illustrated recently in the disagreement between Italy and Greece over just such a matter as it was designed the League of Nations should deal with. The two parties to the affair were signatories of the League of Nations covenant, but Italy decided, without a moment's hesitation, that the dispute was outside the domain of the League, and resorted to an immediate display of force to emphasise her position. It is not difficult to imagine that had this dispute arisen between two nations of equal strength in populations, resources and armament the question might have been allowed to go to arbitration, or that the action of Italy would have been considered an unequivocal declaration of war. It is not conceivable that Italy would have been so ready to apply the Fascisti method to any such dispute with any one of the great Powers. It may be, therefore, that arbitration treaties are of some use and value when made between nations each conscious of the equal strength of the other. The arbitration treaty existing between Great Britain and the United States is useful, for it is a tie between the two countries, and to a certain extent a pledge of delay in case of serious controversy before either country would assume a hard-and-fast position, and the more numerous such ties the better. It is along these lines that it is possible for the proposed limited partnership in the world's affairs between Great Britain and the United States to materialise, which in turn might result in time in the unrestricted co-operation of the English-speaking peoples.

Leaving out of consideration the effect of the war upon British-American relations, an event in a class by itself, the next important move towards a consolidation of interests was the agreement for the reduction of naval armaments. Other nations were concerned in this agreement it is true, but its real significance lay in the action of Great Britain and the United States, the two great naval powers of the world. France, Italy or Japan could never have seriously competed with either of these countries in any race for naval supremacy. The ambitions of France lie upon the land. Her army and her coastal fleet are

her really vital weapons of attack and defence. The same may be said of Italy. In the case of Japan there are economic restrictions which set future limits upon her sea power as compared with the practically unlimited powers of expansion possessed by the British Empire and the United States.

The willingness of Great Britain to put herself upon a basis of equality with the United States in the matter of sea power has done much to disarm American criticism and do away with the suspicions founded upon past events and conditions. There are still those however, on both sides of the Atlantic, who refuse to accept this evidence as conclusive in either case. Every move the United States may make in the matter of armament is regarded with suspicion, and the honesty of the British is questioned in the matter of possible secret arrangements for increasing their power upon the sea either by the building of armament which does not comply with the spirit of the agreement, or by treaties or arrangements with other Powers for co-operation with the British in time of need. It is useless to close the mind to the existence of these unfavourable elements in the situation, for they can be better dealt with if dragged into the open. As suggested in a previous chapter, it lies within the hands of the two Governments to reduce the power of unwarranted suspicion to do harm to international relations by appointing men to posts in foreign countries who, while fully alive to the interests and needs of their own country, do not arrive at their destinations fully convinced that they are in an enemy country, and that their duty is to put the worst possible interpretation upon everything they hear or see. Only a person more or less familiar with the character of some of the reports sent to Home Governments by representatives stationed abroad is in a position to realise the importance of this matter.

Fortunately for the peace of both nations the responsible officials to whom these reports are sent are usually men of more than average intelligence and knowledge, and the direful information they convey is discounted by being carefully filed away in the Government archives, where it can do no harm. Every once in a while, however, there is a slip, and either the man who is reported to presents favourable ground for sowing seed of this kind, or through official stupidity the alleged information reaches the public and trouble ensues. One slip of this

kind sometimes does more damage than can be repaired in many a day, and then only by a slow process of denaturalisation. International relations of importance are acutely sensitive, and they may flourish and bear most valuable fruit, or they may blight and wither away as the wind of public feeling may blow. Undoubtedly those that are destined to result favourably will survive mistakes, stupidities and unfortunate circumstances no matter how serious these may be, but there is no reason why they should not be given the same careful nurture which man devotes to far less important affairs. Much responsibility rests upon leading men in a community, whether they be Government officials or not, for the average citizen, obsessed with his own personal and immediate affairs, gets his education in these matters in a haphazard manner, and he receives impressions from what he may believe to be authoritative sources, and quite unconsciously perhaps adopts these as his opinions, entirely unaware that they are not the result of any process of thought or based upon any first-hand knowledge.

Another strong link that has been forged between the British and American peoples was the adjustment of the British debt to the Government of the United States. Before the war it was estimated that the people of the United States owed to Europe at least \$5,000,000,000, represented by American securities upon which money had been advanced to build American railroads, finance American industry, and otherwise supply capital for a country developing faster than could be handled by the local population. It was estimated that more than \$250,000,000 left the United States each year in payment of interest on this debt. It was known that by far the greatest part of this indebtedness was held by the British, and that to Great Britain went most of the money sent for interest payments and purposes of redemption. The necessities of war brought much of this capital sum back to the United States. The American people, by reason of their accumulating wealth and because of the desire in Great Britain to realise upon investment, were able to reduce their foreign indebtedness. How much of this still remains it is impossible to say, but that it is still a very large amount is undoubtedly true. It is estimated by some experts as still at least three-fifths of what it was before the war.

When America was paying interest on the full amount there

was no complaint from either side at the situation. No one suggested that this vast indebtedness meant any inferiority on the part of the debtor or implied any advantage or control for the creditor. It was a greater amount than is now owed to the United States by Great Britain, and it is not impossible that the present debt of individual Americans to individual British is quite as great as the debt of the British Government to the Government of the United States. This is also in reality an individual matter, for the American Government borrowed this money to lend to the British from individual Americans, and still owes it to them, and the British Government expended most of the money borrowed among the people of Great Britain in return for labour and material. The circumstances of the borrowing, the vastness of the sum in the aggregate, and the fact that there was apparently but one creditor and one debtor have led to confusion of thought in regard to the whole transaction; but the settlement as arranged by trusted representatives of both Governments and the detailed explanations which have been made as to the real status of the debt have done much to clarify the thinking of both nations concerning the transaction.

## CHAPTER XXVI

### THE FAILURE OF THE OBVIOUS

**T**O make war impossible between any of the so-called civilised nations is the desire of at least nine-tenths of all the people included within these nations. Notwithstanding this almost universal desire there is at the present time no guarantee that the people of two or more of these nations will not be called to arms for purposes of attack or defence at a few days' notice. The people of the United States, safe in their geographical isolation, hold themselves aloof and regard with suspicion the motives and manœuvres of the Governments of every other country. The people of Great Britain, jealously watchful of what other peoples are doing, are ready at any time to rally to the defence of the far-flung interests of the British Empire, possessed in the meantime of a certain sense of security for themselves arising from their conscious strength and their water-bound frontiers.

On the continent of Europe the many nations there grouped together, each maintaining an armament far beyond that suggested in reason, regard each other with sullen hatred and suspicion, and stand ready to put their strength to the test at any time. And yet practically all of these people passionately desire a guarantee of future peace and the ease that would come to their national and individual affairs if their armament on land and sea could be reduced to negligible proportions. It is an extraordinary situation and one out of which it is difficult to find a way that would lead to a relaxation of the strain. Many minds are feverishly seeking for some practical plan which would put an end to this undesirable state. The League of Nations was an expression of this demand on the part of humanity for some surcease from ever futile wars, but it is evident that not even in the League of Nations as constituted has been found the answer to the riddle; and while its Council sits in conclave in Geneva, Governments of countries which are

signatories to the covenants devote their time and energy to plans and preparations for military conflict.

The obvious way out is a binding mutual agreement of all principal nations to do away with armament and to refuse to consider that war is a necessity under any circumstances. This, however, is the last stage of a solution, and can only be reached by slow process involving not only international negotiation and agreement point by point, but an actual change of heart in the nations themselves. The practical man who starts out to accomplish a considerable task builds gradually but surely from a sound foundation. It was hoped and believed by those who founded and organised the present League of Nations that this was what they were doing, but they have since discovered that fundamental matters had been ignored or forgotten which robbed their labours of the convincing character necessary to real success. They still cling to their belief. The world wishes them well, but there is no faith among the people that the plan will prevail, and without the faith of humanity behind it no plan conceived for the purpose can prevail.

Among the British people there was at the beginning hope that the League of Nations was in reality a good start towards the objective in mind, but this hope was based largely upon the expected co-operation of the people of the United States. When this failed of fulfilment it was still hoped that it might be forthcoming later. When it became assured, however, that the American people were not going to come into the organisation, hope died in the hearts of all excepting a few of the most optimistic and, it may be said in no spirit of criticism, the most impractical. In the United States the creation of the League in the form adopted never aroused the enthusiasm or even the approval of a majority, and this state of public opinion was emphasised when the British control of the actual executive machinery of the League became apparent. Anti-British influences took good care that this latter point should not be lost sight of in any discussion as to the possible merits of the League. That this was a feature of the organisation will be indignantly denied by the British, and in fact has been so denied; but on the other hand, that this impression has played its part in bringing the League into disrepute with some sections of American opinion cannot be gainsaid. •



No other definite plan has been laid before the American people for their consideration. The name itself, the League of Nations, presents in concrete form the only definite conception as to possibilities which has occurred to anyone, but the form such a League should take has never been agreed upon by any considerable number of people. The idea itself—that is to say, a League—is in harmony with American ideas as to a possible control of important international events, but as a law is not effective if it does not provide penalties for violation thereof and facilities for enforcing these penalties; so the League remains, so far as America is concerned, a vague idea without tangibility of any sort, owing to American disagreement as to such penalties and their possible enforcement. A prominent American editor has offered a prize of \$50,000 to any American citizen for a plan which will “provide a practicable means whereby the United States can take its place and do its share towards preserving world peace while not making compulsory the participation of the United States in European wars, if any such are in the future found unavoidable.”

It would seem that the condition attached to any plan for American intervention is such as to prevent anyone from winning this prize. The United States can participate in world courts, arbitration tribunals and all kinds of international pleasantries of like character, but these provide in small measure for placing the United States in a position to do its no inconsiderable share towards preserving world peace. In times of peace all of these important minor international agreements work to the furtherment of good international relations, but so long as the Fascisti spirit prevails in Government—and it is apparently increasing in intensity in Europe—everything of that kind goes by the board in the face of a national wave of emotionalism. Force is a large factor in the government of the world to-day, and will remain so for some time to come, possibly for all time. No thoughtful man with any knowledge of conditions as they are can convince himself or others that future wars between nations are unlikely. In fact there is incontrovertible evidence to the effect that the foundation of coming wars have been and are still being laid by the reactionary Governments of Europe. They are building far more effectively

for a continued state of turmoil than they are for the established peace of the world.

The League of Nations might have failed of its original purpose just as completely as it has even had the United States been one of the charter members. Many people think, however, that it would not have done so, and in consequence the American people are held to blame for its ineffectiveness. This is as it may be; but one thing is certain, and that is the existence of a universal agreement that no League or international organisation of any kind can be a success with either the United States or the British Empire left out. Men who have pondered these matters seriously and with intelligence find themselves always thinking in circles. No matter where they begin or how widely their thoughts may roam the inevitable conclusion is that the whole matter of international relations rests for its character and ultimate stability upon the relations between the peoples of the British Empire and the United States. No League or international agreement of any kind of general application is worth the paper it is outlined upon unless to that paper is appended the signatories of the British and American peoples as represented by their Governments.

From another point of view it may be said with equal positiveness that an agreement concerning international affairs of general application entered into by the British Empire and the United States without the adhesion of any other nation becomes more effective than any such agreement entered into by all other nations put together or even than one to which the signature of either the British Empire or the United States is appended and the other lacking. There is practically no important objective in world affairs which could not be accomplished by a working arrangement between the British and American peoples. Equally is it true that comparatively little can be accomplished in the control of these affairs by either nation working alone or even in partnership with other so-called Great Powers.

If this situation be admitted, the responsibility of the two nations becomes enormous—in fact almost appalling—and a proper discharge of this responsibility the greatest possible question before the two peoples. It transcends in gravity all other problems, internal or external. It is a moral, political,

social and economic responsibility, involving the welfare and happiness not only of the five hundred and fifty million population of the countries concerned, but also those of the millions of more or less unconscious people elsewhere who, with their limited outlook, are not aware as to the real meaning of this British-American responsibility in their own lives and to the destinies of their descendants. In the British Empire and the United States live nearly one-third of all the people in the world, over one-third of all the white and practically all the English-speaking people. Thus it must be that when the British Empire and the United States speak with a single voice they are making articulate the needs, desires or commands of at least one-third of all humanity and certainly of the dominant fraction of that population of the world which counts itself as the guiding influence in the progress of civilisation.

In the domain of material affairs the British Empire and the United States hold the balance of power over all other countries combined. In supplies of food, raw materials, fuel manufacturing power, transportation, means of communication, gold and money based thereupon, they hold not only sufficient for their own needs, but are in a position as well to dictate as to the distribution of a surplus which now supplies the deficiencies of other countries and upon which they are largely dependent for their industrial motive power. They could at any given moment, through combined and simultaneous action, reduce any section of the earth's surface outside of their own boundaries to a helpless state economically so far as man's activities are concerned, and by the employment of a minimum amount of actual force render the people thereof incapable of doing much real harm to others.

These are the reasons why no League of Nations can be a success without the whole-hearted adhesion of both the British Empire and the United States, and again why a League of which the British Empire and the United States were the only members could be more powerful than any form of League which might include in its membership all other nations. The snag against which all plans founder, however, is the element of force which enters into any practical scheme for a League of Nations which shall be able to impose its demands whether such a League comprises the fifty-six countries of diplomacy

or only the British Empire and the United States. It has yet to be proved that political ostracism or an economic blockade will stop any country from going to war, or bring any country to a state of peace which has already gone to war. There is no question, however, but that if the United States and the British Empire chose to present a united front to any other country or countries, that such action would have great influence upon any situation which might arise. The adherence of France, Germany and Italy to any agreement of the character implied would of course mean a domination of the world such as could be secured in no other way. The beginning and the foundation of any move for peace or reconstruction must be an agreement among the English-speaking peoples, and no League will ever be formed with a chance of accomplishing its object until an agreement such as suggested has been accomplished.

It may be said that such a union of the English-speaking peoples would force the countries on the European continent into a combination against this British-American partnership. A military alliance of such countries can be conceived as possible, but no real entente of the nations can be reached between the peoples of Northern and North-Western Europe and the peoples of Southern Europe, and military alliances are but affairs of the moment. As a rule they originate in a mutual fear of aggression. There could be no such fear of a British-American attack, and any reason for a defensive military alliance would thus fail to appear. The British-American League would not force a Continental combine for the purposes of aggression, for such a partnership would be so powerful in a material way as to make ridiculous any combination of other countries for that purpose.

There is far more chance of a British-American League holding a commanding and authoritative position in the eyes of other nations than the League of Nations as now constituted, and such a League would probably exert more authority without a threat of employing force than any other combination possible. A dispassionate review of the conditions throughout the world to-day, a full recognition of the right of all mankind to the "pursuit of happiness," and a realisation that a majority of the people of all countries ask only to be permitted to pursue in peace the usual activities of man, and that they have no

desire to kill their neighbours, can lead to but one sane conclusion. This conclusion is that the nations which wield the greater power in the affairs of the world either fail to realise what they could do if they acted with initiative and courage, or else they are shirking their plain duty.

It is said that the spirit of nationalism was largely responsible for the recent war. If this be true the world is now in greater danger of new wars than it was of the recent war in the years preceding 1914. Since the late war there has been such a manifestation of the spirit of narrow nationalism as to destroy most of the erstwhile ties between nations which were believed to have achieved a more or less permanent character. Grave suspicion, distrust, jealousy and even hatred mark the international relations of nearly all important countries to-day, with the notable exception of those between the British Empire and the United States, for in these there is but a flavouring of those malign influences. One of the results of the war has been to create a lot of small and allegedly independent states, whose existence is dependent upon the goodwill of their larger neighbours and whose peoples are jealous and suspicious of each other. In the effort made by these smaller states to become important they maintain armies of disproportionate size, and they have entrenched themselves behind frontier regulations for trade and travel which constitute a considerable drawback to the free economic development of Europe as a whole. The attempted determination of all small nationalities, doomed to certain failure in a majority of cases, has led to the delineation of many frontiers, which will probably only disappear when future wars have taken place, and for which they will have been partially responsible. The formation of a United States of Europe, comprising a large part of that continent, would have been a more useful and practical ideal to have worked towards than the subdivision of that same territory into a lot of small and necessarily quarrelsome independencies.

The serious difficulty confronting any attempt on the part of a British and American partnership to exert its influence over the affairs of the world would be the fact that nearly all the white people other than those in the British Empire and the United States are 'massed together in the numerous political divisions of the continent of Europe. Were these

political entities scattered about, as are the component parts of the British Empire, the problem would be comparatively easy of solution. They could be dealt with independently one after the other. Massed together as they are they possess at least an appearance of greater strength than they really have, and the peoples of these countries on the European continent derive an importance in their own eyes which complicates the problem of bringing them into peaceful accord one with the other and with the nations of the English-speaking countries. If it is claimed that the English-speaking peoples are officious, and assuming a responsibility for the affairs of the world which they do not possess and to which they are not entitled, the answer and the justification seems plain enough, for they are the most powerful unit, and their purpose is not one of aggression. The people of no other country or of all the countries of a like language possess a fraction of the power or authority which could be wielded by the countries in which English is spoken. If such a country or countries existed as could wield an equal or superior power then it would be the duty and responsibility of the people of those countries to do what it is claimed should be done by the British Empire and the United States.

It is in the European complex that originate all the problems now faced in the international situation. The relations between France and Germany, between Italy and Greece, between Italy and Jugo-Slavia, between Russia and Poland and several other less important antagonisms in the Near East are the cause of the unrest and uncertainty which now holds the people of all the world in unprofitable state. The people of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, Spain and Portugal are more or less patiently awaiting the outcome of all the din and disturbance with which they are surrounded. The rest of the world is much in the same position, and because of the disturbances kept up by less than 150,000,000 white people, 400,000,000 white people are deprived of their rest at night. It is also probably true that out of the 150,000,000 less than 1,000,000 are really responsible for all the trouble. The other 149,000,000 would undoubtedly be willing and glad to join with the vast majority of their fellow-men in a resumption of a normal everyday state of affairs. "The majority, however, is apparently unaware of its power or lacking the courage to use

it, and allows the extremely small minority to prescribe a continuance of conditions which all agree are thoroughly bad and largely unnecessary.

Taking human nature and conditions as they are to be found, and dealing with the matter under an opportunist policy, the European complex would not be so difficult to handle. The countries of Europe do not form a "bloc." Some of them are hopelessly antagonistic one to the other. They would at no time present a mutual front to a British-American position. It would be found that some of them would eagerly follow any lead offered which promised safety and material progress for their people, and a British-American combine is the only power in the world which could give them this lead with any assurance of stability for the future. The very power of the combination would attract more power, and the logical outcome would be a League of Nations from which no country could afford to be excluded. It is extremely probable that all this could be brought about without the employment of force or even a threat of force. The mere existence of a working partnership between the British Empire and the United States would be a sufficiently strong argument with most other nations in favour of accepting the suggestions or complying with the requests these two might make in their united capacity.

The direct and positive methods employed by Mussolini in handling the foreign relations of Italy have been approved by some people, not because they agreed with his objectives, but because they, in company with millions of their fellow-men, are surfeited with the cowardice, procrastination and shilly-shallying of modern statesmanship, and to find a man who at least knows what he wants and is not afraid to go after it is an enormous relief. Because of this the actions of Mussolini have escaped much of the criticism which was in reality his due. If the same methods were to be employed to bring peace and prosperity to millions of people now leading bewildered, unhappy and profitless lives by reason of the political conditions oppressing them, instead of being used in bullying weak nations into compliance with the extravagant, selfish and unreasonable demands, an excuse might be found for them.

## CHAPTER XXVII

### WHAT CAN BE DONE

**W**HAT could be accomplished in the end in matters of world-wide application by a British-American partnership is of course largely a matter of conjecture, and the subject invites controversy. Each person who gave the matter any thought would be influenced by temperament, environment, nationality, and the state of knowledge of world conditions possessed. A universal agreement would be too much to expect at this stage of affairs. It is possible, however, to begin with a move of epoch-making importance, and that is to arrange a British-American entente such as would be equivalent to a partnership in all external matters of mutual interest. Opinion may vary as to whether this could be brought about, and it does ; but as to its possible importance to the English-speaking peoples and as to its possible beneficent influence upon the affairs of all the world there can be no controversy. It speaks for itself, politically, socially and economically, and no British or American citizen can advance an argument against it worthy of serious consideration.

All the objections that can be made will be found to be based upon the narrower form of nationalism, personal prejudice or antagonisms, or a deep-rooted conservatism which hesitates at undertaking something as yet quite unknown to international relations. All forms of international alliances or agreements other than this have been tried and have failed to accomplish more than the immediate objective. The conventional arrangement has never been made for other purposes than that of joint defence or aggression and in all cases in the hope of maintaining a superior balance of force as opposed to some other force, single or combined, regarded as inimicable. The beginning of any real international league organised for purely beneficent purposes must be an agreement between the British Empire and



the United States. Let follow what may, there can be no valid objection on the part of any other nation to such an agreement, with all its objects known to the world and guaranteed by the parties thereto not to be for the purpose of aggrandisement at the expense of others. It would, in brief, be a matter which in its actual accomplishment concerned only the British and American peoples. It would not imply any commercial favouritism or reciprocal trade concessions, hence would not conflict with any "favoured nation" agreements. There would be no discrimination against any other country, its activities, or its people. In a sense it would be as much a personal matter between the two nations as would a similar agreement between two individuals who agreed to cast their lot together within the limits set by moral, national and international laws for their own personal benefit and that of those with whom they might come in contact.

It is possible that the recent interpretation of what the so-called Monroe Doctrine means to the United States as made by Mr Hughes, the American Secretary of State, would suggest what a close British-American entente might mean to the two nations in their relations to each other and their joint attitude towards other nations. Mr Hughes has said that the Monroe Doctrine and its application to the affairs of the Western Hemisphere is the business of the United States in which other countries have no share. He said that the United States reserves to itself the "definition, interpretation and application of the Monroe Doctrine." The mere fact that some of the South American republics, through their Governments or Press, may resent this attitude is immaterial. The United States has no designs upon them, whatever they may think, and in the protective strength of the United States, which is unchallenged in Europe, they have a guarantee of being able to work out their destinies without interference. What these destinies may be it is not difficult to say, for no one of these Central or South American countries, or any combination of these countries, will become what is known as a first-class world-power, at least within a period of time which brings the possibility within the range of twentieth-century statesmanship.

Mr Hughes declared specifically that the Monroe Doctrine does not attempt to establish a protectorate over the South

American States, and significant to the discussion of American foreign relations was his statement that it did not stand in the way of wider international co-operation. Under this policy the United States already has the entire Western Hemisphere under its influence and, to a certain extent, under its control. From a vast part of this territory it not only exacts no tribute, or even exercises any rights, but regards with complacency its government by alien powers. It is a negative attitude of great value to the peace of half the world, and it only becomes positive when that peace is threatened from outside sources, as has been demonstrated on several occasions since 1823. On one occasion the British Government learned something as to what the Monroe Doctrine meant to the American people, and President Cleveland's pronouncements over the Venezuelan dispute met with instant support from the whole nation, regardless of political affiliations. The intervention of the United States in the affairs of Cuba, Haiti and Santo Domingo, and the meticulous care with which the United States Government considered the matter of a recognition of a Government in Mexico, abstaining at the same time from armed intervention into an almost unbearable situation, throw considerable light upon the character of this important tenet of American foreign policy when in action.

Add to the Western Hemisphere that part of the world dominated by the British Empire and its influence, and let the two Governments speak as one, and what Power or Powers now or yet to be could successfully oppose a British-American mandate in international affairs. Perhaps in the principles which underlie this American Monroe Doctrine, its entirely beneficent purposes and their application may be found the suggestion for a successful and enduring British-American partnership which would lead inevitably in time to ever greater things—perhaps even to that much-discussed, long-dreamed-of and ideal League of Nations which, according to some, is to rid the earth of the principal cause of the sufferings of mankind *en masse*. As suggested, the only obstacle to such a partnership being able to give a practical guarantee that there would be no more war of magnitude is that highly developed, closely populated and politically subdivided area known as Western Continental Europe. In this congested area live practically all of

the most powerful nations other than the British and American. For centuries past they have warred with each singly and in varying groups. They are of different origins, and more or less of incompatible temperaments, and yet the mass of the population in all these nations is just as peacefully inclined as the populations of the United States and the British Empire. It is in the relations of this Continental group to the suggested British-American entente that lies the answer as to whether the British and American people would be compelled to rest content with this accomplishment, or would be able to extend the principles thus employed to include in their operations the Continental nations. To employ force against them is not what is wanted. For them to employ force successfully against the combined strength of the British and American nations would not be practicable from their point of view or a physical possibility. It is also highly improbable that the nations of the Continent would be able to harmonise their interests or their characteristics sufficiently to form a solid "bloc" against the English-speaking peoples.

It is not suggested that a British-American entente would solve the question for all time or for all peoples, but that it would have more influence towards bringing stability to the world's affairs than anything else short of a real and effective league of all the nations supported wholeheartedly by each and every member is apparently unquestionable. That it would be a tremendous stride towards an ideal situation is obvious. That it lies within the power of the English-speaking people to take this stride must be admitted. That it is more possible to arrange this suggested British-American partnership than to bring off any other combination of states for a similar purpose is evident and is inherent in present and visible contacts, sympathies, and the existing ties of language, race, reciprocal need one of the other, economic independence, and ideals and purposes common to both peoples. To accomplish anything that will lead to greater stability in international relations is difficult in any case, but in view of this great need of humanity that something be done in this direction it becomes an obligation upon those who have the greatest power to labour unceasingly for results. In crossing an unexplored mountain range the low pass between the hills is sought—in other words the line of least resistance.

The line of least resistance in international affairs to-day is a working arrangement between the British Empire and the United States. The obstacles in the path are largely self-created—nationalism, fear, prejudices, largely obsolete impressions, traditions and reservations, and a modicum of mutual jealousy. None of the obstacles is economic or social, or, in other words, tangible.

If the real obstacles were tangible they could be disposed of much easier than can these intangible difficulties. It may be said they are too real and too much in evidence to be considered as intangible. That they do have the appearance of tangibility is admitted, but in a way they are as the reasons of a sceptic for not accepting the faith, for when he is converted they fade away until the fact that they once existed appears almost incredible. Originating in the domain of argument and not of fact, it is possible they can be made to disappear as does the writing from a sponged slate. That it would take courage and initiative on the part of a statesman of prominence and power in either Great Britain or the United States to take this as his great cause and concentrate upon it is true. It would take greater political courage to do this in the United States than it would in Great Britain. In the latter country, when a public man of authority is disapproved of he may be retired for the moment from governmental activity, but should he so desire he can remain permanently before the people and continue his propaganda along lines he has chosen. It is even possible that although he may advocate something which does not meet with majority approval at the time, he may still remain in the public service, giving of his abilities along other lines. This may be true, especially if in his public activities he has no power to put into effect the particular course he advocates, but which does not meet with public approval.

In the United States, if a public man strongly advocated some national or international move contrary to the approval of the public he would almost inevitably be retired at the first opportunity given the voters. Once retired his prestige and influence would disappear. He would in fact have been sunk without trace. Political opportunism and ambition stand in the way therefore in the United States of a successful or even a powerful advocacy of a cause which, even if it be not

unpopular, the people are not ready for or place as minor to other questions at issue. The American statesman may argue to himself more or less logically that if he takes an unpopular stand and sacrifices himself upon the altar of an idea, no matter how good it may be, or how strongly he may believe in it, he may be wasting his time, killing himself politically, and doing the cause no good. It is this opportunism in life, and especially in public life, which smothers the fire of the crusader which is in the heart of every leader of men who is worthy of their confidence and support.

This leaves the matter largely in the hands of the Press and the publicists, and unfortunately the Press, daily or periodical, is for business reasons often compelled to avoid taking sides in a matter of controversy. Publicists who ride a hobby are accused of being paid propaganda agents. Some are and some are not, but they are generally classed together by the public, and even by editors who are asked to consider their work. The average man cannot understand why anyone should devote himself to the furtherance of a single idea unless there is some personal gain to be achieved by such activity. The British get considerable free publicity however in the American Press, and this is reciprocated by the British Press, with its considerable publicity for America and American affairs. Notwithstanding a general impression to the contrary, the character of the publicity given the British by the American Press is of a more desirable character on the whole than that given to America in Great Britain. This is especially true of the past five years, and, as before stated, it has served a good purpose in improving British-American relations.

A few years ago the late Professor Benjamin Kidd wrote a book called *The Science of Power*. It is one of the most interesting and significant books of its kind ever written, and it suggests a method which can be successfully and legitimately employed to bring two great nations together as it has been employed in the past either to keep them apart or to bring them to a state of war against each other. The method employed is, to put the matter briefly, one of suggestion, and the wonderful results which can be achieved were shown in the German system of before the war, which resulted in practically every man, woman and child in Germany believing with the faith of fanatics that

the day was coming when the German Empire would smash the ring of alleged enemies sitting on her frontiers and reign supreme over all the countries of the world. The system, however, was not made in Germany. It was employed in Great Britain so far as was possible to prepare the people mentally for a war against Germany. The same system was employed successfully, though not so thoroughly, to bring about the war between the United States and Spain in 1898.

It has also been used, largely unconsciously however, to create an anti-British feeling in the United States, and it has been in operation in that country to this end for one hundred and fifty years at least. Through books, lectures, music, the schools, the playhouse, and through all like channels which feed the mind from earliest youth, the work was carried on, gaining momentum as it went and helped along by those who were interested in having it make headway. When the war of 1914 began a reaction was setting in. It had begun to look foolish to sensible men. The Irish and the Germans did their best to revive the work however, and succeeded for a time to a certain degree. When America came into the war it was held in abeyance through popular emotion, and when the war ended the Germans no longer had reason to create British-American antagonism, and the Irish question was shortly afterwards largely removed as an irritant from American social and political life.

The almost immediate result of these phenomena was a slump in the anti-British influence throughout the United States, and those who had long realised the folly and even criminality of this insidious propaganda, carried on in many instances by people unaware of its origin, its real meaning and its possible results, were able to make their voices heard.

It will take many years, however, to counteract effectively the work that has been done in the years now past. The recent war and its reactions have helped amazingly to speed up the needed reconstruction of the personal relations of the British and American peoples, and this is at least one great good which has come out of the greatest evil recorded in history. The science of power lies in making an impression on the minds of the young, not only of adolescent youth, but of the child from the early days of its intelligence, and continuing and

emphasising this impression through the formative years. It may be said, therefore, that the real future of British-American relations lies with the parents, more notably the mothers, and with the teachers who guide the efforts of American youth along the educational way.

Alliances of peoples are not made in a day ; and although the process may appear involved, and even circuitous, it is the only one which starts at the very beginning of things and carries on through a process of mental evolution until the objective is achieved. The tendencies of the system which prevailed for so long were all towards evil. The purposes of that suggested are entirely beneficent, and the objective is desired of all men, regardless of nationality, who have hope and faith as to the outcome of the great experiment of creating an evolutionary human being. No matter how closely the Governments of two countries may appear to have come together, unless the people of the two nations are behind this approachment it will possess but temporary value at the best.

The Governments of the British Empire and the United States are doing their best to set the pace for the nations behind them, and much has been accomplished. This in turn has reacted upon the peoples with admirable effect. The reason these Governments are ahead of the nations is that the men responsible for these Governments possess mentalities far above the average of the nations to which they belong. They see more than do most of the people, and they look farther ahead. Theirs also is the responsibility, and it is nearly always irresponsibility which makes trouble between nations as well as between individuals. These Governments cannot go farther, however, than the people will let them go, and even some of the work already done has found critics of no mean power whose following is large. This is more manifestly the case in the United States than in the British Empire, because of the closer contact of the United States Government with the nation, on which it rests, than is the case with the British. The British Government can act, and does often so act, without consulting the nation, and stands or falls by its work. The United States Government must consult the nation before it acts, and shape its course, according to the popular verdict. As Dr Nicholas Murray Butler said in a recent lecture delivered in England : " It would

be accurate and more convincing to say, not that sovereignty is divided between the nation and the states, but that the sovereign power—namely, the people of the United States—had divided its delegated authority between national and state organisations of Government.” He was speaking more especially of the power of Government in the United States and its origin under a system of federation, but the same idea applies to everything done by the American people as a nation speaking through its constitutional mouthpiece. This includes practically every function of Government, some of which in other countries also constitutionally governed are only remotely referable to the popular will.

It is the logical destiny of the British Empire and the United States to draw ever closer together in the discharge of their international activities and responsibilities. That this is desirable is apparently largely agreed upon by the two peoples, individual opinion only differing as to the pace of the approach and the ultimate degree of affiliation. Every joint action taken by the two nations hastens the day; every tie that is created or mutual interest acquired quickens the growing understanding of each other. If the imagination of the two peoples is allowed free play with the future possibilities of a British-American partnership, it will be realised that this is the only possible way in which the ideals and ambitions of both nations in their international activities can be even partially realised.









